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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
With this research the relevant provisions relating to the establishment of a minimum age 
for criminal capacity in the International Instruments will be highlighted and explained. An 
overview of the recent developments on the topic of criminal capacity in Australia, the 
United Kingdom and Hong Kong will be furnished and a limited illustration on how this 
concept is being dealt with by their Courts will also be furnished. 
 
Furthermore, the issue of criminal capacity and the presumption of criminal incapacity 
applicable to children between the ages of 7 and 14 years are described.  The present 
position in South Africa’s criminal justice system, the practical implementation and 
assessment of the concept of criminal capacity of children by our Courts and the statistics 
of children under the age of 14 year in prison over the past 5 years will be discussed and 
furnished.  
 
The proposed provisions in the Child Justice Bill, 2002 regarding the codification of the 
common law relating to criminal capacity of children, the presumption of doli incapax and 
the evaluation of criminal capacity in children will be discussed. A practical illustration 
where the criminal capacity of a child offender aged 12 years where decided upon by the 
Court will be furnished. Other important factors, that should also be taken into account 
when assessing and deciding on the criminal capacity of children will be identified and 
discussed. 
 
Issues linked to criminal capacity, that might pose problems in this regard will be 
highlighted and solutions will be offered, where relevant. 
 
 2
The approaches of the various professionals involved with children in conflict with the law, 
regarding the issue of criminal capacity and the assessment thereof will also be analyzed 
and described. 
 
All of the above will be implemented – where applicable – to develop a model for 
adjudicators to access the criminal capacity of children under South African law. 
 
1.2 Methodological Foundation 
 
1.2.1 Goal of the Research Project and Guiding Principle 
 
With this research the present position in  South Africa’s criminal justice system regarding 
the minimum age for criminal capacity, the common law presumption of doli incapax 
applicable to children between the ages of  7 and 14 years, is described and it is explained 
how this concept is being dealt with in the Courts. The important factors to be taken into 
account when doing an assessment on the criminal capacity of a child will be highlighted 
and the views of a selected group of the various professions (social workers, lawyers, 
criminologists and psychologists) on the issue of criminal capacity and the assessment 
thereof will be discussed to ascertain whether there is any difference in their approach to 
the issue of criminal capacity and to ascertain their informed opinions regarding doli 
incapax and related issues.  A further goal of the research is to determine if there are any 
relevant criminological contributions or insights that can be added to this judicial concept of 
criminal (in)capacity of children. 
 
The guiding principles of the research were twofold:  In the first place it was to look for 
differences and similarities between the views of the selected professionals.  In the second 
place it was to look for cues from them to enhance the existing judicial position on doli 
incapax.  
 
1.2.2 Rationale 
 
Since the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 by 
South Africa on 16 June 1995, our country became obliged to comply with the various 
provisions in the said Convention. One of these provisions (Article 40(3)(a)) includes the 
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establishment of a minimum age below which children should be presumed not to have the 
capacity to infringe the penal law.  In terms of the common law in South Africa, all children 
under the age of 7 years are irrebuttably presumed to be doli incapax and can therefore 
never be prosecuted. Children between the ages of 7 – 14 years are rebuttably presumed 
to be doli incapax and if any such child is to be prosecuted, the prosecution must prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the child offender had the required criminal capacity at the 
time of committing the crime. The issue is now in the process of being included in 
legislation in the form of the Child Justice Bill, 2002 and therefore a closer look into the 
assessment and establishment of criminal capacity of juvenile offenders between the ages 
of 10-14 years are necessary. The role of the relevant professionals, including 
criminologists, in this regard also needs to be investigated and highlighted. 
 
1.2.3 Delimitation 
 
Regarding literature, the focus was exclusively on the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 
51 of 1977); Child Justice Bill, 2002 (Bill 49 of 2002) and International Legal Instruments.  
All the above and other relevant and applicable research articles and books available on 
the research topics are listed in the bibliography.   
 
Furthermore, the empirical part of the research was limited to professionals working in the 
field of crimes committed by children and who, according to the knowledge of the 
researcher, are well-informed regarding doli incapax and the applicable related issues.  
Because the empirical data are limited to the views of selected professionals only, it is 
clear that the data gathered from them can only be generalized as is the case with this 
type of research, to include the universum as explained in paragraph 1.2.4. 
 
The key concepts will be explained in the relevant chapters to indicate the denotation and 
connotation of such terms for the purposes of this research. 
 
1.2.4 The Respondents 
 
Initially, the selection of the respondents was conducted by utilizing the membership list 
received from the South African Professional Society on the Abuse of Children (SAPSAC). 
132 Professionals in the field were selected, out of 160 members on the list, based on the 
specialized field indicated in the membership list as lawyers, social workers, criminologists 
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and psychologists. During the pilot study, it became clear that police officials would not 
respond. One senior police official commented that police officials are only called on to 
apply the law and therefore are reluctant to give opinions on it. This is why no police 
official was included in the list from the members of SAPSAC.  The rest of the members 
were selected due to the fact that all the professionals selected are in private practice and 
thus well-informed about doli incapax – thus comprising a purposeful sample.  The rest of 
the members are medical professionals, nurses, teachers and other professionals like 
police officials, that were not included in this study.  
 
The questionnaire with 11 open-ended questions was sent to them via e-mail on 11th July 
2005 and 29th September 2005.  To secure appointments with them would pose a problem 
and some of them stay in provinces far away from Gauteng, posing time, financial and 
logistical problems. Therefore, e-mail was used. 
 
However, this posed a problem. The problems in securing responses included the fact that 
some of the e-mail addresses on the membership list were incomplete, the addresses 
changed, the recipients were unavailable for a period of time due to long leave and some 
of the e-mails were undeliverable due to service provider problems. Furthermore, various 
professionals did not furnish an e-mail address to be included into the membership list.  
Another problem was that 54 of the professionals did not furnish their e-mail addresses 
with a result that only 78 e-mails were sent out to the selected group of 132. Of this group 
of 78, 29 e-mails were returned undeliverable due to the fact that the user is unknown or 
the unavailability of the mailbox, reducing the response group to 49. Of the remaining 49, 
two responded via automatic response that they are on long leave, one indicated that she 
did not feel competent to complete the questionnaire and one resigned.  Therefore the 
final group consisted of 47 only. 
 
For the purposes of this research the universum is 49 of which 17 (34,69 percent) 
responded with completed questionnaires.  Seaberg (De Vos 2002:200) and Grinnell and 
Williams (De Vos 2002:200) state that in most cases a sample of 10 percent should be 
sufficient. 
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1.2.5 The Research and Data Collection Process 
 
Starting Points 
 
To start off, Kerlinger (De Vos 2002:45) states that scientific work is systematic and 
controlled. This means it is so ordered that investigators can have critical confidence in its 
outcomes. It also means that it is empirical.  Being about empirical refers to the fact that 
the scientist must put his belief to a test outside himself, that is, subjective belief must be 
checked against objective reality. Two basic research styles are available for 
criminologists to ascertain objectivity, namely the quantitative and the qualitative 
approaches. The quantitative works with the ideal of random sampling to ensure 
representativity of the universum and utilized closed-ended questionnaires (Strydom & 
Venter 2002:203–206; Delport 2002:165–196).  The qualitative approach’s approach 
differs significantly from the quantitative approach.  These differences are specifically 
based on how big the samples are and on the data collection techniques.  The samples 
are much smaller and the data collection technique is based on collection styles like 
interviews, participant observation and the like (Strydom 2002:278–290; Greeff 2002:291– 
320).  It is also a well-established fact that the data gathered by means of the qualitative 
approach cannot be generalized. 
 
Data Collection  
 
The data collection technique that was chosen for the purposes of this research was 
based on the quantitative approach and a sample of 34,69 percent of the universum could 
be secured.  A semi-structured questionnaire with open-ended questions was utilized and 
the data was collected by means of e-mail. 
 
It should also be remembered that this research is explorative by nature.  As far as it could 
be ascertained, doli incapax has not yet been researched in Criminology by a South 
African criminologist.  Therefore the research is explorative.  The semi-structured interview 
schedule was utilized due to the fact that the research is limited to doli incapax and related 
issues only. 
 
The first stage of the research consisted of literature research. The literature research was 
used to systemize the research report into chapters and to compile the questionnaire.  
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The Structure of the Questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire consisted of 11 questions, which followed cues of the literature relating 
to criminal capacity, the assessment thereof, the position regarding this issue in Australia, 
the United Kingdom and Hong Kong and the provision in the proposed Child Justice Bill, 
2002.  The questionnaire that was used is attached as an addendum. 
 
1.2.6 Compilation of the Report 
 
To secure a logical train of thought, this research report is compiled as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 highlights the various International Instruments furnishing guidelines regarding 
the establishment of a minimum age for criminal capacity and the interpretation thereof, 
the developments regarding criminal capacity since 1998 in Australia, United Kingdom and 
Hong Kong  are discussed and these countries’ implementation thereof.  
 
Chapter 3 deals with a brief history of the concept of criminal capacity, the present position 
in our criminal justice system regarding the minimum age for criminal capacity, the 
presumption of doli incapax applicable to the children between the ages of 7 and 14  years 
and to illustrate how the Courts deal with this issue. Statistics on children under 14 years 
in prison over the past 5 years are also furnished.  
 
Chapter 4 deals with the proposed provisions in the Child Justice Bill, 2002, the 
introduction of the Child Justice Bill, 2002 in Parliament, the deliberations and the present 
status of the Child Justice Bill, 2002. The issue of criminal capacity as provided for in the 
Child Justice Bill, 2002 and the provisions relating to the evaluation of criminal capacity in 
children are also discussed.  
 
Chapter 5 gives a practical illustration of a case where the criminal capacity of a child 
offender was considered by the Court and decided upon on the merits and facts of the 
case. Other important factors that should also be taken into account when assessing the 
criminal capacity are highlighted.  
 
 In Chapter 6 other important issues linked to criminal capacity are discussed and possible 
problems are highlighted and some solutions are offered.  
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Chapter 7 contains the findings, conclusions and recommendations of this report. 
 
1.3 Summary 
 
In this chapter the reader was introduced to the research topic and the methodological 
foundation. Therefore attention was given to the goal, rationale and delimitation of the 
research. 
 
In the next chapter the relevant provisions relating to criminal capacity in the International 
Instruments protecting the rights of children will be highlighted. A comparative study on the 
different approaches of Australia, the United Kingdom and Hong Kong on the issue of 
criminal capacity will also be conducted.  
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CHAPTER 2  
 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND COMPARATIVE STUDY ON CRIMINAL 
CAPACITY IN AUSTRALIA, UNITED KINGDOM AND HONG KONG 
 
2.1 Introduction 
  
In this chapter the general guidelines for the establishment of a minimum age for criminal 
capacity, as provided for in the International Instruments will be highlighted. A brief 
summary of the different approaches on the issue of criminal capacity and the practical 
interpretation thereof in Australia, the United Kingdom and Hong Kong will also be 
furnished. These countries were chosen because all of them recently investigated the 
issue of criminal capacity of children and made some changes to the laws governing the 
criminal capacity of children, and because the law relating to the criminal capacity of 
children was and is in some instances still similar to our law in this regard. The law relating 
to the criminal capacity of children before it was reconsidered will be furnished for each 
country, the reasons why the law was reconsidered will be summarized and the current 
position will be highlighted. 
 
2.2 International Instruments 
 
Van Bueren (1995:173) points out that one of the basic principles enshrined in 
international law is that the concept of criminal responsibility should be related to the age 
at which children are able to understand and appreciate the consequences of their actions.   
 
Article 40(3)(a) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (1989:16) provides as 
follows :  
 
“State Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and 
institutions specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused of, or recognised as 
having infringed the penal law, and, in particular: 
 
(a) The establishment of a minimum age below which children shall be presumed not to 
have the capacity to infringe the penal law;” 
 
 9
 When establishing minimum ages for criminal capacity, the United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (1985:4) (hereinafter referred to 
as the Beijing Rules) endeavour to provide guidance for States when exercising their 
discretion. Skelton (1996:186) explains that although the Beijing Rules, 1985 were written 
before the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, a number of the fundamental 
principles have been incorporated into the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 
Beijing Rules are expressly referred to in the preamble of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. 
 
Rule 4 of the Beijing Rules provides that “In those legal systems recognizing the concept 
of the age of criminal responsibility for juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be 
fixed at too low an age level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual 
maturity.”  
 
In the Commentary to the Beijing Rules (1985:4) it is stated that “…. the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility differs widely owing to history and culture. The modern approach 
would be to consider whether a child can live up to the moral and psychological 
components of criminal responsibility; that is, whether a child, by virtue of his/her individual 
discernment and understanding, can be held responsible for essentially antisocial 
behaviour. If the age of criminal responsibility is fixed too low or if there is no lower age 
limit at all, the notion of responsibility would become meaningless. In general, there is a 
close relationship between the notion of responsibility for delinquent or criminal behaviour 
and other social rights and responsibilities. Efforts should therefore be made to agree on a 
reasonable lowest age limit that is applicable internationally.” 
 
Van Bueren (1995: 173) indicates that the Beijing Rules links the establishment of a 
minimum age below which children should be presumed not to have criminal capacity to 
infringe the penal law, to the child’s development and maturity. 
 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990:6) in Article 17.4 also 
deals with the establishment of a minimum age for criminal capacity. South Africa ratified 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child on 18 November 1999. 
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Article 17.4 provides: “There shall be a minimum age below which children shall be 
presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law.” The wording is in all material 
aspects the same as those in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989. 
 
The United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (1990) 
and the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh 
Guidelines) (1990) are not discussed since no reference is made to the concept of criminal 
capacity. 
 
The UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre (1999:4) also points out that there is no clear 
international standard regarding the age at which responsibility can be reasonably imputed 
to a child and indicates that the disparities in the minimum age for criminal responsibility 
from one country to another are astounding.   This fact is borne out by the following: 
 
 At present there is wide disparity in the minimum age for criminal capacity, not only 
globally, but even within the same Continent. Van Bueren (1995:173) refers to Europe 
where criminal responsibility begins at 7 years in Ireland, at 14 years in the Ukraine, and at 
15 years in Sweden. Such a range raises the question whether children mature at such 
different paces even within the same Continent.   
 
In the USA different States have adopted different ages for criminal responsibility, with the 
lowest reportedly being 10 years (Burchell & Milton 1991:200). Burchell and Milton 
(1991:200) states that in England children less than 10 years of age are not criminally 
responsible and in Germany the limit is 14 years of age (Burchell & Hunt 1997:158).  In 
certain countries, for example the Netherlands and Belgium, there is no fixed age below 
which children are criminally unaccountable (Labuschagne 1978:265; 2001: 199; Van den 
Wyngaert 1993:1). 
 
Progress of Nations (1997:8) states the in at least 15 countries, 7 year old children can be 
held responsible for criminal actions. 
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2.3 Criminal Capacity in Australia  
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
Australia, an island as well as a continent consists of six states and two territories. As of 
July 1995 it had a population of approximately 18.3 million inhabitants (Atkinson 1997:29). 
Urbas (2000:2) points out that most prosecutions of children under the age of 15 in 
Australia are for property offences. Killing by children in this age group are relatively rare. 
Children tend to commit crimes in groups (often with older juveniles or adults) rather than 
alone and there is anecdotal evidence of deliberate use of children below the age of 
criminal responsibility in organised thefts. 
 
According to the New South Wales Commission for Children and Young People (1999:2) 
“…. the laws applicable to children in the earliest stages of Australia’s colonial 
development were the laws of England. Children who committed offences were tried in the 
same Courts as adults and were generally subject to the same penalties. There were no 
special measures of dealing with them. The most important concessions which the English 
law made to children were expressed in two common law presumptions. There was the 
irrebuttable presumption that a child under the age of 7 years was incapable of committing 
a crime and a rebuttable presumption to the same effect regarding children between the 
ages of 7 and 14 years of age. During the nineteenth century it was accepted that the 
presumption as to capacity applied regardless of the type of offence charged” (Bennion 
2001:2). 
 
All the Australian states gradually gave statutory form to the irrebuttable presumption 
regarding children under the age of 7 years. Most states rose the age of criminal 
responsibility to 10 years (New South Wales Commission for Children and Young People 
1999:2; Bennion 2001: 2). 
   
The Australian Law Reform Commission (1997:4) recommended that the age of criminal 
responsibility in all Australian jurisdictions should be 10 years and that Tasmania and the 
Australian Capital Territory should enact legislation to this effect since the age of criminal 
responsibility was 7 and 8 years in these two jurisdictions respectively. 
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2.3.2 Statutory Minimum Age 
 
Urbas (2000:1–6) points out that at present in all Australian jurisdictions the statutory 
minimum age of criminal responsibility is 10 years. Between the ages of 10 and 14 years, 
a rebuttable presumption (doli capax) operates to deem a child between these ages 
incapable of committing a criminal act. Only if the prosecution can rebut this presumption, 
by showing that the accused child was able at the relevant time adequately to distinguish 
between right and wrong, can a contested trial result in a conviction (New South Wales 
Attorney-General’s Department 2000:2). 
 
As indicated above, in terms of the common law the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility, often called the age of discretion, was 7 years. However, the harshness of 
criminal penalties imposed on convicts made it clear that further protections such as the 
doli incapax presumption were needed. The doli incapax presumption survives in all the 
Australian jurisdictions either in statutory form (Commonwealth, Australian Capital 
Territory, Tasmania, Northern Territory, Western Australia and Queensland) or as part of 
the common law (New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria) (Urbas 2000:3). 
 
Urbas (2000:4) states that “… several basic propositions have been recognised by the 
Courts governing the operation of doli incapax.  The first is that evidence adduced to show 
that a child had sufficient appreciation of the wrongness of an act must be strong and clear 
beyond all doubt and contradiction. The second is that such evidence must not consist 
merely of evidence of acts amounting to the offence itself. To these may be added the 
requirement that the evidence must show the accused to have appreciated that the act in 
question was seriously wrong as opposed to something merely naughty or mischievous”. 
 
The Supreme Court of Queensland Court of Appeals, in the matter of R v Folling: Ex Parte 
A-G 1998QCA97 looked at the test for evidence which must be applied to rebut the 
presumption of doli incapax. In this matter, the accused was charged with the following 
offences:  assault with the intent to do bodily harm, breaking and entering with the intent to 
commit that offence, and armed robbery. The evidence adduced at the trial and relied on 
by the prosecution to prove that the accused had the capacity, at the time of the 
commission of the alleged, to know that he ought not to commit those acts was the 
following: firstly, evidence of circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, 
secondly evidence of a false alibi given by the accused, and thirdly, evidence of his 
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educational standard together with the proximity of his age to that of 15 years.  The 
evidence of events of the second charge proved that the accused and another young 
person entered the victim’s house in the early evening whilst he was asleep, woke him, 
assaulted him, demanded drugs from him, bound and blindfolded him.  One of the 
offenders, it is not clear who, cut the complainant’s telephone cord before leaving.  In the 
course of a video recorded interview with the police, the accused said that he was in 
another suburb with some people whom he named from about three o’clock on the 
afternoon that the incident took place, until well after the time that the offences of that day 
were committed.  He denied being at the victim's house on that night.  It may be accepted 
for the purpose of this instance that his alibi was false.  Finally the prosecution relied on 
evidence of the accused’s educational qualifications.  He was educated to Grade 9 
standard and in addition he had done some other educational programmes which appear 
to be trade programmes; instruction in the use of laser machinery and nickelling 
machinery. The prosecution did not rely on the video recording of the accused’s interview 
with the police in order to show his level of comprehension and maturity and consequently 
the relevant capacity. The Court stated that the prosecution can call evidence in order to 
rebut the presumption, or draw inferences from: 
 
(i) the accused’s age and education; 
 
(ii) false denials of the accused, admitted without objection which asserts a false alibi; 
and 
 
(iii) the surrounding circumstances of the offence included rendering the complainant 
incapable of identifying the perpetrator and/or summoning assistance during the 
commission of the offence. 
 
The Court again reaffirmed that evidence of the accused’s age alone cannot rebut the 
presumption, but must be considered together with evidence of the accused’s education, 
the surrounding circumstances of the offence, and with observation of the accused’s 
speech and demeanor.  However, the Court noted that the older the accused and the more 
obviously wrong the conduct, the easier it would be for the prosecution to rebut the 
presumption (New South Wales Commission for Children and Young People 1999:27). 
The Court also stated that the prosecution is permitted to lead evidence, to rebut the 
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presumption, of previous dealings with the police and also that of previous convictions (R 
V Folling (supra); New South Wales Attorney-General’s Department 2000:2). 
 
Urbas (2000:1-6) points out that “….. it has been observed that in attempting to rebut the 
presumption of doli incapax, the prosecution is allowed considerable evidentiary 
concessions whereby normally inadmissible, highly prejudicial material is deemed 
admissible.  Often this evidence takes the form of admissions by the accused during police 
interviews, notably including admissions in relation to earlier acts of misconduct. Evidence 
of previous criminality is rarely admissible to prove an issue in a criminal trial. However, in 
relation to doli incapax such evidence is regularly admitted to prove criminal capacity.  
Even where an accused makes no admission showing a consciousness of wrongdoing, 
the prosecution may introduce evidence of surrounding circumstances from which such 
consciousness may be inferred. This may include evidence of attempts to run from the 
police or to hide facts. In more serious cases, expert psychiatric assessment of a child’s 
mental development may be conducted”.  
 
According to Bradley (2003:9) in reality, the presumption is rarely pleaded.  This is 
because under the operation of the rules of evidence, it works to the disadvantage of the 
juvenile when compared with an adult defendant. As indicated above, considerable 
evidentiary concessions have been allowed by the Courts. 
 
Cashmore (2000:2) also states that the defence of doli incapax is often not raised by 
defence lawyers, especially in rural areas, but there are no figures to indicate how often it 
is raised or how often it is successful. However, it is only applicable where the child pleads 
not guilty and 80-90 percent of children plead guilty. There is no evidence therefore that 
the existence of the presumption prevents most children from being held criminally liable 
for their actions in New South Wales.   
 
In the case of The Queen v M 1977(16)SASR589 the Court stated that the rule excluding 
evidence of past misbehaviour yields when that evidence is relevant to prove one or more 
of the elements of the crime in issue. In this case the accused, who was 12 years of age, 
murdered a younger boy by hitting him on the head with a brick. The accused then 
concealed the body and misled searchers who were looking for the boy. The accused was 
questioned by police about this and other matters, including assaults on other children, 
stealing, arson and breaking and entering. The accused told police that he knew that in 
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committing those prior offences he was doing seriously wrong acts.  Most juveniles admit 
guilt regardless of available defences. Yet where doli incapax is in issue, a pre-court police 
interview has gravity beyond that experienced by an adult defendant (Bradley 2003:9). To 
illustrate this point further Bradley (2003: 9) notes that both the nature of the alleged 
offence and the defendant’s conduct upon apprehension have been used to demonstrate 
the defendant knew right from wrong.  This generally occurs without the admission of 
defendant-specific psychological testimony.  In the matter of C v DPP 1995(2)WLR383 the 
fact that the defendant ran from the police upon apprehension was sufficient for the 
presumption to be rebutted.  The accused was aged 12 and was seen by police officers 
using a crowbar to tamper with a motorcycle in a private driveway.   
 
Bradley (2003:9) points out that “The testimony of forensic or developmental psychologists 
is rarely tendered when considering doli incapax. In a questionable extension of the 
opinion rule, it is more likely for the prosecution to subpoena the defendant’s 
schoolteacher or parents to give evidence of a moral education. For example a 
schoolteacher might be called, in a case where a child is charged with homicide because 
he/she dropped rocks from a freeway overpass, to give evidence that throwing rocks was 
prohibited in school.” Bradley (2003:9) is of the opinion that “As the primary law 
mechanism for protecting child defendants, doli incapax in its contemporary form, provides 
very limited refuge.  Most importantly for a human rights analysis, doli incapax can provide 
no assistance to the State in meeting its obligation to provide the defendant with a fair trial.  
Doli incapax is not concerned with trial procedures or the capacities of the child in the 
context of criminal adjudication and this is the standard against which the State will be 
judged. More cogent measures are required to compensate for the disadvantaged position 
of child defendants within the criminal justice system.” 
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (1997:5) also points out that doli incapax can be 
problematic for a number of reasons mentioned above, including the fact that the 
prosecution has sometimes been permitted to lead highly prejudicial evidence that would 
ordinarily be inadmissible.  In these circumstances, the principle may not protect children 
but be to their disadvantage. The Australian Law Reform Commission, however, 
considered the principle of doli incapax a practical way of acknowledging young people’s 
developing capacities and indicates that it has the merit of making the police, prosecutors 
and the judiciary stop and think about the degree of responsibility of each individual child.  
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Urbas (2000:5) states that the legislative uniformity recently achieved across Australian 
jurisdictions in relation to the minimum age of criminal responsibility is encouraging.  He 
indicates that further uniformity is possible in relation to the operation (whether in statutory 
or common law form) of the doli incapax presumption.  Whether more radical reform or 
even abandonment of this mechanism is desirable in the longer term, depends to a large 
extent on future assessments of the value of subjecting children and young people to the 
formal imposition of criminal liability and penalties. The Australian Law Reform 
Commission (2001:1) indicates that the age for criminal responsibility has been increased 
to 10 years in the Australian Capital Territory by the Children and Young People Act 1999 
and in Tasmania by the Justice Act 1997. 
 
Bennion (2001:4) is of the opinion that Australian law, with regard to age and criminal 
responsibility, has always taken some account of the different stages of development of 
children.  That is the reason why the rebuttable presumption of doli incapax is still part of 
the Australian law. 
 
Crofts (2003:9) states that “The presumption of doli incapax is a recognition of the 
fundamental nature of childhood, that children are not naturally equipped with an ability to 
understand the wrongfulness of criminal acts but develop this gradually, at different and 
inconsistent rates. The presumption is flexible and practical.  The assumption of absolute 
incapacity for children under ten is an expression of the conviction that they are not ever 
developed enough to be held criminally responsible. For children aged ten but not yet 
fourteen, it is acknowledged that some may be able to form a guilty mind. The presumption 
of incapacity can therefore be rebutted if there is proof to the contrary. This affords 
protection to those who are not developed enough to be criminally responsible while at the 
same time allowing the conviction of those who are able to understand the wrongfulness of 
what they have done. The claim that the presumption is stopping children from being dealt 
with by the Courts must also be put into perspective. Firstly, the rebuttable nature of the 
presumption should be borne in mind and, secondly, there is no evidence that the 
presumption is in fact hindering prosecutions. The objections to the presumption seem to 
be based on a misunderstanding about the nature of the presumption and about its 
practical application.  It may slow down proceedings in requiring the prosecution to 
consider the development of the child, but it does not stop prosecution if there is proof of 
understanding.” The presumption is therefore one of the possible methods of ensuring that 
Australian law complies with Article 40(3)(a) of the United Nations Convention on the 
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Rights of the Child.  It is also in line with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Administration of Juvenile Justice (1985) (Crofts 2003:10). 
 
Mackie (2002:2) argues that a child can still be charged with a criminal offence at a very 
young age and that the presumption rule simply requires the prosecution prove that the 
child involved had the mental capacity to understand what he or she did was wrong, a task 
that is neither onerous nor contentious. 
 
Phillips (2000:1) reports that on 3 December 1999, a New South Wales Supreme Court 
jury in Sydney in the matter of R v LMW (1999)NSWSC1109 rejected a charge of 
manslaughter laid against an 11 year old boy.  The trial followed after the accidental death 
of Corey Davis on 2 March 1998. Davis drowned after being pushed in a local river by the 
boy. According to Phillips (2000:1) the trial was held after Nicholas Cowdery, the NWS 
Labor government’s Director of Public Prosecutions, issued an ex-officio statement 
overruling a Senior Children’s Court Magistrate, who had dismissed manslaughter charges 
against the boy, who was 10 years old at the time of the commission of the offence. One of 
the two expert defence witnesses testified that the boy was intellectually and socially 
immature for his age and was incapable of understanding the consequences of pushing 
the other boy into the river (Phillips (a)1999:1; (b)1999:4; Phillips & Mc Dermid 1999:3). 
 
2.3.3 Excerpts from Case Law 
 
The following are examples of how the Australian Courts have dealt with the issue of doli 
incapax (New South Wales Commission for Children and Young People 1999:28–30; 
Johnston 1999:1-18; Children’s Court Victoria 2005: 1-19; Labuschagne 1997: 168-173). 
 
(i) In the case of R (a child) v Whitty (1993)66A Crim R462 (Supreme Court of Victoria) 
the child defendant had admitted to a police officer that she went into a department store 
and stole a pair of jeans.  It was held that by using the word stole in her admission, no 
other conclusion is reasonably open but that the defendant used it deliberately and 
appropriately and knew what it meant.  Accordingly, she knew what she was doing was 
wrong in terms of her appreciation of the true nature and quality of her act, and this was 
not just reliant on the facts relating to the theft, but also on the admission she had made to 
the police.  In this way, the prosecution successfully rebutted the doli incapax presumption. 
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(ii) In the matter of R v CRH (Unreported No. 60390 of 1996) Supreme Court of NSW 
Court of Criminal Appeal, the 12 year old defendant was charged with two counts of sexual 
assault on his 6 year old cousin. The prosecution sought to rebut the doli incapax 
presumption with evidence that on one of the occasions, the defendant had forced his 
cousin to have oral sex with him in the family lounge room, by forcing her head into his lap.  
Upon hearing a noise, and being disturbed by the cousin’s older sister, the defendant 
pulled a blanket over the cousin’s head. The prosecution relied upon the furtive nature of 
the conduct of the defendant in waking his young cousin in the dead of night, taking her 
into the lounge room, and then seeking to hide his cousin when they were disturbed. The 
prosecution submitted that this indicated knowledge on the part of the defendant that what 
he was doing was particularly wrong. On appeal, it was held that this was not sufficient to 
rebut the doli incapax presumption, as the defendant’s conduct may have revealed nothing 
more than mere embarrassment, as opposed to knowledge that his conduct was wrong. 
 
(iii) In the case of JM (a minor) v Runeckles (1984)79Cr App R 225 Supreme Court of 
Victoria, the 13 year old defendant attacked and stabbed another girl with a broken milk 
bottle.  Her account of events when she was interviewed by the police was not dissimilar to 
that of the victim.  She had gone to the victim’s home, knocked on the door and threatened 
to break in. She then taunted the victim, stabbed her and then ran away.  On her way from 
the attack she was seen by the police, who pursued her. She ran away from them but 
once caught, made admissions. The Court held that evidence of her running away from 
the scene and her statement to the police after her arrest was sufficient to rebut the 
presumption. The Court further held that the prosecution must show that the act was 
seriously wrong and not just something that would invite parental disapproval 
(Labuschagne 1997: 170).   
 
(iv) In the matter of The Queen v M (supra) the 12-year-old defendant was charged with 
murder, following an assault on another child which led to the death of that child.  He had 
been questioned by the police as to offences of stealing, breaking and entering, assault on 
other children, and arson, which had previously been committed by him. He had admitted 
to the police that when committing these offences, he knew he was doing wrong. The 
prosecution was able to lead evidence of the police questioning and the defendant’s 
admissions, to show that the child knew he was doing wrong when he committed the 
assault which led to the death of the other child, and that this successfully rebutted the 
presumption of doli incapax. 
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(v) In K v Rooney (July 1996) unreported Supreme Court of New South Wales, a 12-
year-old defendant was charged with sexual assault of a 10 year old in the poolroom of a 
Juvenile Justice Centre.  The defendant had threatened to assault the 10 year old if he did 
not pull down his pants, and then the defendant proceeded to sexually penetrate the 
victim. The magistrate held that the actions of the defendant were so intrinsically wrong, 
that no further explanation was required by the prosecution in order to rebut the 
presumption.  The Supreme Court subsequently decided that the magistrate was incorrect, 
and that in this case, the presumption had not been successfully rebutted merely by the 
nature of the defendant’s actions. 
 
(vi) In the case of R v ALH (2003)VSCA239 (4 September 2003) the Court dealt with 
whether acts constituting the offences and applicant’s age may be sufficient on their own 
to discharge the onus.  It was held that acts surrounding the offence could be used.  In this 
case, the child offender and victim were siblings. The child offender was charged with two 
counts of indecent assault and two counts of sexual assault/rape occurring on four 
different dates. The age range was from 13 and 8 months, to 12 days before his fourteenth 
birthday.  All four incidents occurred whilst the child offender and his sister were home 
alone.  Their mother and mother’s partner were at alcoholics anonymous. The victim was 
12 years old at the time, described as isolated and vulnerable and cried throughout the 
incidents. The child offender had no prior record. The Court held that acts may be so 
serious, harmful or wrong to properly establish requisite knowledge in the child; others 
may be less obviously serious, harmful or wrong, or may be equivocal, or may be 
insufficient. The correct position is that proof of the act themselves may prove requisite 
knowledge if those acts established beyond reasonable doubt that the child knew that the 
act or acts themselves were seriously wrong.   
 
2.4 Criminal Capacity in the United Kingdom  
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
Britain comprises of Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland) and Northern Ireland.  
Britain is densely populated and has a population of over 59 million people. According to 
Gelsthorpe and Kemp (2002:128) different arrangements exist for dealing with young 
offenders in the three jurisdictions: England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland and 
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the approach of each with regard to the issue of criminal capacity will be dealt with 
individually. 
 
2.4.2 England and Wales 
 
Gelsthorpe and Fenwick (1997:77) point out that under the common law the age of 
criminal responsibility was 7 years until 1933. In England and Wales, juveniles between 7 
and 14 years were presumed incapable of crime and it was for the prosecution to prove 
that they knew that their conduct was wrong. Such proof, however, was usually 
forthcoming. It was felt that sparing the penalties of law merely on account of age would 
have weakened the deterrent force of the law. Accordingly, in the eighteenth and early part 
of the nineteenth century, juveniles accused of crimes were treated as adults at both trial 
and disposition stages – they could be imprisoned or executed. 
 
The age of criminal responsibility was raised to 8 years in 1933 and subsequently to 10 
years in 1963 (Gelsthorpe & Kemp 2002:130). 
 
As a result of Court cases in 1994 and 1995 (most notably the case of V and T v UK 
(2000)Crim LR 187 ECHR wherein Thompson and Venables, aged 10 years were tried for 
killing 2 year old James Bulger) the principles governing the criminal responsibility of 
children between the ages of 10 and 13 years were reviewed.  Children between the 10 
and 13 years were presumed in law to be doli incapax and this presumption had to be 
rebutted by the prosecution before they could be convicted.  In order to rebut the 
presumption, the prosecution had to show beyond all reasonable doubt that the child 
appreciated that what he or she did was seriously wrong as opposed to merely naughty or 
mischievous. Turner (1994:735) points out that in this case, a Home Office forensic 
psychiatrist testified unequivocally that Venables did know the difference between right 
and wrong. Another psychiatrist however testified that she could not say categorically 
whether he did know the difference, but that on the balance of probabilities she thought 
that he did.  
 
Moffatt (2002:45) indicates that both Thompson and Venables were tested extensively and 
found to be of sound mind, suffering no mental illnesses. If the boys had committed the 
crime six months earlier, the law would have supposed that they were incapable of 
formulating wrongful intent, but since both boys had passed their tenth birthday they were 
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tried as adults. Court experts said that the boys fully understood the implications of their 
behavior prior to the crime, but the author argues that this is impossible.  Understanding 
the permanence of death is not an all-or-nothing issue, rather, it is progressive  
 
The judgment in V and T v UK (supra) was delivered on 16 December 1999 by the 
European Court of Human Rights. Thompson and Venables had an average to below 
average intelligence and came from families in which they had suffered great social and 
emotional deprivation (Turner 1994:737).  In 1993 they abducted 2-year-old James Bulger 
from a suburban shopping centre, having previously tried to abduct at least two other 
young children.  They assaulted the child over a four kilometer walk to a railway line, beat 
him to death and left him on the track. The abduction was recorded graphically on a 
security video. The boys’ trial followed when they were 11 years old and both were 
convicted of murder. The Court rejected the United Kingdom Government’s argument that 
the doli incapax presumption provides adequate protection for juvenile defendants.  It drew 
a clear distinction between the boys’ capabilities of crime at common law and the 
standards required in international law. The Court regarded doli incapax as insufficient 
protection for the applicants’ human rights and unsatisfactory in differentiating their 
capabilities from those of adult defendants.  In relation to the age of criminal responsibility 
the Court rejected the applicants’ argument that imposing criminal responsibility on a 10 
year old was itself, a breach of international law (Labuschagne 2001:198; Scott 2005:1-30; 
European Court of Human Rights 1999:1-39). 
 
According to the final report of the Youth Justice Task Force (Home Office 1998:1) the 
majority of the members of the Task Force favoured abolishing the presumption of doli 
incapax in England and Wales on the grounds that it leaves the youth justice system 
unable to deal with some young people who regularly offend. A small minority preferred 
the status quo, on the grounds that abolishing the presumption would leave children 
between the ages of 10 and 14 years open to the full force of the criminal law at a much 
younger age than in many comparable countries where children of this age were below the 
age of criminal responsibility.  
 
In a consultation document (Home Office 1997:1) it is stated that the UK Government 
believes that there is no case for the retaining of the presumption of doli incapax in 
England and Wales. In 1995 the House of Lords recommended that Parliament should 
review this presumption, which had been inconsistently applied and was capable of 
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producing inconsistent results. The arguments for reforming the presumption of doli 
incapax were based on three contentions: that it is archaic, that it is illogical and that it is 
unfair in practice. The doctrine is considered out of date in at least two main aspects.  
First, it assumes not only that a child under 14 is less morally culpable for his or her 
actions than an adult, but that in general, a child under 14 cannot differentiate right from 
wrong.  While it is true that a child’s understanding, knowledge and ability to reason are 
still developing, the notion that the average 10 to 14 year old does not know right from 
wrong seems contrary to common sense in an age of compulsory education from the age 
of 5, when children seem to develop faster both mentally and physically. Secondly, the 
doctrine assumes that children under 14 need special protection from the harshness of 
criminal punishment. At the time the doctrine developed the need for protection was 
undoubted – the death penalty was available for children, for crimes less serious than 
murder. But the criminal law is now very different and for most young offenders, the 
Court’s emphasis is as much on preventing re-offending as on punishment for the crime.  
The presumption is also criticised as illogical.  For a child aged 10 to 14 years to be 
convicted of an offence, the prosecution must rebut the presumption by showing that the 
child knew that what he or she was doing was seriously wrong. In practice, the 
presumption can be rebutted if the prosecution produces evidence that the defendant is of 
normal mental development for his or her age. But the doctrine itself presumes that 
children of that age normally do not know right from wrong, so to rebut the presumption by 
proving the child’s normality is logically inconsistent (Home Office 1997:1). 
 
It is further pointed out that the doctrine is also said to be unfair in practice. It may be 
impossible in some cases for the prosecution to provide the evidence necessary to show 
that a child knew his or her act was seriously wrong. To rebut the presumption, the 
prosecution must produce evidence separate from the facts of the offence – for example, 
of the defendant’s response to police questioning, or reports from his or her teachers.  
Such evidence may simply not be available. Sometimes there may be previous convictions 
which the prosecution wants to use as evidence that the defendant knows right from 
wrong. But this gives rise in turn to legal difficulties over whether previous convictions 
should be admissible in Court.  Accordingly the UK Government believes that the 
difficulties with the doli incapax presumption stop some children who ought to be 
prosecuted from ever appearing in Court. The interests of justice and of the victims of 
crime are not served if cases which ought to come to Court are discontinued because the 
prosecution knows that it will not be able to rebut the presumption of doli incapax.  Nor is 
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such discontinuance in the young offender’s best interests, if it means that the opportunity 
is missed to take appropriate action to prevent re-offending. The UK Government agrees 
that the law should not treat a child in the same way as it treats an adult. But it believes 
that the presumption of doli incapax is wrong in principle and in practice. It believes that 
justice is best served by allowing the Court to take account of the child’s age and maturity 
at the point of sentence, not by binding them to presume that normal children are 
incapable of the most basis moral judgments (Home Office (a)1997:2). Labuschagne 
(1997:173) agrees with the objections raised against the presumption of doli incapax in 
England and predicts that in time all age limits will disappear and criminal liability will 
determined with reference to each individual’s insight and abilities. 
 
Accordingly the UK Government (Home Office 1997:3) had two options for reform namely: 
abolition of the presumption or reversal of the presumption. Firstly the presumption could 
be abolished and this would mean that a child of 12 years, who was accused of a crime, 
would be in the same position as one aged 14 to 17 years. If the offence was one which 
required a particular criminal intent the prosecution would have to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the necessary intent existed. But they would not separately have to 
show that the child knew that what he or she was doing was seriously wrong. Secondly the 
presumption could be reversed and this would mean the Court would start with the 
presumption that a child of 10 years and over but less than 14 years was capable of 
forming criminal intent. But such a child would be acquitted if the defence could prove on a 
balance of probabilities that he or she did not know that what they were doing was 
seriously wrong. If such a defence were made, to secure conviction, the prosecution would 
have to show beyond reasonable doubt that the child did indeed know that the action was 
seriously wrong. The UK Government favoured the first option of abolishment (Home 
Office 1997:2).  
 
Gelsthorpe and Kemp (2002:145) point out that in 1998 this rebuttable presumption was 
repealed by section 34 of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998. Section 34 of the Crime 
Disorder Act, 1998 provides that the rebuttable presumption of criminal law that a child 
aged 10 or over is incapable of committing an offence is hereby abolished.    
 
This provision came into effect on 30 September 1998 and has the effect that children 
between the ages of 10 and 13 years will be treated in the same way as other juveniles 
aged between 14 and 17 years (Home Office 1998). 
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Crofts (2002:84) states that without the presumption of doli incapax there is no regard paid 
to the fact that children are still in the process of maturing at this stage of life and may not 
yet be developed enough to understand the wrongfulness of all criminal acts. 
 
2.4.3 Scotland 
 
The Scottish Law Commission (2002:4) indicates that the position in Scots law with regard 
to criminal responsibility of children below 14 years were uncertain. Children above 14 
years had full capacity and were liable for their actions. During the 19th century it became 
accepted that children below 7 years could not be subjected to criminal punishment though 
there was no definitive statement of this rule as one relating either to mens rea or to 
immunity to prosecution. An important development was the introduction of juvenile Courts 
by the Children Act, 1908 which sought to separate young offenders from adults within the 
criminal justice system. In 1928 a Committee on the treatment of young offenders in 
Scotland made various recommendations designed to bring about modifications on the 
existing system of juvenile Courts. In addition the Committee recommended an alteration 
to the age of criminal responsibility, that the age be raised by statute from 7 years to 8 
years. The effect was that Scots law on this subject was placed on a statutory basis and 
the age raised from 7 to 8 years.  The next stage in the development of the law on age of 
criminal responsibility was the Committee on Children and Young Persons in Scotland, 
chaired by Lord Kilbrandon which reported 1964 (Scottish Law Commission 2002:6). The 
Committee recommended that all juveniles under the age of 16 should in principle be 
removed from the jurisdiction of the criminal Courts. This was subject to the overriding 
discretion of the Crown. The Committee also recommended that any rule of law or 
statutory provision establishing a minimum age of criminal responsibility should be 
repealed. 
 
The bulk of the Kilbrandon Committee’s recommendations were implemented but no effect 
was given to recommendation in respect of the age of criminal responsibility. 
 
Section 41 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995 provides that it shall be 
conclusively presumed that no child under the age of 8 years can be guilty of any offence 
(Scottish Law Commission 2002:7). 
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Section 42(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995 provides that no child under 
the age of 16 may be prosecuted for any offence except on the instruction of the Lord 
Advocate, or at his instance. 
 
In the case of Merrin v S 1987SLT193 the Inner House by a majority held that the referral 
of a child to a children’s hearing on the ground that the child committed an offence, could 
not apply to a child under the age of 8 years (Scottish Law Commission 2001:24). 
 
On 31 October 2000 the Scottish Law Commission (2002:1) received an instruction from 
the Scottish Minister to investigate the age of criminal responsibility and related matters.  
In their final report the Commission (2002:16) recommended the following: 
 
(i) Abolition of the rule in section 41 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995 
that a child under 8 years of age cannot be guilty of an offence, and its common law 
equivalent. 
 
The Scottish Law Commission is of the opinion that with the introduction of the children’s 
hearing system in 1971 and the experience of the workings of that system, there is no 
need for the rule in section 41. The Commission, however, emphasized that it is not a 
consequence of this proposal that children of any age, even children below 8 years, would 
necessarily be liable to criminal prosecution.  Instead their point is that the issue is better 
characterised as one relating to prohibition or restriction on prosecution rather than about 
the capacity to commit crimes. 
 
(ii) Amendment to section 42 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995 by 
providing that a child under 12 years of age cannot be prosecuted. 
 
Include Youth (2002:8) (a non-government organization) states that the age of criminal 
responsibility must be raised significantly and is of the opinion that the Scottish Law 
Commission’s proposal of 12 years is too low as it takes insufficient account of children’s 
different rates of development and the difficult circumstances which many of these children 
have to deal with.  It is proposed that in the best interests of children that the age for 
criminal responsibility be raised to 16 years. 
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The Scottish Law Commission (2002:19) noted that they are of the view that the existing 
statutory provisions which allow the prosecution of children less than 16 years should be 
retained. The Commission indicates that they are of the opinion that the existing controls 
on the Lord Advocate’s discretion are in general terms adequate to ensure that children 
under 16 years are subject to prosecution only in rare cases where required in the public 
interest, but they now recommend that children under the age of 12 years should be totally 
immune from prosecution. The Commission points out that the following controlling factors 
which limit the discretion of the Lord Advocate in deciding whether the public interest calls 
for the prosecution of children under 16 years of age, are in place: 
 
(a) In the first place, (apart from cases of strict liability) the Crown must always prove that 
the accused acted with the requisite mens rea for the offence.  In the case of children who 
are accused of crime, there might be formidable difficulties in proving the criminal capacity 
of the child. This requirement would have the effect that in practice very young children 
would not be prosecuted. 
 
(b) Secondly, the effect of the European Convention on Human Rights is that when a 
child is to be subject to prosecution in the criminal Courts, the procedure must be modified 
to reflect fully the child’s capacity to understand and to participate effectively in the 
proceedings against him. The younger the child the more modifications to the procedure 
there will have to be. 
 
(c) Thirdly, the Crown’s discretion is subject to guidelines on when it is appropriate to 
prosecute children under 16.  The Crown Office has published a Prosecution Code which 
sets out the general criteria for prosecution decision-making. These criteria include the 
nature and gravity of the offence, and the impact of the offence on the victim. Another 
criterion includes the age of the accused. The Code also refers to the range of options 
available to the Crown when considering alternatives to prosecuting in the criminal Courts. 
 
(iii) Reversal of the decision in Merrin v S (as discussed in paragraph 2.4.3 supra) so that 
a child may be referred to a children’s hearing on the ground of having committed an 
offence even if the child could not be prosecuted for that offence (Scottish Law 
Commission 2002:16). 
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Children in Scotland (2001:4) supports this recommendation and states that children of 
whatever age, who are engaged in criminal conduct, are exhibiting behaviours that need 
expert consideration and may well benefit from statutory supervision.   
 
The Scottish Law Commission (2002:24) indicates that the effect of the decision of Merrin 
v S is that there are cases of children under the age of criminal responsibility who are not 
subject to the children’s hearing system despite having committed offences.  The nature of 
proceedings under the Children (Scotland) Act, 1995 is centrally concerned with the 
welfare of the child and not the prosecution and punishment of crime. 
 
The Scottish Law Commission (2002:26) furthermore proposed that no equivalent to the 
doli incapax presumption should be introduced into Scots law. 
 
McAra (2002:448) states that the age of criminal responsibility in Scotland is currently set 
at 8 years, and this is the first age at which children can be referred to the Children’s 
Hearing System on offence grounds. Scotland has one of the lowest ages of criminal 
responsibility in Europe. The recommendations by the Scottish Law Commission have not 
been enacted in legislation at this stage and therefore the position with regard to criminal 
responsibility in Scotland remains unchanged:   
 
(i) no child under the age of 8 years can be guilty of an offence; 
 
(ii) no child under the age of 16 years may be prosecuted for any offence except on the 
instruction of the Lord Advocate, or at his instance; and 
 
(iii) no child under 8 years may be referred to a children’s hearing on the ground that 
he/she committed an offence. 
 
2.5 Criminal Capacity in Hong Kong 
 
2.5.1 Law Reform Commission 
 
Most of the information furnished under this sub-heading was obtained from the report by 
the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (2000) on the issue criminal responsibility. In 
their report the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (2000:1-139) made references to 
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the guidelines in the International Instruments for the establishment of a minimum age for 
criminal responsibility, the positions in other countries, the debate in the United Kingdom 
on the Crime and Disorder Bill 1997 (wherein the presumption of doli incapax was 
eventually abolished in section 34 of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998) (United Kingdom 
Parliament 1997:4), the case law in England and Wales as well as the report by the South 
African Law Commission (2000). The participants and contributors of submission were 
acknowledged at the end of the report with no specific reference to their contributions or 
reference to the specific material from where the contributions were obtained from. 
However, the contents of the report were carefully considered and judged to be sufficient 
for the purposes and aim of this chapter, which is to furnish a brief overview on the history 
of the concept of criminal capacity of children in Hong Kong, the recent developments in 
the law in this regard and an indication of how the Courts in Hong Kong deal with this 
concept. 
 
Hong Kong is located on the coast of southern China. At the end of 1999 the total 
population stood at 6,974,800 and Hong Kong qualifies as one of the most densely 
populated places in the world (Traver 2002:207). 
 
The development of juvenile justice in Hong Kong was anything but the result of a gradual 
evolutionary process. Instead, Hong Kong’s juvenile justice system emerged fully 
developed in 1932 when the Juvenile Offenders Ordinance was enacted. The motivation 
for the establishment of a system of juvenile justice came from the British colonial 
administration, which was legally obligated to see that the laws in Hong Kong were more 
or less in line with English law. The 1932 Juvenile Offenders Ordinance was basically 
transferred from English law and grafted into Hong Kong Society and law, with little or no 
thought about how well it might fit with local circumstances (Traver 1997:118). 
 
2.5.2 Historical Background and Present Position  
 
Traver (1997:113; 2002:207) points out that Hong Kong has been a British colony since 
1842 and became a Special Economic Region of the People’s Republic of China on 1 July 
1997.  The law of Hong Kong has therefore largely been influenced by the law of the 
United Kingdom, as indicated in the following paragraphs.  
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The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (2000:4–14) indicates that, while 7 years has 
been fixed by statute as the minimum age of criminal responsibility in Hong Kong since 
1933, the age finds its roots in medieval England. 
 
According to the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (2000:4–14), in its formative 
years, the common law provided no definite points as the age at which a child would be 
held criminally responsible. Early records show that different treatment was meted out to 
children below the age of 7 years, according to whether or not they were considered able 
to distinguish right from wrong. Thus, up to the seventeenth century in England, it was 
almost impossible to tell with certainty the age at which a person would be held 
answerable for a crime committed. It was left to the individual judge in each case to decide 
whether the child brought before the Court was old enough to be criminally sanctioned. 
This approach stemmed from the recognition of the severity of the punishments imposed 
at that time, which were based on vengeance.  In an age where a person would be hanged 
for stealing a sheep, it was considered necessary to protect young children from the full 
rigours of harsh adult justice. During Anglo-Saxon times, a child could not be found guilty 
of a crime until he attained the age of 12.  By the time of Edward I, the law had become 
more severe and the age of criminal responsibility was reduced to 7. This marked the 
beginning of an era where, until that age was attained, no evidence that the child knew 
that his conduct was wrong would avail. This was based upon the notion that a child within 
that age group should not be punished as he or she had yet to acquire adequate discretion 
or understanding of the crime. Although the Year Books 30, 31 Ed. 1 recorded that a child 
of tender years was incapable of committing a crime, the Register of Writs refers to a 
precedent of a pardon to a child under 7, and so implies that children under that age were 
still on occasions prosecuted. The controversy as to the age at which criminal 
responsibility should commence continued until the age of 7 was confirmed as well as the 
common law rule that children between the ages of 7 and 14 were presumed to be doli 
incapax, though this presumption was capable of being rebutted by evidence to the 
contrary. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the minimum age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales 
has twice been adjusted upwards, with the present minimum age now set at 10 years.  
Hong Kong has made similar attempts at reform but without success.  In 1973, an attempt 
was made to raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility from 7 to 10 through the 
Juvenile Offenders (Amendment) Bill, 1973.  The Bill foundered as it was thought that 
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children below the age were old enough to be manipulated by undesirable characters for 
unlawful purposes. There has been pressure for change since. In May 2000 the Law 
Reform Commission of Hong Kong (2000:84–86) recommended that the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility be raised to 10 years of age, and that the rebuttable presumption of 
doli incapax should continue to apply to children of 10 and below 14 years of age. The 
recommendations have been enacted in legislation and implemented during March 2003 in 
the Juvenile Offenders (Amendment) Ordinance (6 of 2003) (Law Reform Commission of 
Hong Kong 2000:4–14).  Section 3 of the Juvenile Ordinance states that “it shall be 
conclusively presumed that no child under the age of 10 years can be guilty of an offence 
(Hong Kong Ordinances 2003:1)   
 
2.5.3 Implementation of the Doli Incapax Presumption in Hong Kong 
 
The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (2000:5–10) makes the following remarks on 
the manner in which the doli incapax presumption has been implemented in practice in 
Hong Kong: 
 
(i) The presumption can be rebutted by the prosecution on proof beyond reasonable 
doubt that, at the time of the offence, the child was well aware that his or her act was 
seriously wrong, and not merely naughty of mischievous.  When this presumption is 
rebutted or removed, full criminal responsibility will be imposed on the child who may then 
be charged, prosecuted and convicted for any offence allegedly committed.   
 
(ii) The child must be presumed to be doli incapax in the absence of evidence that at 
the time of the offence he knew the particular act constituting the offence was seriously 
(and not merely naughty or mischievous) wrong.  Under this rebuttable presumption, it 
follows that once it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the child knew the act to be 
seriously wrong, in the sense that he was not merely naughty or mischievous, the 
presumption of doli incapax will be rebutted.  The child will thus become doli capax 
(capable of committing a crime) and will be subject to prosecution and conviction 
accordingly.   
 
The principle governing this area of the law was explained in R v Gorrie (1918)83JP136 as 
follows: In the case of persons under 14 years of age, the law presumed that they were not 
criminally responsible; they were not supposed to have that discretion which would make 
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them criminally responsible. But in any particular case, if the prosecution could show that 
although the accused was under 14 the act was done with what was called mischievous 
discretion, then they could rebut the presumption that the child was not responsible. 
Therefore, the jury should first of all consider whether it would be their duty to find him 
guilty if he were over 14, and then consider whether mischievous discretion deprived him 
of the shelter which he would otherwise have.  If it was an assault and not an accident – if, 
however little he might have meant to do him any harm, he did in fact intentionally stab the 
other boy with the penknife and thereby caused his death, that was manslaughter.  Then 
they came to the second point. The boy was under 14, and the law presumed that he was 
not responsible criminally; and if the prosecution sought to show that he was responsible 
although under 14, they must give them very clear and complete evidence of what was 
called mischievous discretion:  that meant that they must satisfy the jury that when the boy 
did this he knew that he was doing what was wrong – not merely what was wrong, but 
what was gravely wrong, seriously wrong. It was for the jury to say whether there was any 
evidence that this boy when, as was alleged, he jagged the other with the knife in this 
horseplay, had any consciousness that he was doing that which was gravely wrong. 
 
(iii) The effect of the principle stated in Gorrie (supra) is that, in order to secure the 
conviction of a child aged between the ages of 7 and 14 years, the prosecution must first 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the child committed the offence with the necessary 
mens rea.  It must also show that the child should be criminally responsible for the alleged 
offence by proof beyond reasonable doubt that the child had in him or her a mischievous 
discretion, in the sense that, at the time of the alleged offence, the child knew that the act 
constituting the offence was gravely or seriously wrong.  It is therefore insufficient for the 
prosecution to prove that the offence was committed by the child. The prosecution has to 
go a step further to prove that the child knew his conduct was seriously wrong at the 
material time.  Under this principle, the mere proof of the doing of the act charged, 
however horrifying or obviously wrong the act might have been, cannot establish the 
requisite guilty knowledge and rebut the presumption.   
 
(iv) Despite the fact that the test laid down for rebutting the presumption of doli incapax 
has been well established, there is as yet no absolute formula for satisfying all the 
requirements set out in the test. The requirements are that the State must prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the child knew the act to be seriously wrong at the time when 
committing the offence.  The reason is that in rebutting the presumption, the Court would 
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consider the background of the particular child, as well as the unique features of the case, 
before arriving at its decision as to the knowledge of the child at the time in question.  The 
actual age of the child, though an important factor to be taken into consideration, is not 
conclusive. However, in most cases, matters such as the circumstances of the case, 
things said or done by the child both before and after the act, the age of the child, and the 
individual particulars of the child are matters relevant to the Court’s consideration. 
 
(v) Evidence of the circumstances of the case and the child’s conduct, statement or 
demeanour associated with the offence is admissible to prove knowledge of a serious 
wrong.  In R v Li Wai-lun (1989) Mag App 436/89, it was held that the answers provided by 
the child appellant to questions put to him by police would be a valid consideration upon 
which knowledge of a serious wrong could be inferred as the child was considered by the 
Court to be careful enough to avoid giving any incriminating answers. 
 
(vi) It is important to note that although knowledge of a serious wrong, coupled with any 
necessary implication from the age of the child, can be inferred from the circumstances of 
the case, a child cannot be presumed to know the nature of the act simply because other 
children of his age and background would normally be held to possess such knowledge.  
In rebutting the presumption, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
the child himself or herself knew what he or she had done was seriously wrong, and was 
not being merely childish, naughty or mischievous. 
 
A summary of revised positions on the issue of criminal capacity of children in Australia, 
the United Kingdom and Hong Kong was furnished to the professionals and they were 
requested to indicate which country, in their opinion, offered the best protection to child 
offenders regarding the establishment of criminal capacity and their reasons for it. Their 
various responses are summarized in table 1. 
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Table 1:   Which one of these countries offers the best protection with reference to the 
                                 establishment of criminal capacity?  Why do you say so? 
View Motivation Problems Suggestions/Advice 
 
Subjects 1,3,4, 
10,11,12,16 and 
17 chose 
Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 2 chose 
UK 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject  7,9,13 
and 14 chose 
both Australia 
and Hong Kong 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 8 chose 
Hong Kong 
 
Subject 1: Gives better understanding 
of what has to be proved to public. 
Better protection because can 
understand what has to be proved 
instead of having to deal with legal 
terminology 
 
Subject 3: Proper assessments are 
being done 
 
Subject 4: More child-friendly and more 
leave-way for developmental 
differences. More individualized process 
 
Subject 10: Some children between 10-
14 years are so immature that they are 
incapable for committing a crime. They 
should be assessed before standing 
trial 
 
Subject 11: Very similar to our own 
 
Subject 12: The prosecution must prove 
all the elements of the charge against 
an accused 
 
Subject 16: Offers the best option to the 
protection of children’s rights 
 
Subject 17: 12 years should be the age 
for criminal capacity. Australia allows for 
assessment of children under 14 years 
– thereby affording some protection 
 
Subject 2: Children between 10-13 
years are able to operate and carry out 
crimes with same level of intent as 14-
17 year olds 
 
 
 
Subject 7: Provide better protection. 
Although presumptions not popular with 
UN provide mantle of protection if 
properly upheld by Courts 
 
Subject 9: Not much difference between 
these two 
 
Subject 13: These countries raised the 
minimum age of criminal capacity to 10 
years  
 
Subject 14: Because of the minimum 
age and the presumption of doli incapax 
 
 
Subject 8: Depend largely on process 
followed in Court and training of 
Criminal Justice professionals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 7: British writers 
expressed regret about 
scrapping of doli incapax 
presumption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 7: Maybe if minimum 
age for criminal capacity is 
increased to 14 there will be 
no need for presumption 
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As indicated in table 1, eight subjects chose Australia, one chose the United Kingdom, four 
chose both Australia and Hong Kong and one chose Hong Kong.  
 
The eight choosing Australia stated that this country’s formulation was more clear and 
there is better understanding on what needs to be proved, there is proper assessments, it 
is very similar to our own system. One subject stated that the formulation appeared more 
child-friendly and offered more leave-way for developmental differences. Three subjects 
are lawyers; two are criminologists; two are social workers and one a psychologist. 
 
The subject who chose the United Kingdom motivated the choice by indicating that 
children between 10 – 13 years are able to operate and carry out crimes with the same 
level of intent as children between the ages of 14 – 17 years.  This subject is a social 
worker. 
 
Four subjects (three lawyers and one social worker) chose both Australia and Hong Kong 
stating that their approaches provides better protection, although presumptions is not 
popular with  the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child. One subject 
indicated that the presumptions offer a mantle of protection if they are properly upheld by 
the Courts. 
 
One subject, a social worker chose Hong Kong but indicated that it depends on the 
processes followed by the Courts and on the training of the Criminal Justice professionals. 
 
Mention was made of the fact that some British writers have expressed their regret about 
the scrapping of the doli incapax presumption in the United Kingdom. 
 
It was suggested by one subject that maybe if the minimum age for criminal capacity is 
increased to 14 years there will be no need for the presumption. It was however stated, 
that in South Africa such an approach might not be politically sellable.  
 
Both Australia and Hong Kong have rebuttable presumptions of doli incapax and the fact 
that only one subject was of the opinion that the United Kingdom (where the rebuttable 
presumption has been abolished) offers the best protection for child offenders with 
reference to the establishment of criminal capacity, is a clear indication the majority of the 
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professionals, who participated, are in favour of the retention of the rebuttable presumption 
of doli incapax.  
 
Subjects 5, 6 and 15 did not choose a specific country.  Two are criminologists and the 
other is a lawyer. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
It is clear that the issue of criminal capacity is regarded as an important aspect by the 
relevant International Instruments protecting the rights of children.  It is also very clear that 
the issue of criminal capacity and the manner in which it should be implemented and 
applied differs vastly from country to country and there are conflicting views on whether or 
not it really protects children, especially those between 10 and 14 years of age.   
 
All three countries under discussion – Australia, United Kingdom and Hong Kong – 
recently investigated the issue of criminal capacity and the question whether the doli 
incapax presumption should remain or be abolished.  In all three these countries there 
were developments regarding this issue although different approaches were followed.   
 
Australia decided to keep the doli incapax presumption and only amended the minimum 
age for criminal responsibility to 10 years in all its jurisdictions. 
 
In the United Kingdom of Great Britain there are differences. England and Wales abolished 
the doli incapax presumption and Scotland, although recommendations for changes have 
been made by the Scottish Law Commission in 2002, has not amended their position. 
 
In Hong Kong the decision was taken to increase the minimum age for criminal 
responsibility to 10 years and to retain the doli incapax presumption for children between 
the ages of 10 and below 14 years. 
 
In the next chapter a brief history on the concept of criminal capacity, the present position 
in our criminal justice system regarding the minimum age for criminal capacity, the 
presumption of  doli incapax  applicable to the children between the ages of 7 and 14  
years and the way the Courts deal with this issue will be furnished and discussed. 
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Statistics on children under 14 years of age in prison during the past 5 years are also 
furnished.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
CRIMINAL CAPACITY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND POSITION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Criminal responsibility in this chapter relates to a child’s ability to distinguish between right 
and wrong and his/her ability to act in accordance with this insight.   
 
Snyman (2002:158) indicates that “… before a person can be said to have acted with 
culpability, he must have had criminal capacity – an expression often abbreviated simply to 
“capacity”. A person is endowed with criminal capacity if he has the mental abilities 
required by the law to be held responsible and liable for his unlawful conduct.  It stands to 
reason that people such as the mentally ill (the “insane”) and very young children cannot 
be held criminally liable for their unlawful conduct, since they lack the mental abilities to 
distinguish between right and wrong and to act in accordance with such insight, which 
normal adult people have. The mental abilities which a person must have in order to have 
criminal capacity are: 
 
(i) the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, and  
 
(ii) the ability to conduct himself in accordance with such an appreciation of the 
wrongfulness of his conduct.   
 
If a person lacks one of these abilities, he lacks criminal capacity and cannot be held 
criminally liable for an unlawful act or omission carried out by him while lacking one of 
these abilities” (Snyman 2002:158). 
 
In this chapter the historical background of the concept of criminal capacity in the South 
African context will be discussed. The present position in our criminal justice system with 
reference to the common law presumption will be highlighted and the application and 
interpretation thereof by the Courts will be furnished. The statistics regarding children 
under the age of 14 years sentenced to imprisonment will also be furnished.  
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The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the historical background of the 
concept of criminal capacity in South African law, to simplify the current position of the 
concept of criminal capacity in our law and to illustrate how the Courts deal with this 
concept. Although criminal capacity is a juridical concept, the content of this chapter does 
not focus on a complete and detailed legal comparison of the different views of this 
concept but rather on a practical illustration and submission for the purposes of explaining 
this concept to criminologists who do not have a legal background or did not receive legal 
training. Nevertheless, a brief historical background sets the scene for the understanding 
of this concept of criminal capacity. 
 
3.2 Historical Background 
 
The general concept of criminal capacity as set out above was unknown in Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law. Although these legal systems recognised that certain categories of 
people such as mentally ill and young children (infantes) could not be convicted of crimes, 
this lack of liability was not explained in terms of a general concept of capacity (De Wet 
and Swanepoel 1985:109). De Wet and Swanepoel (1985:109) further point out that 
although the Roman jurists did not always reveal clear insights into the issue of criminal 
capacity, it is clear that they realised that diminished mental abilities can exempt a person 
from criminal responsibility. It appears that a lack of intellectus was regarded as a reason 
for exemption from criminal responsibility of juveniles and mentally ill persons.   
 
Labuschagne (1993:148) refers to the Corpus Iuris Civilis and indicates that children under 
the age of 7 years, in other words infants, were not criminally responsible.  A puberes, on 
the other hand was criminally responsible.  A puberes was a child who reached puberty.  
Puberty was determined by the physical development of the child. Our common law 
presumptions originated from the Roman law (Labuschagne 1978: 264; Labuschagne 
2003:21-22; De Wet & Swanepoel 1985: 111). 
 
The concept of criminal capacity is likewise unknown in Anglo-American legal systems.  In 
South Africa the concept is usually described as “capacity” or “criminal capacity”, although 
terms such as “criminal accountability”, “criminal responsibility”, and “imputability” have 
also been used.  The concept of “capacity” hails from the European continent, mainly from 
German criminal-law theory (Snyman 2002:159). 
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Snyman (1995:146) refers to the origin of the concept of criminal capacity and indicates 
that “… before 1970 this concept was largely unknown in South African criminal law, but it 
has subsequently gradually gained acceptance.  One of the most important reasons for its 
growing recognition was undoubtedly the appearance of the influential Rumpff Report (the 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons 
and Related Matters) in 1967.  This report resulted directly in the formulation of the 
biological-psychological criterion for the determination of the incapacity of mentally ill 
persons in section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) (Rumpff 
1967: 72; Visser, Vorster & Maré 1990:325).   
 
Burchell and Hunt (1997:153) point out that  “The Rumpff Commission of Inquiry noted that 
modern psychology conceived of the normal human personality as being made up of three 
categories of mental function: cognitive, conative and affective. The cognitive function 
relates to the individual’s capacity to think, perceive and reason – the capacity by which 
humans learn, solve problems, make plans; the conative function relates to the capacity 
for self-control and the ability to exercise free will (the conative or volitional functions); the 
affective capacity relates to the capacity for emotional feelings such as anger, hatred, 
mercy and jealousy (Rumpff 1967:43).  A person whose cognitive or conative capacities 
are impaired in a significant way, the Commission suggested, ought not to be held 
criminally responsible for his or her actions. Criminal capacity is thus concerned with a 
person’s cognitive and conative functions or, in other words, his or her capacity for insight 
and self-control. The test for determining whether an accused had criminal capacity thus 
is: did the accused have the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his of her conduct 
and the capacity to act in accordance with this appreciation?” (Rumpff 1967:72; Visser, 
Vorster & Maré 1990:317–325). 
 
According to Snyman (1995:146–147): “It was widely assumed, until about 1981,  that 
incapacity, which is the inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of one’s conduct or to 
conduct oneself in accordance with such an appreciation, could be a defence only if the 
inability was the result of “biological” factors, namely mental illness (“insanity”) or immature 
age.  Up until that time the criterion applied in practice for determining incapacity consisted 
of two legs, namely first a “biological” leg (that is, either mental illness or immature age) 
and secondly a “psychological” leg (that is, the inability mentioned above to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of the conduct or to conduct oneself according to such an appreciation). In 
1981 in S v Chretien 1981(1)(SA)1097(A) the Appellate Division held that a person could 
 40
lack capacity and accordingly escape liability not only if the (psychological) inability was 
the result of mental illness or immature age, but also if it was caused by intoxication. Thus 
the so-called biological factors (first leg of the test) were expanded to include intoxication. 
After 1981 the important question arose whether there was any reason for limiting the 
biological leg of the test to the three factors mentioned above, namely mental illness, 
immature age and intoxication. The question was whether these factors should not be 
expanded to include, for example, anger resulting from provocation, or factors such as 
emotional exhaustion, fear, shock or stress. The feasibility of limiting the defence of 
incapacity to situations in which the (psychological) mental inabilities were the result of 
only certain circumscribed biological factors was increasingly doubted.”   
 
Snyman (2002:164–165) states that towards the end of the eighties, the appellate division 
held in a number of cases, of which S v Campher 1987(1)SA940(A), S v Laubscher 
1988(1)SA163(A) and S v Wiid 1990(1)SACR561(A) are the most important, “… that 
incapacity could be a complete defence even if it were not the result of mental illness, 
immature age or intoxication.  For successful reliance on the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity it is in fact not necessary to prove that the accused’s mental disability was the 
result of certain specific causes or pathological states; if the accused does not rely on the 
specific defences of mental illness in terms of section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
or of immature age, but the Court is nevertheless satisfied on the evidence as a whole that 
at the time of the act the accused was incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his 
act or of conducting himself in accordance with such an appreciation, he must be found 
not guilty, irrespective of the cause of his mental inability.”   
 
Against this brief background the current position in South Africa will now be discussed. 
 
3.3 Current Position in South Africa 
 
3.3.1 The Concept of Criminal Capacity 
 
Snyman (2002:159) points out that the position in our law at the moment is as follows: “If a 
person commits an act which accords with the definition of the proscription of the crime 
and which is also unlawful, but at the time of the commission lacks the ability (a) to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or (b) to conduct himself in accordance with his 
appreciation of the wrongfulness of his act, he is not criminally liable for such an act, 
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irrespective of the cause of the inability. Because of his lack of capacity he must be found 
not guilty of the crime.”   
 
Snyman (2002:160) indicates that before any person can be said to have acted culpably, it 
must be clear that at the time of the act such a person was endowed with criminal 
capacity.  The adherents of both the normative and the psychological theories of culpability 
admit this. The description of the precise relationship between capacity and culpability 
depends upon whether one adopts the normative or the psychological theory of culpability.  
Those who adhere to the psychological theory tend to separate capacity from culpability, 
and to view the former as merely a prerequisite of the latter. In this regard Visser, Vorster 
& Maré (1990:305) are of the opinion that criminal accountability is a separate element of 
every offence. According to these authors criminal accountability may be directly 
connected to culpability but, in their opinion, it does not form part of culpability. The 
followers of the normative theory of culpability, on the other hand, always adopt an 
integrative approach and regard capacity as one of the indispensable components of the 
culpability concept. It is submitted that this approach is the correct one. To say that a 
person acted culpably, means that there are grounds upon which, in the eyes of the law, 
he may be blamed for his unlawful conduct. One of the reasons why he can be blamed is 
the fact that at the time of the conduct he had criminal capacity.  Thus, contrary to what is 
sometimes alleged, capacity is not an element of criminal liability, which is separate from 
culpability.  If forms part of the culpability requirement (Snyman 2002:160). 
 
Snyman (2002:160) points out that whatever the precise relationship between capacity 
and culpability, there is general agreement that the need to consider the accused’s 
capacity arises only once it is clear that the accused has committed an unlawful act.  It 
follows that a person who lacks capacity is nevertheless capable of committing an unlawful 
act.  This principle is of practical importance in the following respect:  a person may rely on 
private defence only if he defends himself against an unlawful attack.  Since even a person 
who lacks capacity, such as somebody of immature age, may act unlawfully, an accused 
may rely on private defence even if he defends himself against an attack by such a young 
child. If an investigation reveals that the accused lacked capacity at the time of his conduct 
he escapes conviction due to lack of capacity:  it then becomes unnecessary to investigate 
whether he acted with intention or negligence.   
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Meintjies (2001:A3–1) states that the provisions of sections 77 and 78 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977, although dealing with Capacity to Understand Proceedings: 
Mental Illness and Criminal Responsibility, are equally apposite when having to deal with 
the question whether to institute a prosecution with reference to child offenders. 
 
Section 77 provides that the accused must be capable of understanding the proceedings 
so as to make a proper defence.  
 
Section 78 provides that if an accused person suffers from a mental illness or mental 
defect which makes him incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his act or incapable 
to act in accordance with such appreciation, he shall not be criminally responsible for such 
act. 
 
In terms of the common law presumptions all children under the age of 7 years are 
irrebuttably presumed to be doli incapax and can thus never be prosecuted. Children 
between the ages of 7 years and 14 years are rebuttably presumed to be doli incapax and 
if any such child is to be prosecuted, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the 
required criminal capacity at the time of committing the offence (Meintjies 2001:A3–1; 
Visser, Vorster & Maré 1990:306; Burchell & Milton 2005:364; Burchell & Hunt 1997:159; 
Van Dokkum 1994:213;  De Wet & Swanepoel 1985:111). 
 
Snyman (2002:161–163) discusses criminal capacity as follows:  “X’s capacity is 
determined with the aid of two psychological factors, namely first his ability to distinguish 
between right and wrong, and secondly his ability to conduct himself in accordance with 
this insight into right and wrong.” 
 
According to the Rumpff Report (1967:45) these two factors form the basis of a person’s 
capacity and his responsibility for his conduct.  These two factors refer to the two different 
categories of mental functions (Visser, Vorster & Maré 1990:317). 
 
These arguments can be applied as follows in a diagram: 
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Snyman (2002:162) explains the two psychological requirements for capacity as follows: 
“The first function, which is the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, lawful and 
unlawful, forms part of a person’s cognitive mental function. The cognitive function is 
related to a person’s reason or intellect, in other words his ability to perceive, to reason 
and to remember. Here the emphasis is on a person’s insight and understanding. 
 
The cognitive function may be described in different words. Sometimes (as in section 78 
(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977) it is described as the ability to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of a person’s act. Sometimes it is described as the ability to appreciate 
unlawfulness of the act, and sometimes as the ability to differentiate between right and 
wrong. Normally it does not matter what expression one uses; they are simply employed 
as synonyms. 
 
The second function, which is the ability of a person to conduct himself in accordance with 
his insight into right and wrong, is known as his conative mental function. According to 
Snyman (2002:162) the conative function consists in a person’s ability to control his 
behaviour in accordance with his insights – which means that, unlike an animal, he is able 
to make a decision, set himself a goal, to pursue it, and to resist impulses or desires to act 
contrary to what his insights into right and wrong reveal to him.  Here, the key word or idea 
 
Criminal Capacity
 
Ability to appreciate 
wrongfulness 
 
Ability to act in accordance 
with such an appreciation 
 
Cognitive 
(ie ability to differentiate) 
 
Conative 
(ie power of resistance) 
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is self-control.  According to the Rumpff Report the conative function implies a disposition 
of the perpetrator through which his insight into the unlawful nature of a particular act can 
restrain him from, and thus set up a counter-motive to, its execution. 
 
Snyman (2002:163) states than in short, the cognitive and conative functions amount to 
insight (ability to differentiate) and self-control (power of resistance respectively). 
 
In order to have capacity the child must have both the above-mentioned two psychological 
functions and abilities.  If any one of them is absent, the child lacks capacity. 
 
Snyman (2002:177–178) points out that the test ought to be whether such a child, in spite 
of his age, is nevertheless capable of appreciating the nature and consequences of his 
conduct and that it is wrong (this is the cognitive part of the test) and further whether he is 
capable of acting in accordance with that appreciation (this is the conative part of the test).  
The fact that the Courts recognize that a child should have the power to resist temptation 
(the conative part of the test) before he can be considered to have criminal capacity, is 
evident from the large number of decisions in which the Courts have refused to convict 
children between the age of seven and fourteen years who have committed crimes under 
the influence of older persons. 
 
Snyman (2002:177) further points out that in practice a short cut is usually taken by asking 
whether a child was aware that what he was doing was wrong.  Such a formulation of the 
test is unacceptable for the following reasons: Firstly, the formulation confuses two 
completely distinct requirements for liability, namely criminal capacity and awareness of 
unlawfulness. Secondly, the traditional test employed by the Courts involves only one 
aspect of the accused’s knowledge, namely his knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act.  
His knowledge of the factual nature and consequences of his deed is equally important.  
Thirdly, the traditional formulation contains no reference to the accused’s ability to act in 
accordance with his appreciation of right and wrong. 
 
The presumption is not rebutted merely by proof that the accused could distinguish 
between right and wrong.  It must be clear that the accused knew that what he was doing 
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was wrong within the context of the facts of the particular case.  All the circumstances of 
the case, such as the nature of the crime and the conduct of the child, must be taken into 
account in determining whether the State has rebutted the presumption (Snyman 
2002:179). 
 
Burchell and Hunt (1997:153, 160) indicate that persons are responsible for their criminal 
conduct only if the prosecution proves, beyond reasonable doubt, that at the time the 
conduct was perpetrated they possessed criminal capacity or, in other words, the 
psychological capacities for insight and for self-control.  The authors warned that the Court 
should be careful not to place an old head on young shoulders and it must take into 
consideration the age, knowledge, experience and, what is most important, the judgment 
of the child in the specific circumstances facing the child at the time of commission of the 
prohibited act.  It is important to acknowledge that children often do act irrationally and 
sometimes forget what they have been told. 
 
Sapa (2005:1) correctly reports, after a shooting incident involving a six-year-old boy, who 
allegedly shot and killed a three-year-old girl, with reference to the current position in 
South African law that the unlawful conduct of a child of this age can never lead to a 
conviction of any crime.  
 
The questionnaire sent to the various professionals, identified for the purposes of this 
research, included a summary of the current position in our law regarding the irrebuttable 
presumption of doli incapax relating to children under the age of 7 years and the rebuttable 
presumption of doli incapax relating to children between the ages of 7 and 14 years. They 
were requested to comment on the statement that the minimum age of 7 years for criminal 
capacity is too low. Their responses were as follows: 
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Table 2:   The minimum age for criminal capacity is too low. 
View Motivation Problems Suggestions / Advice 
Subjects 
2,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,
13,14,15,16 and 17 
agreed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subjects 1,3,4 and 
5 disagreed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 2: Frustration and aggression do lead to 
uncontrolled and uncontained emotional reactions 
in very young children; act out in extremely anti 
social behaviour 
 
Subject 6: Experience shows no prosecution take 
place of children under 10 years 
 
 
 
 
Subject 7: UN criticised minimum age of 
prosecution under 12 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 8: UN agrees age is too low. UN suggest 
minimum age of 14 years  
 
Subject 9: Should be raised to conform with 
obligations in terms of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child as well as international trends 
 
Subject 10: Children too young to be accountable 
for their actions 
 
Subject 11: Must be increased to at least 10 years 
 
Subject 12: Most 8,9 & 10 year olds are not 
capable to distinguish between right and wrong and 
can not always guide their conduct in terms of this 
insight 
 
Subject 13: Even 10 years as proposed in the Child 
Justice Bill, 2002 is a compromise 
 
Subject 14: Should be raised to at least 10 years 
 
Subject 15: Agree, too young to form intent to 
commit crime 
 
Subject 16: Should be increased to 10 years. 
Unlikely that child of 7 years would understand 
consequences of his/her actions 
 
Subject 17: It is too low 
 
Subject 1: Even if child is doli capax under 7 years 
– might be unfit to stand trial – do not understand 
proceedings 
 
 
 
 
Subject 3: Child of 9 years can determine 
difference between right and wrong 
 
Subject 4: Developmental status and abilities of 
child at that age appropriate. 
 
Subject 5: Child of 7 years knows what he/she is 
doing and many have committed serious crimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 1: May 
preclude child from 
receiving State 
assistance that will 
benefit him/her like 
psychological 
treatment or removal 
from parents/streets 
to place of safety 
 
                        
  
 
 
 
Subject 6: Possibility of 
proceedings provides tool for 
intervention – child can be 
compelled to participate in 
diversion or other programs    
 
Subject 7: Children move from 
concrete to abstract thinking 
between 10-12 years. In 
concrete thinking difficult to have 
full knowledge of difference 
between right and wrong, to 
understand the consequences of 
behaviour and to be able to 
control impulses to ensure that 
acts are in accordance with the 
understanding  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 13: Children below 10 
years should be treated as 
children in need of care since 
they can not fully appreciate the 
consequences of their actions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 1: If changed, severe 
caveat-principles must apply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 4: Individualized process 
needed 
 
Subject 5: Expert and Court must 
decide in each case 
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Table 2 indicates that the majority of the subjects (thirteen) were of the opinion that the 
minimum age for criminal capacity is too low. Four of the subjects disagreed with the 
statement that 7 years is too low for criminal capacity. 
 
The subjects who agreed with the statement motivated this agreement by referring to the 
fact that this coincided with the view of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child. One of the subject’s motivation referred to the fact that from experience no 
prosecutions take place of children under the age of 10 years.  Another motivation made 
reference to the uncontrolled and uncontained emotional reactions that can occur in very 
young children when frustrated and angry. Five subjects suggested that the minimum age 
for criminal capacity should be raised to 10 years. 
 
The four subjects who disagreed with the statement motivated this by referring to the fact 
that children older that 7 years can determine the difference between right and wrong and 
that they know what they are doing and that the developmental status of that age is 
appropriate. Two of the subjects in this regard are criminologists, one a lawyer and the 
other a psychologist. 
 
Some of the subjects offered some suggestions and advice in this regard, which included 
that the possibility of proceedings provides a tool for intervention, that a child can be 
compelled to participate in a diversion program and that children below 10 years who are 
in conflict with the law, should be regarded as children in need of care since they can not 
fully appreciate the consequences of their actions. It was also suggested that if the 
minimum age for criminal capacity is to be changed, severe caveat-principles must apply. 
It was furthermore submitted that an individualized process is needed and that experts and 
the Courts must decide on the issue of criminal capacity. 
It is interesting to note that the subjects who disagreed with the statement only referred to 
the fact that children of 7 years and older know what they are doing and that they know the 
difference between right and wrong. They only dealt with the first leg of the test for criminal 
capacity. The second leg requiring that the child must have the ability to act in accordance 
with this insight into right and wrong at the time of the commission of the offence does not 
feature in their motivation. Maybe if both legs of the test were taken into account by them 
their responses would have been different. 
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From the above it is clear that the majority of the various professionals, who participated, 
agree on the fact that the minimum age of 7 years for criminal capacity is too low and that 
it should be raised.  
 
3.3.2 Prosecution - Factors to be Considered  
 
According to the Meintjies (2001:B3-2 – B3-3) the following factors should be considered 
when prosecutors are confronted with the decision of whether to prosecute a child 
between ages of 7 to 14 years: 
 
(i) the child’s age (a prosecution will rarely be considered when the child is of tender 
age ± 10 and younger); 
 
(ii) the nature of the crime (the more heinous, the less weight will be given to the age 
factor, if having acted under the influence of others, the extent of this influence must be 
considered); 
 
(iii) the possible benefits of diversion should the child be prepared to plead guilty (it is 
preferable that the child be made to take responsibility for his/her actions); 
 
(iv) the possible benefits of prosecution (what sentence would probably be 
suggested/imposed); 
 
(v) the views and concerns of the complainant; 
 
(vi) the interest of the community (is the child a troublemaker, are there previous 
transgressions?); 
 
(vii) the result of any assessment of the child (level of maturity, personal circumstances, 
etc); 
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(viii) balancing relevant considerations (the relevant children’s rights instruments need to 
be taken into account, the child’s best interests to be of paramount importance). 
 
In many cases the facts of the case itself will prove criminal capacity and the child’s 
capacity to follow the proceedings will soon become apparent or, if represented, some 
objection will be raised by the defence counsel. Although the onus rests on the 
prosecution to prove criminal capacity, there is no legal obligation to prove this prior to 
putting charges or at any specific stage of the proceedings.  It is simply one of the 
elements necessary to be proved and needs only be proved prior to closure of the State 
case. It is, therefore, possible to rely on the evidence presented on the merits for purposes 
of arguing that this element has, if fact, been proved (Meintjies 2001:B3–3). 
  
Labuschagne (2003:26) states that one of the most difficult aspects regarding the 
presumption against the criminal capacity of children between the ages of 7 and 14 years 
must be the decision on which factors to take into account to rebut the presumption. He 
distinguishes the following factors: 
 
(i) the age of the accused (the presumption weakens with the advance of the child’s 
years towards fourteen); 
 
(ii) blameworthiness of the child’s conduct (this can also be evident from the 
circumstances and factors like cruelty, mercilessness and ruthlessness in which the crime 
was committed); 
 
(iii) the mindset and state of mind of the child (with reference to the specific 
circumstances of the case and a specific act); 
 
(iv) the presence of an older person (the presumption of coercion is important in this 
regard); and 
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(v) the conduct of the child after or during the commission of the crime (this should be 
done with caution because children do not always follow rational patterns). 
 
Van Dokkum (1994:213) refers to the onus on the prosecution to rebut the presumption of 
doli incapax beyond reasonable doubt and indicates that a practice has developed in the 
lower Courts, whereby the prosecution calls the parent or guardian, who has to 
accompany the child to Court in terms of section 73(3) and 74 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977), to testify for the prosecution in this regard. The parent or 
guardian is usually called to confirm the age of the child offender and to confirm that the 
child has been taught the difference between right and wrong and whether or not the child 
had the ability to differentiate between right and wrong at the time when the alleged 
offence was committed. Van Dokkum (1994:214) describes this practice as unfair and 
indicates that uneducated persons might believe that they are giving evidence in 
mitigation. Van Dokkum (1994:219) states that the State should call a teacher or a 
probation officer, or a psychologist, if the child consented to an interview, to prove criminal 
capacity. The author is furthermore of the opinion that the practice of calling a parent or a 
guardian to testify on behalf of the prosecution to prove criminal capacity, could be 
challenged in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977), the common law 
and public policy, as interpreted by the Courts. 
 
Skelton (1996:180) indicates that in South African law, only children below the age of 7 
years are irrebuttably presumed to lack criminal capacity. This represents one of the 
lowest ages of criminal capacity in the world. Children between the ages of 7 and 14 years 
are rebuttably presumed to lack criminal capacity. According to Skelton this presumption is 
designed to protect children under 14, but it is too easily rebutted in our Courts. Skelton is 
of the opinion that a balanced approach should be adopted in determining an appropriate 
minimum age for criminal capacity. Skelton submits that the minimum age of 7 years, is 
unacceptably low. Furthermore, should South Africa wish to retain the doli incapax 
presumption, then better safeguards should be adopted so that the presumption will be 
more difficult to rebut. This might include a requirement that the State lead expert 
testimony in order to achieve rebuttal, and thereby protecting child offenders more 
effectively. 
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Cassim (1998:335) does not agree with the opinion that the minimum age of 7 years for 
criminal liability is too low and submits that the aim of a juvenile system should be to make 
children accountable and responsible for their actions and not to make them untouchable.  
 
The South African Law Commission (2000:22) indicates that the presumption with regard 
to the criminal capacity of children between the ages of 7 and 14 years was designed to 
protect children but that it is too easily rebutted and that it does not in fact present an 
impediment to the prosecution and conviction of young people.  For instance, mothers of 
children are asked to indicate whether their children understand the difference between 
right and wrong.  An answer in the affirmative is often considered sufficient grounds to 
rebut the presumption of doli incapax. 
 
 Van Oosten (1993:133) also indicates that in practice the Courts have paid mere lip-
service to the criminal capacity test by making the inquiry turn on the child’s knowledge of 
the wrongfulness of his/her conduct in the circumstances under which the act was 
committed. 
 
Skelton & Zaal (1998:550) also point out that in their opinion the Courts allow the 
presumption of a lack of criminal capacity to be rebutted too easily. The authors submit 
that appropriate submissions from a legal representative for the child might make this 
presumption more difficult to rebut. It is also argued that expert evidence should be 
compulsory to rebut the presumption and the younger the offender, the more compelling 
the obligation to call an expert should be.  
 
On the other hand, Labuschagne (1978:265; 1991:119; 1993:152; 1993:104-105; 1997: 
148; 2003:32) opposes the use of fixed chronological age structures to determine criminal 
liability and is of the opinion that an individualised approached, focusing on the specific 
offender should be followed when determining criminal liability. In this regard Labuschagne 
(1978:263) refers to the legal systems of various countries and distinguishes three 
approaches with different variants regarding the criminal liability of children, namely: 
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(i) the undifferentiated-chronological approach where a general age is set and children 
below this age are not criminally liable and children above this age are criminally liable. 
Examples of countries following this approach are Japan and Norway where the age is 14 
years; 
 
(ii) the differentiated-chronological approach where there is clear chronological and 
criminal differentiation. South Africa is an example in this regard where children under the 
age of 7 years is not criminally liable and between the ages of 7 and 14 years the 
presumption of doli incapax  comes into operation; and 
 
(iii) the individualised approach where there are no chronological limits on the criminal 
liability of children. In theory a child of any age can be held criminally liable. The 
Netherlands is an example of a country following this approach. This approach is also 
favoured by the author. 
 
Labuschagne (1978:265) is of the opinion that any attempt to tie human abilities, attitudes 
and judgments to a set chronological age structure will miss human uniqueness and 
individuality and can therefore not constitute valid and meaningful punishment for human 
behaviour. Labuschagne (1978:265) is furthermore of the opinion that a child of any age 
should in principle be criminally liable. It is suggested that a child should be held criminally 
liable only if he is aware of the legal wrongfulness of his specific act, if he is able to control 
his actions at the time of the commission of the criminal act and if he intended the 
consequences of his act. 
 
Labuschagne (1993:152) points out that criminal liability ought to focus on the intellectual 
qualities of a specific offender and therefore an offender should only be punished if he was 
aware of the unlawfulness of his act at the time when the act was committed and if he had 
the ability to act according to this insight. The chronological age of the offender is not a 
decisive factor in this regard. 
 
According to Labuschagne (1993:105) age limits are arbitrary when determining criminal 
liability. The author predicts that the individualisation and deconcentration processes will 
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eventually result in the individual’s mental structure being the sole determinant of whether 
or not he/she is criminally liable. Age limits will still serve as guidelines but will not have the 
effect of fixed rules (Labuschagne 1997:148; Labuschagne 2003:32). 
 
The professionals were also requested to indicate whether or not they are of the opinion 
that criminal capacity should be linked to a specific chronological age. Their responses 
follow. 
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Table 3:      Criminal capacity should be linked to a specific chronological age. 
View Motivation Problems Suggestions/Advice 
Subjects 
1,3,5,7,8,12,
13,14,16 
and 17 
agreed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subjects 
2,4,6,9,10, 
11 and 15 
disagreed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 1: Certainty in law is stabilising factor in 
society 
 
 
Subject 3: Unclear cut-off unwise and have no 
worth 
 
 
Subject 5: Need to be starting at a point 
somewhere. Impractical not to link to 
chronological age 
 
Subject 7: Practical reason to have cut-off age  
 
 
 
Subject 8: Useful to link to a specific age 
 
 
Subject 12: It should however be raised 
 
 
Subject 13: Necessary for purposes of guiding 
prosecution, it is an alternative option 
 
Subject 14: Links should be established on the 
basis that the chronological age of the child and 
the cognitive-development age (stage) is at the 
same level 
 
Subject 16: Normally expected that at a 
particular age a child should have attained a 
certain level of personal responsibility to be in a 
position to comprehend the consequences of 
his/her actions 
 
Subject 17: At the age of 12 years a child can be 
said to have criminal capacity 
 
Subject 2: Difficult to link due to social/ 
emotional, environmental  differences and 
mental capacity 
 
Subject 4: Developmental status cannot be 
linked to specific chronological age 
 
Subject 6: Capacity to distinguish between right 
and wrong varies and is not linked to age alone 
 
Subject 9: It is desirable from legal perspective 
because it creates legal certainty and treats 
children equally. However, children’s cognitive 
ages differ individually and retention of common 
law presumptions seems appropriate as it 
provides for individual maturity 
 
Subject 10: In some instances children differ 
 
Subject 11: Discretion is important. Individual 
assessment necessary. Rebuttable presumption 
leaves room for individual assessment in 
uncertain cases  
 
Subject 15: The child’s capacities and 
psychosocial circumstances in its context before 
and at the time of the commission of the offence 
should also be taken into account  
Subject 1: Courts are 
very subjective due to 
amount of discretion 
allowed. Requiring 
psychological testing 
would create 
uncertainty.  
 
Subject 5: Other factors 
like mental age, 
emotional age is 
subjective and difficult 
to measure 
 
 
 
Subject 8: If not, young 
children might be 
brought to Court and 
tried unnecessary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 7: Rebuttable presumption of doli 
incapax for 7–14 year olds allow for 
flexibility and individual assessment  
 
Subject 8: Keep in mind majority of judicial 
officers have not had training in children’s 
issues and may come from cultural 
context where child-adult interaction is 
limited by norms and culture 
 
Subject 13: The issue of age is not only a 
problem in SA, but also elsewhere in the 
world 
 
Subject 14: Worked with many cases 
where children of 16 years were 
functioning on a cognitive-developmental 
level of 5-7 year old child, and criminal 
capacity can not be assumed.  Although 
they can distinguish between right and 
wrong there is no insight into the 
consequences of their actions.  
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 2: Perhaps criminal capacity 
should be linked to EQ and IQ to gauge 
intent  
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Ten of the subjects agreed with the statement that criminal capacity should be linked to a 
specific age and seven disagreed with it. 
 
The ten subjects who agreed, motivated it by stating that it is practical to have a cut-off 
age, that there need to be a starting point somewhere and that it is normally expected that 
at a particular age a child should have attained a certain level of personal responsibility to 
be in a position to comprehend the consequences of his/her actions. One subject indicated 
that it leads to certainty in the law, which in itself is a stabilizing factor in society.   
 
The seven subjects, who disagreed, motivated their disagreement by stating that it is 
difficult to link chronological age to criminal capacity due to the social, emotional, 
environmental and developmental differences which varies in each child. The capacity to 
distinguish between right and wrong varies and can not be linked to age alone, and that 
the cognitive development differs from one child to another.  
 
The problems pointed out in this regard included the fact that the Courts are very 
subjective and psychological testing in each case would create uncertainty. It was also 
stated that mental age and emotional age is subjective and difficult to measure. Another 
problem is that if criminal capacity is not linked to a specific chronological age, young 
children might be brought to Court and tried unnecessary. 
 
It was also pointed out that the rebuttable presumption of incapacity allows for flexibility 
and individual assessment. Another submission referred to the fact that the majority of 
judicial officers have not had training in children’s issues and may come from a cultural 
context where child-adult interaction is limited by norms and culture. On subject suggested 
that criminal capacity should be linked to EQ and IQ.   
 
The fact that ten out of the seventeen subjects were of the opinion that criminal capacity 
should be linked to a specific chronological age indicates that there is a need to have 
certainty as to when a child can be held criminally responsible  to prevent the unnecessary  
exposure of too young children to the trauma of appearing in Court.  
 
The professionals who did not agree on the statement that criminal capacity should be 
linked to a specific chronological age included three lawyers, two social workers, one 
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criminologist and one psychologist. Those who agreed included four lawyers, three 
criminologists and three social workers. It is clear that even within the various professions 
there is a difference of opinion on whether or not criminal capacity should be linked to a 
specific age. Further research on the desirability and implications of linking criminal 
capacity to a specific chronological age should be conducted. 
 
Next the focus is on how South African Courts dealt with criminal capacity of children. 
 
3.4 Case Law  
 
Case law where the criminal capacity of children was dealt with by the Courts indicates 
and illustrates the following: 
 
(i) In S v Kholl 1914CDP840 two boys aged eleven and a half and 7 years 
respectively, were convicted of theft.  On review the Court pointed out that a child between 
the ages of 7 and 14 years of age is rebuttably presumed to be doli incapax. The Court 
confirmed the conviction of the older boy because there where evidence that the 
presumption has been rebutted for instance he gave a false account as to where he 
obtained the stolen goods. The motivation for the Court’s decision in this regard is 
questionable because there could be various reasons why the child told a lie.  
 
(ii) In R v Kaffir 1923CDP261 a child under the age of 12 years was prosecuted on a 
statutory offence of vagrancy because he walked through a fenced farm without the 
owner’s permission. The Court indicated that in the case of a child under 14, the 
presumption arises that he is doli incapax, but this presumption may be rebutted by 
evidence.  According to the Court it seems that in a case of an offence which is purely 
statutory, the evidence should be stronger than where the act complained about is malum 
in se. Here there was no evidence to show that this little boy knew that he was doing 
wrong when he went on to the farm in question. This case is important because it is clear 
that it is not about the general ability of the child to distinguish between right and wrong but 
rather whether he knew in this specific instance that he acted wrong. There must be 
evidence that the child knew that he was doing wrong when he went on the farm.   
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(iii) In 1924 in the case of the Attorney-General, Transvaal v Additional Magistrate of 
Johannesburg 1924AD421 the Appeal Court, although obiter remarked that the law of 
South Africa on this subject still is what it always has been, namely that a child under the 
age of 7 years is conclusively held to be doli incapax, and that a child between the ages of 
7 and 14 years is presumed to be doli incapax, but this presumption is rebuttable on proof 
of a malicious mind on the part of the child. 
 
(iv) In R v Mahwahwa and Another 1956(1)SA250(SR) the two 13-year-old accused 
were convicted of lighting a fire in a forest without authority. The fire had spread and 
caused damage. They both pleaded guilty and were found guilty. They stated that they 
were playing with matches and set fire to the grass, but that they thought they had put the 
fire out before they left. The review Court pointed out that there was nothing whatsoever in 
the evidence that shows that the accused appreciated that they were committing an 
unlawful act. The Court indicated that it is undesirable that youths of about 13 years of age 
should be prosecuted for statutory offences, which might often be no more than boyish 
pranks. The conviction was set aside because there was no evidence to rebut the 
presumption that the accused were doli incapax. 
 
(v) In R v K 1956(3)SA353(A) the Court decided that the State must show affirmatively 
that the child knew what the reasonable and probable consequences of his act would be.  
In this matter a child of 13 years of age was charged with murder. According to the 
evidence, the deceased (accused’s mother) was an inmate of a mental institution for about 
nine years.  After her release (about 3 years prior to the incident), she had relapses from 
time to time and became violent towards members of her family.  Whenever that happened 
the accused’s father left his home. He did so on the day of the murder. The accused’s 
sister stated that on the day of the murder, the deceased grabbed the accused and she 
separated them. The accused ran away and the deceased followed him with a plank.  
There was another struggle and the deceased fell down, collapsed and died in hospital.  
The accused ran away.  The father testified that the accused had a little pocket-knife for 
the purpose of sharpening pencils, the accused returned home a day after the murder, that 
the accused knew the difference between right and wrong, and that he thought the 
accused appreciated the fact that a knife could be dangerous. The review Court held that 
the State did not proof that at the time the accused used a sharp instrument in defending 
himself, knew that he was doing a wrongful act. The fact that the accused ran away may 
be explicable on the ground that he was too frightened to return to his home when the 
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deceased might still be awaiting him. The conviction was set aside because there was 
reasonable doubt whether the accused was doli capax and there is reasonable doubt 
whether, in all the circumstances of this case, his action exceeded the bounds of self-
defence. 
 
(vi) In R v Tsutso 1962(2)SA666SR a boy of 10 years pleaded guilty to a charge of 
culpable homicide and was convicted after he killed the deceased, who had a fight with his 
father. The only eyewitness was the wife of the deceased. The child stabbed the deceased 
with a knife and ran away to a pigsty. The magistrate, in his reasons, stated that it was 
impossible to say with exactitude what the accused thought at the moment of stabbing the 
deceased, whether his motive was revenge or whether he thought it was his duty to 
protect his father. According to the magistrate, the accused must have known that a knife 
is a dangerous instrument and in stabbing someone, he would cause harm to that person. 
The magistrate considered that fact that the accused ran away after the stabbing, as an 
indication that the accused knew full well that what he had done was wrong. The review 
Court differed from this and pointed out that the running away of the accused may also be 
explicable on the basis of the fright of a young child. The doctor who examined the 
accused a fortnight after the incident said that when he examined the accused he showed 
no sign of appreciating the full importance of the allegations. The conviction and sentence 
were set aside because the State failed to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the 
accused’s mind was sufficiently mature to understand and that he did understand the 
wrongful character of his conduct. 
 
(vii) In the case S v Van Dyk and Others 1969(1)SA601(CPD) an eleven-year-old child 
and two adults were charged with housebreaking with the intent to commit a crime 
unknown to the State. They all pleaded not guilty and, after evidence had been led to 
establish the commission of the offence, were all found guilty. The sentence imposed on 
the child was three strokes with a light cane. The case went on automatic review due to 
the sentence imposed on one of the adult accused. The review Judge requested reasons 
from the Magistrate for the conviction and sentence of the child.  The Court was doubtful, 
taking the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, of the fact that a child of 
eleven years in the position of this accused, would necessarily have appreciated the 
wrongfulness of his conduct.  Another important factor was that the principal participants 
were adult persons and the child might have acted under the coercion or influence of the 
adults. The Court stressed the fact that before convicting a child under the age of 14 years 
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on a charge of housebreaking, to which he has pleaded guilty, the presumption should be 
rebutted before convicting the child on his plea of guilty. 
 
(viii) In S v S 1977(3)SA305(OPA) the accused was 13 years of age when he committed 
the crime of sodomy.  The Court decided that a male under the age of 14 years can be 
convicted on attempt to commit sodomy and the Court found that the State has 
successfully rebutted the presumption of doli incapax. The accused admitted on the day 
that the offence was committed, that he had intercourse with the complainant (a three year 
old boy). He testified in the magistrate’s Court that he had intercourse with the complainant 
while the other children were not around and that he waited for them to go home, before 
he had intercourse with the complainant. He indicated that he waited for them to go home 
because he was afraid that they might tell the adults. He knew that he would get a hiding 
and that it was wrong to do what he did.  The review judge held that the child planned the 
offence and that he knew what he was doing because he was afraid of the punishment. 
 
(ix) In the matter of S v Pietersen and others 1983(4)904(ECD) three accused (of which 
2 were aged 9 according to the charge sheet) were charged with house breaking with the 
intent to steal and theft.  Accused no 1 was 18 years old.  All three pleaded guilty and were 
questioned in terms of section 112(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977.  The 
magistrate asked each of the accused whether they knew that they were doing wrong by 
breaking into and entering the house and to take stuff from it.  All three accused answered 
this question affirmatively. After the questioning had been completed the prosecutor called 
the father of accused no. 2 and he testified that he taught his child the difference between 
wrong and right, that he punished him if he has done something wrong and that he knew 
that he may not break into other people’s homes and steal their property.  The Court found 
that accused no. 2 was criminally responsible.  The same procedure was followed 
regarding accused no. 3 when his mother was called to testify and the Court also found 
him to be criminally responsible.  The review Court held that a proper decision, regarding a 
child offender’s criminal responsibility, could be reached in an appropriate case by 
questioning a youthful accused, who pleads guilty, in terms of section 112(1)(b) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977.  The Court also pointed out that where a child, aged 
between 7 and 14 years, is associated in the commission of a crime with an adult or even 
with a youth appreciably older than himself, the relationship between the two and the 
circumstances under which they both came to be involved, must be investigated before the 
child can be pronounced doli capax.  In this case it is clear that no such investigation was 
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embarked upon nor was the matter given any consideration by the magistrate. The fact 
that accused no. 2 and no. 3 agreed that they knew it was wrong to break in and steal, 
does not end the matter, nor does their parents’ evidence.  The 18 year old companion 
played a leading role. There must be a strong suggestion that he compelled, coerced or 
inveigled them into joining him in the crime. The Court stated that prosecuting authorities 
should appreciate that, when they charge young children of under 14 years together with 
adults or older youths, they accept the onus not only of proving that the children know that 
what they do is wrongful but also of proving that they do that with which they are charged 
of their own volition, uninfluenced by their older companions’ persuasion. The matter was 
referred back to the magistrate to deal with it in terms of section 113 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 (to enter a plea of not guilty and proceed with trial) since the 
accused have not been sentenced at the time of the review.   
 
(x) In the case S v Mbanda and others 1986(2)PHH108(T) three boys, of whom two 
were aged 11 and 12 years, were convicted of burglary and theft. The review Court 
pointed out that there is no indication that accused no. 1 (the 11 year old boy) was doli 
capax.  He was only asked whether he knew that it was wrong to break into a place, to 
enter it and to take the property for himself.  It does not proof that accused no. 1, at the 
time of the commission of the offence, knew that what he was doing constituted an 
offence.  From the welfare reports, it was clear that all three accused were street children, 
had no place to go to and had no fixed source of food. They saw the cakes and chocolates 
in the middle of the night and decided to break in. The State submitted that the one year 
age difference between accused no. 1 (11 years of age) and accused no. 2 (12 years of 
age) assisted in proving doli capax of the accused. The Court pointed out that the 
difference in the criminal capacity between an eleven year old and twelve year old can 
barely be measured.  The State’s submission that the fact that accused no. 1 received a 
postponed sentence 2 years previously for theft of a bicycle also proved he was doli 
capax, was also rejected by the Court.  No investigation was done to establish whether 
accused no. 1 and no. 2 were not influenced by accused no. 3 (an older boy).  The 
conviction and sentence were set aside. 
 
Van Oosten and Louw (1997:125) are of the opinion that, with reference to the Court’s 
decision in S v Mbanda (supra), although the Court reiterated and confirmed the test for 
criminal capacity of children applied by the Courts, it deviated from the norm by applying 
additional criteria for the criminal capacity of children between the ages of 7 and 14 years: 
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(i) Was the accused, at the time of the perpetration of the alleged crime, aware of the 
fact that he/she acted in contravention of the law or was he/she aware of such a 
possibility?; 
 
(ii) could the accused, at the time of the alleged perpetration of the crime, control 
his/her conduct?; and 
 
(iii) did the accused intended the consequences of his/her act or did he/she foresee the 
consequences as a possibility but acted notwithstanding such foresight? 
 
Van Oosten and Louw (1997:127) submit that this formulation is deficient and confusing 
because it fails to refer to the child’s ability to appreciate the nature and quality of his/her 
act and  the ability to distinguish between right and wrong.    
 
(xi) In S v F 1989(1)SA460(ZHC) the Court strongly censured the acting Attorney-
General of Zimbabwe for charging a 10 year old boy with indecent assault of an eight year 
old girl, and the Magistrate for convicting and sentencing him to four cuts.  In this mater the 
probation officer, after assessing the accused, recommended that the case be withdrawn 
and the matter settled under his professional counselling. The probation officer also stated 
that both the accused and the complainant were still too young to appreciate what goes on 
in a criminal Court of law, and that the accused was incapable of appreciating the 
wrongfulness of his alleged action. The Court also found that the presumption of incapacity 
had not been rebutted. 
 
(xii) In a recent case S v Ngobese and others 2002(1)SACR562 three children, one 13 
years of age and the other two 14 years of age, were convicted on a charge of 
housebreaking, attempt to steal and theft.  When they were confronted by the complainant 
they ran away.  The review Court held that no evidence of any nature whatsoever was led 
by the State to prove that the 13 year old accused was doli capax at the time of the 
commission of the crime. The Court points out that in no way was his conative capacity 
(his ability to resist temptation) assessed. The fact that the 13 year old accused was 
accompanied by two older boys prima facie makes the task of the State more difficult in 
proving that he knew what he was doing, at the time of the commission of the crime, was 
wrong. The Court found that there is no direct evidence to show that the 13 year old 
accused knew the difference between right and wrong, that he acted on such appreciation 
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within the circumstances of the case and that he did not act under the influence of his 
older co-accused.  The Court alluded to four factors relevant to the State when discharging 
the onus of proving that a child under 14 years is in fact doli capax (Community Law 
Centre (a)2003:1).  These factors are as follows: 
 
(a) the precise age of the child, as the presumption weakens with the advance of years 
towards 14, 
 
(b) the nature of the crime itself, as the presumption weakens where the offence is 
inherently bad, 
 
(c) the advancement of evidence that the particular accused appreciated the distinction 
between right and wrong, and 
 
(d) proof that he or she knew the act which had been committed by him or her was 
wrong within the content of the particular case.  
 
With reference to the matter of S v Ngobese (supra) Pantaziz and Friedman (2002:818) 
expresses the opinion that the second part of the criminal capacity test, the ability to act in 
accordance with the appreciation of the wrongfulness of one’s conduct, is lost in the 
judgment.  
 
Skelton (2006:1 – 5) indicates that on 24 May 2006 the Centre for Child Law presented a 
13 year old boy in an appeal before the Pietermaritzburg High Court.  The question before 
the Court was whether children below the age of criminal capacity could plead guilty by 
way of a written statement in terms of section 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 
1977.  The appeal was against his conviction and sentence handed down by the court a 
quo.  The child offender (13 years and 3 months) stabbed a 14 year old boy with a knife, 
and he was charged with murder.  The Court rejected the appeal and indicated that the 
child had been legally represented and this implied that the legal representative had 
canvassed the issue of criminal capacity before compiling the statement. 
 
The professionals were requested to comment on a statement that enough is being done 
in our legal system to ensure that all child offenders between the ages of 7 and 14 years 
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have the necessary criminal capacity before they are prosecuted. Their comments are 
indicated in table 4. 
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Table 4: Enough is being done to ensure that child offenders between 7-14 years have 
criminal capacity before prosecuted.   
View  Motivation Problems Suggestions/Advice 
Subjects 
2,4,6,7,8,9,10,11,
13,14,15 and 17 
disagreed 
Subject 2: SA has insufficient recourses 
to measure criminal capacity, especially 
in poorer sectors of society 
 
Subject 4: The role of other disciplines 
in determining criminal capacity is 
minimal 
 
Subject 6: Too little is being done with 
opposite effect i.e. prosecutions not 
instituted because they accept child too 
young and will be difficult to prove 
criminal capacity without assistance of 
assessment being done 
 
Subject 7: Virtually nothing is being 
done. It still happens that mother of 
child is called to testify of child’s 
knowledge of difference between right 
and wrong 
 
Subject 8: Substantive meaning and 
process of assessment misunderstood. 
Criminal Justice professionals have too 
little training in this aspect of the law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 9: Insufficient time is spend in 
Courts to establish criminal capacity 
 
Subject 10: Definitely not 
 
Subject 11: The decision to prosecute is 
taken on the statements in the dockets. 
Child has to appear in Court, if child is 
very young he/she is diverted.  
 
Subject 13: Some Courts don’t apply 
their minds, they just ask the child if 
he/she understand crime and result 
thereof.  A yes or no answer from the 
child is not sufficient proof of criminal 
capacity 
 
Subject 14: The actual assessments 
that are done are ridiculous and no 
proper time can be spend with these 
children for assessment as there are 
too few professionals and a lot of 
children. The competencies of the 
people doing the assessments are 
questionable.  
 
Subject 15: Too little knowledge and too 
little professional people 
 
Subject 17: Not correct. A more detailed 
assessment of emotional and 
psychological evaluation needed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 7: If young child 
pleads guilty to charge, 
often no inquiry into 
criminal capacity 
 
 
Subject 8: Do not have 
sufficient well trained 
professionals but long 
term costs (financially 
and socially) of 
wrongfully convicting 
children far outweigh 
putting in place 
adequate process 
 
 
 
 
Subject 4: Multi-functional and interdisciplinary 
approach needed. Social worker and 
psychologist should work together with other 
legal disciplines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 7: Neglected second leg of inquiry for 
very long time and it is not well handled by 
Court 
 
 
 
Subject 8: To protect children: irrebuttable 
presumption of doli incapax until 12 years, 
between 12-14 years intensive assessment 
with professional assistance and between 14-
18 years more responsibility to Courts with 
professional assistance, if necessary.  
Prosecutors and judicial officers should 
receive comprehensive training on issue 
 
 
Subject 9: Where there is uncertainty, the 
evaluation and assessment of a child by 
experts in child development/psychology 
should be called for 
 
Subject 11: Social worker must be called to 
testify 
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From table 4 it is clear that all twelve of the subjects, who answered this question 
disagreed with the statement that enough is being done in our legal system, to ensure that 
child offenders between the ages of 7 and 14 years have the necessary criminal capacity 
before they are prosecuted.  
 
Subjects 1, 3, 5, 12 and 16 responded by indicating that they have not been involved with 
children in the criminal justice system and are not in a position to comment in this regard. 
One of these subjects is a lawyer, three are criminologists and one is a social worker. 
 
The twelve subjects who disagreed with the statement submitted that our country have 
insufficient resources to measure criminal capacity, the role of other disciplines in 
determining criminal capacity is minimal, too little is being done. One subject went so far 
as to state that virtually nothing is being done and indicated that mothers are still called by 
the prosecution to prove their children’s criminal capacity. Another subject submitted that 
the substantive meaning and process of assessment is misunderstood and that Criminal 
Justice professional have too little training in this aspect of the law. It was also noted that 
insufficient time is spend in the Courts to establish criminal capacity, that some Courts do 
not apply their minds, they just ask the child if he/she understands crime and the result 
thereof. 
 
The problems pointed out in this regard include the fact that if a child pleads guilty, there is 
often no inquiry into his/her criminal capacity, that there are not enough sufficiently trained 
professionals in our criminal justice system. One subject stated that the long term costs 
(financially and socially) of wrongfully convicting children far outweigh the putting into 
place an adequate process. 
 
The fact that all twelve subjects, who responded to this question, disagreed with the 
statement that enough is being done in our legal system to ensure that child offenders 
between the ages of 7 – 14 years have criminal capacity before they are prosecuted, is an 
indication that we need a change in our criminal justice process to address this problem. 
 
The fact that three criminologists preferred not to answer this question because they have 
not been involved with children in conflict with the law, in the criminal justice system is an 
indication that criminologists in general should be encouraged to become involved in this 
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process as they can offer a valuable contribution to assist the Court in reaching a decision 
on criminal capacity.  
 
The extent of crimes committed by children, between the ages of 7 years and under 14 
years, is also of significance to understand the impact of how doli capax and doli incapax 
are applied in South Africa. 
 
3.5 Statistics on Children under 14 years in prison 
 
On 31 July 1995 only one child between the ages of 7 and 13 years was serving a prison 
sentence and this number increased to 4 children on 31 July 1996 and to 14 children on 
30 September 1997 (Sloth-Nielsen 1998:97).  On 31 October 1998 a total of 14 children 
were serving prison sentences (Sloth-Nielsen (a)1999:77). 
 
The Community Law Centre [(b)2003:10] indicates that over the five year period from 1998 
to 2003, a total of 74 children between the ages of 7 (inclusive) and 14 (exclusive) years 
were sentenced to prison.  Of these 40 were 13 years old at the time of sentencing, 18 
were 12 years old and 16 were between the ages of 7 and 11 years.  In 2001, a 12 year 
old was sentenced to imprisonment for 0-6 months on a charge of reckless and negligent 
driving and a 9 year old was sentenced to 0-6 months’ imprisonment for malicious damage 
to property. The statistics also indicated that two girls aged 11 years were sentenced to 
imprisonment during this time – one in 1998 and one in 2001. During the same five year 
period 89 children under the age of 14 years were awaiting trial in prison.  
 
Muntingh (2005:8) indicates that the total number of children in prison has been reduced to 
approximately the 1999-level and that the proportion of very young children has steadily 
decreased, although there are still some children under the age of 13 years in prisons.  
This does not comply with the spirit of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
From the above position it is clear that the determination of criminal capacity, especially in 
cases involving children in conflict with the law, is a very important aspect of our criminal 
justice system. Even though the concept of criminal capacity has been part of our legal 
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system for quite a long period of time, it is clear from the quoted case law that our Courts 
do not interpret and implement it uniformly.  Although there is some critique on the manner 
in which the Courts, in some instances, dealt with this concept, it is clear that our Courts 
do exercise caution in most cases where children between the ages of 7 and 14 years are 
involved.   
 
In the next chapter the proposed amendments to the common law regarding criminal 
capacity, by the Child Justice Bill, 2002 will be highlighted as well as the various 
submissions and the debates in Parliament relating to this issue. The important factors to 
be taken into account when the evaluation of a child’s criminal capacity is done will also be 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CRIMINAL CAPACITY IN THE CHILD JUSTICE BILL, 49 OF 2002 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
South Africa ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) on 16 
June 1995 (Sloth-Nielsen 1995:401, Ehlers 2002:33, Sewpaul: 2000:1; Skelton 1996:180). 
 
According to the South African Law Commission (2000:x), it was requested to undertake 
an investigation into juvenile justice and to make recommendations to the Minister of 
Justice for the reform of this particular area of the law, following the ratification of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.  An Issue Paper (South African Law 
Commission 1997) was published for comment during 1997 which proposed that a 
separate Bill should be drafted in order to provide for a cohesive set of procedures for the 
management of cases in which children are accused of crimes. The Issue Paper was the 
subject of consultation with both government and civil society role-players.  Towards the 
end of 1998 the Commission published a comprehensive Discussion Paper, accompanied 
by a draft Child Justice Bill, 2002. Wide consultation was held regarding this document, 
with all the relevant government departments and non-governmental organisations 
providing services in the field of juvenile justice being specifically targeted for inclusion in 
the consultation process. The draft Bill encapsulated a new system for children accused of 
crimes providing substantive law and procedures to cover all actions concerning the child 
from the moment of the offence being committed through to sentencing, including record-
keeping and special procedures to monitor the administration of the proposed new system.  
The workshops and seminars held regarding the Discussion Paper, as well as the written 
responses received, garnered substantial support for the basis objectives of the Bill as well 
as for the proposed structures and procedures (Ehlers 2002:33; Sloth-Nielsen 2003:175). 
 
Sloth-Nielsen [(b)1999:9] reports that a two-day seminar was held at the University of 
Pretoria, to discuss the issue of a minimum age for criminal capacity and whether or not 
the presumption of doli incapax should be retained in South African Law.  The contributors 
were drawn from a range of disciplines including psychology, education, the judiciary and 
other branches of the legal profession, social anthropology and criminology. Most of the 
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participants were reluctant to see a departure from the doli incapax presumption and most 
of them were in favour of raising the minimum age for criminal capacity to 10 years (Davel 
2001:605). 
 
In their report on Juvenile Justice, the South African Law Commission (2000:xii) 
recommends that the common law with regard to children below the age of 14 years be 
repealed.  The minimum age of criminal capacity is raised from 7 to 10 years. The 
rebuttable presumption of doli incapax with regard to children who are at least 10 years but 
not yet 14 years of age is codified (Davel 2001:605; Burchell & Milton 2005:364).  
 
In this chapter, the proposed amendments to the common law presumption relating to 
criminal capacity will be highlighted. A brief summary of the submissions made to the 
Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development on the issue of criminal 
capacity of children will be furnished.  An overview of the relevant factors, which the 
evaluation on the criminal capacity of a child must include, will also be furnished. 
 
4.2 Child Justice Bill, 49 of 2002 
 
The Child Justice Bill, 2002 was introduced into Parliament in August 2002 (Odongo 
2003:1; Sloth-Nielsen 2003:175).   
 
Public hearings were held on the Bill in February 2003 and the deliberations on the Bill by 
the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development followed in March 
2003. 
 
With regard to the issue of the minimum age of criminal capacity Odongo (2003:1) reports 
that the Portfolio Committee required an explanation for the decision to fix this age at 10 
years. The Parliamentary Monitoring Group [(a)2003:3] reports that on 20 February 2003 
the Chairperson for the Portfolio Committee requested a report on the research conducted 
to support the increasing of the minimum age for criminal capacity and information on the 
number of children between the ages of 7 and 10 years that had committed serious crimes 
during the past five years and the number of those children that have been convicted.  
 
On 25 February 2003 Prof. J. Sloth-Nielsen made a submission to the Portfolio Committee 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group (b)2003:1).  Sloth-Nielsen (2003:1–7) pointed out that 
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South Africa incurred an obligation when ratifying the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child to review the minimum age of criminal capacity and if it was found to be set to low, to 
raise it.  Sloth-Nielsen urged the Portfolio Committee to support the age of 10 years as the 
minimum age for criminal capacity. With regard to the retention of the rebuttable 
presumption of incapacity of children aged between 10 and 14 years, Sloth-Nielsen 
(2003:2) submitted that it is a useful mechanism in ensuring that children do benefit from 
this protection which exists in the common law at present. It was also indicated that it is 
especially apposite in a country such as South Africa, where children from different 
cultures and traditions, and from a wide array of rural, deep rural and urban areas, 
experience childhood very differently.  There are also children with intellectual disabilities 
who do not mature to full capacity at the same rate as children with normal abilities. 
 
The Restorative Justice Centre (2002:1) also made submissions on 25 February 2003 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group [(b)2003:1]), but it focused on restorative justice issues 
only. 
 
The National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO) 
(2002:3), in it’s submission on 25 February 2003, supported the increase of the minimum 
age for criminal capacity to 10 years and the retention of the rebuttable presumption of doli 
incapax for children between the ages of 10 years and below 14 years (Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group (b)2003:1). 
 
On 26 February 2003 both the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and the 
Child Justice Alliance made submissions to the Portfolio Committee (Parliamentary  
Monitoring Group (c)2003:1).  The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
(2002) focused on issues relating to Restorative Justice. The Child Justice Alliance 
(2002:2–3) also supported the raising of the minimum age for criminal capacity to 10 years 
and the retention of the doli incapax presumption.  It stated that the measures put into 
place by the Bill regarding the issuing of a certificate by the Director of Public Prosecutions 
will ensure that the prosecution properly applies its mind to the prosecution of children 
between the ages of 10 and below 14 years (Davel 2001:605). 
 
The deliberations are still in process and the Child Justice Bill, 2002 is not yet finalized.  
Further changes may still be made. 
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The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Ms Brigitte Mabandla on 20 May 
2005, indicated that the Child Justice Bill, 2002 is still pending before the Portfolio 
Committee and she expressed the hope that deliberations on it will resume in the very 
near future (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2005:2).  
 
United Nations (2000:5) indicates that the Committee on the Rights of the Child noted that 
South Africa has drafted legislation to increase the legal minimum age for criminal 
responsibility from 7 to 10 years, but remained concerned that the minimum age of 10 
years for criminal capacity is still relatively low. It was recommended that South Africa 
reassess the draft legislation on criminal responsibility with a view to increasing the 
proposed minimum age even higher (Sewpaul 2000:1–3). 
 
On the other hand, Cassim (1998:336) submits that the age limits for criminal capacity 
have hindered police efforts to control gangs of youths who exploit their age to commit 
crimes. It is furthermore submitted that lowering the age limit for criminal capacity will not 
only prevent exploitation of their ages by juvenile criminals, but it will also prevent 
manipulation of juvenile offenders by adults who use them to further their own nefarious 
ends. It will also help police efforts to address juvenile crime. 
 
Section 5 of the Child Justice Bill, 2002 deals with criminal capacity, and the decision 
whether or not to prosecute a child between the ages of 10 years and 14 years.  Section 5 
provides as follows: 
 
“Criminal Capacity” 
 
“5.(1) A child who commits an offence while under the age of 10 years cannot be 
prosecuted for that offence. 
 
(2) A child who commits an offence while under the age of 14 years is presumed not to 
have had the capacity to appreciate the difference between right and wrong and to act in 
accordance with that appreciation, unless the criminal capacity of the child is proved in 
accordance with section 56. 
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(3) If the Director of Public Prosecutions intends charging a child contemplated in 
subsection (2) with an offence, the Director or his or her delegate must issue a certificate 
confirming an intention to prosecute. 
 
(4) If the certificate contemplated in subsection (3) is not issued within 14 days after the 
preliminary inquiry, the Director of Public Prosecutions must be regarded as having 
declined to institute prosecution. 
 
(5) In issuing a certificate contemplated in subsection (3) the Director of Public 
Prosecutions may have regard to any relevant information, but must have regard to - 
 
 (a) the appropriateness of diversion; 
 
 (b) the educational level, cognitive ability, domestic and environmental                
circumstances, age and maturity of such child; 
 
 (c)  the nature and gravity of the alleged offence; 
 
 (d) the impact of the alleged offence upon any victim of such offence; and 
 
 (e) a probation officer’s assessment report. 
 
(6) The common law pertaining to the criminal capacity is hereby amended to the 
extent set out in this section.” 
 
With regard to the issuing of a certificate by the Director of Public Prosecutions in terms of 
subsections (3), (4) and (5), the Child Justice Alliance (2001:6) submits that this will 
strengthen the operation of the presumption of incapacity and it will prevent indiscriminate 
prosecution and ensure that the question of criminal capacity is appropriately evaluated. 
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Section 56 of the Child Justice Bill, 2002 deals with the establishment of criminal capacity 
and provides as follows: 
 
“Establishment of criminal capacity” 
 
“56.(1) The criminal capacity of a child over the age of 10 years but under the age of 14 
years must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
(2) The prosecutor or the child’s legal representative may request the child justice 
Court to order an evaluation of the child by a suitably qualified person to be conducted at 
State expense. 
 
(3) If an order has been made by the child justice Court in terms of subsection (2), the 
person identified to conduct an evaluation of the child must furnish the child justice Court 
with a written report of the evaluation within 30 days of the date of the order. 
 
(4) The evaluation must include an assessment of the cognitive, emotional, 
psychological and social development of the child. 
 
(5) The person who conducts the evaluation may be called to attend the child justice 
Court proceedings and give evidence and, if called, must be remunerated by the State in 
accordance with section 191 of the Criminal Procedure Act.” 
 
In 2001 Ehlers (2002:36) conducted a study to ascertain the opinions of children, at 
various stages in the criminal justice process, raging from those who had not had any 
contact with the formal legal system to those who had been convicted and already carrying 
out residential sentences, on the Child Justice Bill, 2002.  A total of 17 workshops were 
held in various centers and each group had between 20 to 25 participants (between the 
ages of 12 to 21 years).  Ehlers (2002:41) indicates that 71,5 percent of the participants 
felt that children of 10 years and under are incapable of planning and carrying out a 
criminal act on their own. 
 74
A brief summary on the provisions of the Child Justice Bill, 2002, regarding the increasing 
of the age for criminal capacity to 10 years, codification of the rebuttable presumption of 
doli incapax applicable children between the ages of 10 and below 14 years, were 
furnished to the professionals.  The statement that these provisions will adequately protect 
child offenders was posed to them and they responded as follows: 
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Table 5: Provisions in the Child Justice Bill, 2002 will adequately protect child offenders. 
View Motivation Problems Suggestions/Advice 
Subjects 
2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 
11,12,13 and 16 
agreed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subjects 1,14 and 
17 disagreed 
 
Subject 2: Will protect 
 
 
Subject 3: Will adequately protect 
 
 
Subject 4: Will offer better protection 
 
 
 
Subject 5: With Bill protection will 
increase 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 6: Will protect better 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 7: Believe protection will be 
improved 
 
Subject 8: Improvement on present 
situation 
 
 
 
 
Subject 9: The child’s evaluation 
upon request is greatly supported 
 
Subject 10: That is probably a better 
way to protect children 
 
Subject 11: It will create uniformity in 
the way these cases are dealt with 
and it provides something to work 
from 
 
Subject 12: Agree with proposed 
provisions 
 
Subject 13: Definitely better than we 
have at the moment.   
 
Subject 16: Ensure child is criminally 
liable before prosecution 
 
Subject 1: Protection same  
 
 
Subject 14: The provision says may 
instead of must assess/evaluate.  
Even before it comes to trial, pre-trial 
reports on children should focus on 
this important concept and not just on 
social circumstances as it is presently 
the case 
 
Subject 17: The evaluation should be 
automatic and not dependant on 
request by prosecutor or legal 
representative 
 
 
 
Subject 3: No need to increase 
age of criminal capacity 
 
Subject 4: More child-friendly 
and more flexible for individual 
differences 
 
Subject 5: Do not agree with 
increasing of minimum age for 
criminal capacity. Will send out 
wrong message – young 
children commit serious crimes 
 
 
Subject 6: An order might 
ensure thorough assessment 
and not so superficial as at 
present 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 8: Change in law not 
enough – training also needs 
to be done. If child is doli 
incapax Court’s responsibility 
should not stop – crime does 
not incur in vacuum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 1: Prosecutor must 
request evaluation before trial 
proceeds 
Subject 2: In-depth evaluation must 
be conducted by professional with 
required knowledge  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 5: Bill will work for “once 
off”  child offenders- not going to 
benefit children who grow up in 
environment conducive to crime, 
who are not held accountable and 
become repeat offenders   
 
Subject 6: Assessment for 
purposes of taking decisions on 
whether or not to prosecute, divert, 
to which program to divert to 
should be compulsory 
 
Subject 7: Bill provides for 
assessments at State expense 
 
Subject 8: Need a process whereby 
children who are doli incapax are 
referred to monitored programmes 
that offer remedial assistance that 
is appropriate  
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From table 5 there is a clear indication that thirteen of the subjects agreed with the 
statement that the provisions in the Child Justice Bill, 2002 regarding criminal capacity will 
adequately protect child offenders. The subjects who disagreed include two lawyers and 
one social worker. Subject 15, a criminologist did not respond to this question due to a lack 
of contact with children in the criminal justice system. 
 
Some of the subjects that agreed with the statement, however, indicated that they are of 
the opinion that there is no need to increase the minimum age for criminal capacity. One 
subject stated that a change in law is not enough and that training also needs to be done. 
Another subject submitted that an order to evaluate a child, might ensure a more thorough 
assessment being done as the assessments being done at the moment is very superficial.    
 
Further comments by the subjects included the fact that assessments for the purposes of 
taking decisions on whether or not to prosecute, diversion and to which program to divert 
to, should be compulsory. The need for a process whereby children who are doli incapax 
can be referred to and monitored was also expressed. One subject was of the opinion that 
the Child Justice Bill, 2002 will benefit first offenders and not children who grow up in an 
environment that is conducive to crime, because they are not held accountable for their 
acts and will become repeat offenders. 
 
One of the subjects (a lawyer) who disagreed with the statement indicated that the 
protection envisaged in the Child Justice Bill, 2002 is the same as it is at the moment. This 
subject however, noted that the prosecutor must request an evaluation before the trial 
proceeds. One subject who disagreed indicated that the provision states that a request for 
an evaluation may be made but he suggests that the wording should be must 
assess/evaluate. The other subject stated that the evaluation should be done automatically 
and should not be dependant on a request by the prosecutor or legal representative.  
 
The fact that the majority of the various professionals, who participated, agreed with the 
statement that the provisions of the Child Justice Bill, 2002 will adequately protect child 
offenders is an indication that these professionals are of the opinion that our country needs 
a separate criminal justice system for juvenile offenders, and that the Child Justice Bill, 
2002, in principle, will protect juvenile offenders. The process of getting the Child Justice 
Bill, 2002 approved by Parliament should therefore be prioritized and expedited.  
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4.3 Evaluation and Assessment of Criminal Capacity 
 
As indicated above the criminal capacity of a child between the ages of 10 years and 
under 14 years must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption, 
as stated in the common law, remains basically unchanged (except for the increase of the 
minimum age under which a child cannot be prosecuted to 10 years) and the State still has 
to prove that the child had the capacity to appreciate the difference between right and 
wrong and the capacity to act in accordance with that appreciation, at the time when the 
offence was committed. 
 
In terms of section 56(2) of the Child Justice Bill, 2002 the prosecutor or the child’s legal 
representative may request the Child Justice Court to order an evaluation of the child by a 
suitably qualified person to be conducted at State expense. If such an order has been 
made, the evaluation must be conducted and a written report furnished to the Court within 
30 days of the order.   
 
The questionnaire contained a statement that the evaluation of the child should be done 
before he/she appears in the Child Justice Court.  The responses to this statement are 
indicated in table 6.  
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Table 6:    The evaluation should be done before appearance in the Child Justice Court. 
View Motivation Problems Suggestions/Advice 
Subjects 
2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12
14,15,16 and 17 agreed  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subjects 1 and 13 
disagreed 
Subject 2: Would prevent further 
unnecessary trauma and contamination of 
the evaluation results 
 
Subject 3: Only fair to child 
 
Subject 4: If possible absolutely 
 
Subject 5: If child do not have criminal 
capacity best not to expose to Court 
situation 
 
Subject 6: Agreed 
 
 
 
Subject 7: As soon as possible after 
commission of the offence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 8: Assessment not expertise of 
prosecutor or judicial officer. Result 
should be placed before Court with expert 
to explain 
 
Subject 9: Adequate assessment takes 
time and skilled persons in a better 
position to place child’s background in 
context than Court officials 
 
Subject 10: Yes before he/she is 
traumatized further 
 
Subject 11: One would know what to do 
with child 
 
Subject 12: One should just be careful not 
to contaminate the child’s statements 
 
Subject 14: It will be great 
 
 
Subject 15: In cases of child offenders 
 
Subject 16: This will help to protect the 
child from being criminalized before 
criminal capacity is determined 
 
Subject 17: So that the Court is properly 
informed 
 
Subject 1: Should be done after decision 
to prosecute has been taken 
 
 
 
Subject 13: If order for evaluation is made 
by the Child Justice Court, it will carry 
more weight as it will be an order of the 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 5: Practical 
arrangements may be difficult. 
Who will make order? 
 
Subject 6: Child should not be 
assessed unless proceedings 
are pending 
 
Subject 7: in case in PMB 
evaluation concluded a year 
after commission of the 
offence. Psychologist could 
only guess what child’s 
development and capacity was 
like at commission of offence, 
weakened the evidence 
 
Subject 8: Needs of doli 
incapax child may not be 
addressed and may not be 
diverted away from pattern of 
criminal behaviour  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 14: During the trial a 
further assessment can be 
done if necessary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 1; Child must appear 
in Court within 48 hours after 
arrest – may impose on this 
right. Innocent until proven 
guilty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 1: Court should 
order assessment after 
argument by State and 
defence 
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Table 6 clearly indicates that the majority of the subjects (15), who participated, agreed 
with the statement that the evaluation of the child should be done before he/she appears in 
the Child Justice Court. The two subjects who disagreed with the statement are two 
lawyers. 
 
The motivation by the fifteen subjects who agreed with the statement includes that it will 
prevent further trauma and contamination of the evaluation results, that it will be fair to the 
child, that if the child is doli incapax the child does not have to be exposed to the Court 
situation, it will ensure that the Court is properly informed and it will prevent the child from 
being criminalized before criminal capacity is determined. 
 
One of the subjects who disagreed stated that the evaluation should only be done after the 
decision to prosecute has been taken. It was also submitted that the Court should order an 
assessment after argument by the State and the defence. The other subject stated that an 
order for evaluation by the Court will carry more weight. 
 
The problems foreseen in this regard relate to the practicalities of such an arrangement.  
 
One subject pointed out that if the assessment is not done as soon as possible after the 
commission of the offence, the psychologist or the person who conducts the assessment 
can only guess what the child’s development and capacity was at the time of the 
commission of the offence. 
 
The fact that fifteen of the subjects agreed with the statement that the evaluation should be 
done before the appearance in the Child Justice Court is a clear indication that there is a 
need for the assessment of the child offender as soon as possible to enable all the 
relevant role players to make the correct and informed decisions about the child offender 
at the beginning of the process.  This will be in the best interest of the child. 
 
Section 56(4) states that, if an evaluation has been ordered, such evaluation must include 
an assessment of the cognitive, emotional, psychological and social development of the 
child. The focus will be mainly on the development of children between the ages of 10 
years and under 14 years, since this is the age bracket that the provisions relating to the 
presumption of criminal capacity applies to. 
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4.3.1 Cognitive Development 
 
In terms of section 5(5) of the Child Justice Bill, 2002, the Director of Public Prosecutions 
must issue a certificate when he/she decides to prosecute a child offender between the 
age of 10 years and under 14 years.  When making this decision, various factors must be 
taken into account, amongst others, the cognitive ability of the child. The information 
furnished here, aims to give general guidelines to assist in this decision and in no way 
purport to be an absolute and complete psychological explanation on the cognitive 
development of a child. An assessment of the cognitive development of a child must be 
done by a psychiatrist and does not fall within the ambit of this document. It is a mere 
practical guideline and summary to lay persons in the field of psychology, and is meant to 
assist the Court, prosecutors and other role-players understanding the basic cognitive 
development of children in general.   
 
As indicated in Chapter 2, Snyman (2002:161–163) pointed out that the ability to 
distinguish between right and wrong forms part of a person’s cognitive mental function 
which is related to a person’s reason or intellect.  In other words, a person’s ability to 
perceive, to reason and to remember and the emphasis are on a person’s insight and 
understanding.     
 
Piaget (1967:88–99; Wadsworth 1996:26; Campbell 1976:1–14) give the following 
summary of Piaget’s different stages of cognitive development: 
 
(i) The stage of concrete operations (7 – 11 years).  During these years, the child 
develops the ability to apply logical thought to concrete problems in the present. 
 
(ii) The stage of formal operations (11 – 15 years or older).  During this stage, the child’s 
cognitive structures reach their greatest level of development and the child becomes 
capable of applying logical reasoning to all classes of problems. 
 
The chronological ages during which children can be expected to develop and behave and 
be representative of a particular stage are not fixed. Piaget (1967:88–99; Wadsworth 
1996:26; Campbell 1976:1–14) point out that the age spans suggested are normative and 
denote the times during which the typical or average child can be expected to display the 
intellectual behaviours that are characteristic of the particular level.  One aspect of Piaget’s 
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theory is fixed namely that every child must pass through the levels of cognitive 
development in the same order.  A child cannot move intellectually from the preoperational 
level to formal operations without passing through concrete operations. 
 
Piaget (1967:88–99; Wadsworth 1996:26; Campbell 1976:1–14) refers to another 
interesting social and moral topic investigated and that is the development of children’s 
concepts about lying.  Before the age of 6 or 7 years, most children view a lie as 
something that is naughty.  In addition, young children usually consider involuntary errors 
to be lies.  Between the ages of 6 or 7 and 10 years or so, a lie is typically viewed as 
something that is not true. A false statement is viewed as a lie regardless of the intent.  It if 
is not true, then it is a lie.  Only after the age of 10 or 11 years do children begin to 
recognize intentions in relation to lying. 
 
Piaget (1967:88–99; Wadsworth 1996:26; Campbell 1976:1–14) states that during the 
development of concrete operations (ages 7 – 11 years), a child’s reasoning processes 
becomes logical.  Piaget’s (1967:88–99) research revealed that children’s concepts of 
justice change as they develop.  Preoperational children consider rules as fixed and 
unchangeable. Just punishments are harsh and often arbitrary (expiatory punishment). 
During concrete operational development, children construct a better, though not 
complete, understanding of laws and rules. They begin to consider the role of intentions in 
deciding what is just.  In addition, concrete operational children increasingly come to 
regard punishment by reciprocity as more appropriate than expiatory punishment.   
 
The child is increasingly capable of evaluating arguments rather than simply accepting 
preformed unilateral ideas.  This is accompanied by an understanding of intentionality and 
an increased capability of considering motives when making judgments. Growth can be 
seen in children’s moral concepts, such as their understanding of rules, lying, accidents, 
and justice.   
 
Piaget (1967:88–99; Wadsworth 1996:26; Campbell 1976:1–14) indicates that during the 
development of formal operations, which typically begins around age 11 or 12, a child 
constructs the reasoning and logic to solve all classes of problems.  There is a freeing of 
thought from direct experience. The child’s cognitive structures reach maturity during this 
stage.  That is, his or her potential quality of reasoning or though is at its maximum when 
formal operations are fully developed.  After this stage, there are no further structural 
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improvements in the quality of reasoning. The adolescent with fully developed formal 
operations typically has the cognitive structural equipment to think as well as adults. This 
does not mean that the thinking of the adolescent with formal reasoning is necessarily as 
good as adult thought in a particular instance, although it may be as logical or well-
reasoned; it means only that the potential has been achieved. Both adults and adolescents 
with formal operations reason using the same logical processes.  The development of 
moral reasoning begins with sensorimotor development and reaches its highest levels 
when formal operations and affective development are fully developed.   
 
Around the beginning of formal operations, at age 11 or 12, most children construct a 
relatively sophisticated understanding of rules. The rules of the game are seen as fixed at 
any point in time by mutual agreement and changeable through mutual agreement. The 
earlier belief that rules are permanent and externally imposed by an authority is no longer 
present.  At this stage, the rules in use are known to all, and all agree on what the rules 
are.  Adolescents recognize fully that rules are necessary in order to cooperate and play 
the game effectively.  There also seems to be an interest in rules for their own sake 
(Piaget 1967:88–99; Wadsworth 1996:26; Campbell 1976:1–14). 
 
Piaget’s theory on the relationship between children’s cognitive development and the 
development of concepts of rules, accidents, lying and justice and can be tabularized as 
follows (Piaget 1967:88–99; Wadsworth 1996:26; Campbell 1976:1–14): 
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Table 7: Piaget’s theory on the cognitive development of children. 
Cognitive 
Development 
Rules Accidents Lying Justice 
Concrete 
operations (7 – 
11 years) 
Incipient 
cooperation.  
Rules 
observed, 
though little 
agreement as 
to what the 
rules are 
Intentions 
begin to be 
considered.  
Children begin 
to take the 
view of others 
Lie = not true.  
Unpunished 
untruths are 
lies 
Justice based on 
reciprocity.  
Equality more 
important than 
authority 
Formal 
operations (after 
11 – 12 years) 
Codification of 
rules.  Rules 
known to all; 
agreement as 
to what the 
rules are; 
rules can be 
changed by 
consensus; 
rules of 
interest for 
their own sake 
 Intentions 
decide 
whether a 
false 
statement is 
not a lie.  
Truthfulness 
viewed as 
necessary for 
cooperation 
Equality with 
equity.  
Reciprocity 
considers intent 
and 
circumstances 
 
 
Moffatt (2002:51) states that children are incapable of abstract reasoning prior to 
adolescence. Abstract issues are those that cannot be perceived by one or more of the 
five senses. Concepts like faith, hope, and wrong and right are abstract issues that can be 
partially addressed in concrete terms, but their deeper meaning is abstract. Determining 
right and wrong in a given situation involves more than just knowing the rules. Prior to the 
age of 12 or 13 years, children cannot fully understand abstract issues. 
 
UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre (2005:9) points out that some of the more dominant 
theoretical approaches influencing the current understanding of childhood are rooted in 
assumptions that development is a staged process, whether with respect to physical, 
moral, social, emotional or intellectual capacity. This traditional approach has often been 
linked to research methods influenced by the biological and physical sciences. UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre (2005:9) refers to Piaget, who argued that children’s 
development takes place as a series of discrete stages, stated above. Piaget’s work has 
been taken up and reinforced by subsequent generations of researchers, and has had a 
profound influence on the work of all professions involved with children. UNICEF Innocenti 
Research Centre (2005:9-10) submits that most of the research on which conventional 
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theories are based originates in European and North American contexts and reflects 
presumptions about childhood in those societies. For example these theories assume that 
childhood is a period of time for nurturing, care, play and learning and free from the 
demands of responsibility or employment. However, this is not the reality for many millions 
of children throughout the world. UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre (2005:10) 
furthermore submits that the model of childhood arising from staged theories is 
characterised by the assumption of a natural order in which children are dependent and 
there are incontrovertible rules governing progress towards adulthood. This view takes no 
account of the impact of factors such as family, age of siblings, culture, power, status or 
social and economical context on the process of children’s development. The assumption 
of fixed developmental stages also pathologises many children with disabilities whose 
capacities may, for a variety of reasons, evolve more slowly or in different ways from the 
majority of children in a given population. The fact of their difference is viewed as evidence 
of incapacity to develop. These theories have also been developed by researchers 
observing the very particular childhoods experienced by children in economically 
advanced Western societies (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 2005:11). UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre (2005:12-13) indicates that theories in developmental 
psychology have moved beyond these traditional prescriptive models to embrace a more 
cultural, social and contextual understanding of how children grow up. However, these 
ideas have not sufficiently permeated the wider world to influence law, policy and practice 
impacting on children’s lives. In many areas of social policy, for example early childhood 
development and juvenile justice thinking remains strongly influenced by overly 
prescriptive assumptions about children’s development. 
  
Van Niekerk (2001) (National Coordinator for Childline, SA) wrote a comprehensive 
overview in the Child Law Manuel for Prosecutors regarding the general development of a 
child.  Her overview was judged to suffice for the purposes of this research.  Van Niekerk 
(2001:A3-2 – A3-9) gives the following overview of cognitive development: 
 
Cognitive development in all children, as with other aspects of development, follows 
through certain stages that are generally associated with chronological ages. Elements of 
the child’s physical and emotional environment can affect development of all aspects of a 
child’s growth, including cognitive development. 
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Children from 7 to 12 years 
 
From about the age of 7 years, children begin to develop a more mature understanding of 
events in their lives and their ability to think on an abstract level starts to become more 
complex. Their ability to link cause and effect to less tangible issues increases. At this age, 
thinking becomes more abstract and children begin to develop the ability to manage more 
complex cause-effect thinking (Van Niekerk 2001:A3-2 – A3-9). 
 
Children from 13 years to early adulthood 
 
The ability of children at this age to think abstractly becomes more advanced and they are 
more often able to manage complex thinking processes. 
 
The process of cognitive development that all children go through, has implications for how 
children will interact with and interprets their experience of the criminal justice system.  It is 
important to remember that children will probably understand very little about the legal 
process, the role-players, the procedures and the long-term implications of some of the 
possible outcomes. This may contribute to increased anxiety in the child and underlines 
the importance of simple education programmes for children who undergo investigations 
(police and medical) and attend Court (Van Niekerk 2001:A3-2 – A3-9). 
 
Issues relating to memory 
 
Research indicates that the ability of children to recall events and experiences in their own 
lives is as reliable as that of adult ability to recall childhood events – perhaps more so, as 
children’s life experiences are more limited and therefore memory may not be as distorted 
or overlaid by connections to other life experiences. However, there are some very 
important factors to remember when trying to access a child’s memory of events (Van 
Niekerk 2001:A3-2 – A3-9). 
 
(i) The more anxious the child, the less able the child will be to access information in 
memory. The more relaxed the child in the situation of recall, the more likely it is that the 
child will be able to retrieve the required information from memory. It is thus essential that 
the interview/questioning environment be relaxed, the interviewer be relaxed, and some 
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time be spent in developing rapport with the child. It may also be important for a support 
person to be present to reduce anxiety. 
 
(ii) The cues that enable a child to access memory and produce information about an 
event need to have meaning for that child. It is therefore essential to use language that the 
child understands. 
 
(iii) Young children – like adults – are vulnerable to distortions created by suggestion. 
 
(iv) Memories of young children may be susceptible to fading.  However, fading may be 
reduced if the child has superior knowledge of the subject matter, if the event has 
significance for the child, and if actions are central and familiar to the child. 
 
(v) Memory may be affected by trauma. Sometimes an event may be so overwhelming to 
the child’s psyche that the child may actively or subconsciously suppress, repress or 
distort memory to facilitate coping. 
 
(vi) Factors that affect recall in children (and adults) include: delay; stress; the 
interviewing technique; the interviewing environment; the presence or absence of a 
support person; the status of the interviewer as perceived by the child; and visual cues or 
questions used to help the process of recall. 
 
A good interviewing environment in which recall of an event is required should not be 
cluttered or distracting but warm and comfortable. It should not be a play environment 
although limited play material may be present to help the child relax. 
 
Van Niekerk (2001:A3-2 – A3-9) indicates that both adults’ and children’s memories 
weaken over time, but that children’s memories appear to become more incomplete over 
time compared to adults in relation to peripheral events, rather than to central or salient 
events. This underlines the importance of ensuring speedy resolution of the legal process 
for children. 
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Concentration 
 
It is important to be aware that the ability to concentrate is affected by the child’s level of 
cognitive development and also by the child’s physiological development. Emotional 
distress and trauma may significantly affect concentration. 
 
Concentration time periods need to be assessed when working with children and periods 
of focused questioning need to be linked to the ability of the child to attend and 
concentrate. Generally, concentration and attention spans increase with age and 
developmental progress but, for some children, concentration fails to develop. 
 
The submissions by UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre (2005:9-13) relating to the 
conventional theories on children’s development are especially applicable to our country 
with its diversity of cultures, beliefs, social and economical status and traditions.  The 
conventional theories provide guidelines for the assessment of the cognitive development 
but it is of utmost importance that all professionals, especially those dealing with children 
in conflict with the law, take cognizance of the role that cultural, social and economical 
factors play in the cognitive development of children in our society. It is suggested that 
further research, with the specific needs of our country be conducted with the view of 
developing assessment measures/theories of the cognitive development of children, which 
will specifically apply the children in South Africa.  
 
4.3.2 Emotional Development 
 
Van Niekerk (2001:A3-2 – A3-9) gives the following guidelines regarding emotional 
development of children: 
 
Although emotions are experienced at all ages, the ability to describe and manage feelings 
may differ across age groups. They may be related to other developmental factors; and 
they may also be linked to cultural issues. 
 
It is important to note that the child’s demeanour (appearance) and/or ability to describe 
feelings may not be congruent with what the child may have experienced. 
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Children from 5 to 12 years 
 
From the age of 5 to 12 years, children learn to label the emotions they are experiencing, 
and events are responded to with more appropriate emotional responsiveness (by adult 
definition). 
 
Suppression may often be a successful defence against uncomfortable emotion. Children 
of this age are also aware that they should have some level of control over their feelings, 
that they are capable of appropriate and even strong feelings of guilt, and that they may 
actually fear the loss of control of emotion. 
 
The National Scientific Council on the Developing Child (2005:1) states that the core 
features of emotional development include the ability to identify and understand one’s own 
feelings, to accurately read and comprehend emotional states in others, to manage strong 
emotions and their expression in a constructive manner, to regulate one’s own behaviour, 
to develop empathy for others and to establish and sustain relationships.  Emotional 
development is actually built into the architecture of young children’s brains in response to 
their individual personal experience and the influences of the environments in which they 
live.  As young children develop, their early emotional experiences literally become 
embedded in the architecture of their brains. By the end of the preschool years, children 
who have acquired a strong emotional foundation have the capacity to anticipate, talk 
about and use their awareness of their own and others’ feelings to better manage 
everyday social interaction. Their emotional repertoires have expanded dramatically and 
now include such feelings as pride, shame, guilt and embarrassment – all of which 
influence how individuals function as contributing members of a society.   
 
The National Scientific Council on the Developing Child (2005:2) points out that when 
feelings are not well managed, thinking can be impaired.  Recent scientific advances have 
shown how the interrelated development of emotion and cognition relies on the 
emergence, maturation and interconnection of complex neural circuits in multiple areas of 
the brain. The circuits that are involved in the regulation of emotion are highly interactive 
with those that are associated with executive functions, such as planning, judgment and 
decision making, which are intimately involved in the development of problem-solving skills 
during the preschool years. In terms of basic brain functioning, emotions support executive 
functions when they are well regulated but interfere with attention and decision making 
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when they are poorly controlled. Young children are capable of surprisingly deep and 
intense feelings of sadness (including depression), grief, anxiety and anger (which can 
result in unmanageable aggression), in addition to the heights of joy and happiness for 
which they are better known. For some children, the preschool years mark the beginning 
of enduring emotional difficulties and mental-health problems that may become more 
severe than earlier generations of parents and clinicians ever suspected. 
 
The emotional health of young children – or the absence of it – is closely tied to the social 
and emotional characteristics of the environments in which they live, which include not 
only their parents but also the broader context of their families and communities. Young 
children who grow up in homes that are troubled by parental mental-health problems, 
substance abuse or family violence, face significant threats to their own emotional 
development. In fact, the experience of chronic, extreme and/or uncontrollable 
maltreatment has been documented as producing measurable changes in the immature 
brain.   
 
According to the National Scientific Council on the Developing Child (2005:3) there is no 
credible scientific evidence that young children who have been exposed to violence will 
invariably grow up to be violent adults themselves. Although these children clearly are at 
greater risk for adverse impacts on brain development and later problems with aggression, 
they are not doomed to poor outcomes, and they can be helped substantially if provided 
with early and appropriate treatment, combined with reliable and nurturing relationships 
with supportive caregivers. Science does not support the claim that infants and toddlers 
are too young to have serious mental-health problems.  In fact, young children who have 
experienced significant maltreatment exhibit an early childhood equivalent of post-
traumatic stress disorder, which presents a predictable array of clinical symptoms that are 
amenable to successful therapeutic intervention.   
 
The emotional development of children is a very important aspect when assessing criminal 
capacity in children because the way children deal with their emotions, as indicated above, 
plays an important part in how they behave and act. Children’s emotional wellbeing is 
usually one of the aspects that are neglected in society and in some cultures and traditions 
children, especially boys, are taught not to show how they feel. Professionals dealing with 
children in the criminal justice system should be informed of the different levels of 
emotional development of children to be able to effectively assess and communicate these 
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children. They should also be sensitive towards the different approaches of the different 
cultures regarding this issue (National Scientific Council on the Developing Child 2005:3). 
 
4.3.3 Psychological Development 
 
As indicated above, in terms of section 56(1) of the Child Justice Bill, 2002, the State has 
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a child had the ability to distinguish between right 
and wrong and that the child had the ability to conduct himself/herself in accordance with 
this insight into right and wrong, at the time of the commissioning of the offence.   
 
Snyman (2002:161–163) referred to the second leg of the test as the conative mental 
function. This consist of a person’s ability to control his behaviour in accordance with 
his/her insights. The conative function therefore means that unlike an animal, the person is 
able to make a decision, set himself a goal, to pursue it, and to resist impulses or desires 
to act contrary to what his insights into right and wrong reveal to him. 
 
The Rumpff Report (1967:43–45) states that the psychologist makes a study of the mind in 
general and attempts to determine the influences, either external or originating within the 
personality itself, which affect all human actions. After examination he is able to indicate 
the emotions, considerations and tendencies which contributed to the performance of a 
specific action. In law the question of non-responsibility is solved by means of an inquiry 
into pathological mental abnormalities, but even where none such are found, the 
psychologist’s evidence may nevertheless be of great importance in regard to the question 
of diminished responsibility.   
 
Psychology defines the human personality as a dynamic integration of psycho-physical 
functions by which purposeful behaviour is made possible. This means in the first place 
that mind and body constitute a whole:  the mental functions are very closely integrated 
with the physiological and biochemical reactions in the body. Physical changes can 
influence mental functions, and similarly mental processes can cause physical changes.  
Most physical reactions are reflexive, i.e. involuntary, a person having no control over most 
of these internal reactions (e.g. palpitations, blushing, pain in the pit of the stomach).  But 
when it comes to a voluntary muscular activity it is a different matter altogether, for then 
the person is able to control his behaviour by exercising his will. The normal personality is 
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therefore not the slave of morbid urges or impulses welling up within him.  He is able 
deliberately to inhibit them (Rumpff Report 1967:43–45).   
 
The definition implies that every normal person is able to set himself an aim and to pursue 
it purposefully – or he may even decide not to pursue it. An animal cannot do this. An 
animal acts instinctively. It is precisely because of this difference between men and 
animals that a human being can be held responsible for his pre-planned actions.  For other 
forms of behaviour – reflex actions, automatisms – where volition does not enter, a person 
can hardly be held accountable. So-called impulsive tendencies, however, cannot simply 
be included in the latter group of activities. To elucidate this point a brief reference is made 
to the normal mental functions of the adult personality (Rumpff Report 1967:43–45). 
 
For the sake of convenience the report distinguish three categories of mental functions in 
human beings, namely, the cognitive, the affective, and the conative.   
 
With reference to conative activities the Rumpff Report (1967:43) states that man, unlike 
an animal, is capable of controlling his behaviour by voluntarily exercising his will. He is 
able to set himself an aim and to decide to pursue or to reject it, depending on his own 
insight into the value of this aim.  Such acts of volition on the part of human beings, and 
especially on the normal adult personality, are of paramount importance when it comes to 
judging his behaviour in terms of ethical, moral and social standards or criteria. This brings 
us to the question of freedom of the will, and immediately also to man’s responsibility for 
his acts of volition, i.e. voluntary behaviour.   
 
The Rumpff Report (1967:45) points out that “Two psychological factors render a person 
responsible for his voluntary acts: First, the free choice, decision and voluntary action of 
which he is capable, and second, his capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, 
good and evil, (insight) before committing the act. Insight or understanding presupposes 
intelligence. The more intelligent person also has better insight, is better able to reason 
abstractly and to plan ahead (and therefore also to foresee the consequences of his 
actions) than the less intelligent or mentally retarded person.  The IQ can be measured by 
means of standardised intelligence tests, in this connection particularly in order to 
determine whether at the time the act was committed the person had the necessary insight 
into his actions and their consequences.  If, for instance, he is intellectually within the 
normal limits, and was not mentally ill or in a state of confusion (amnesia, fugue, 
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automatism) at the time when he committed the act, then it may be assumed that he also 
had the necessary volitional control over his actions and may be held responsible. The two 
psychological factors which render a person responsible for his voluntary actions, namely 
free choice and the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, are factors which 
have given rise to the establishment in the various legal systems of the two psychological 
criteria of criminal responsibility, namely insight and self-control or powers of resistance. 
With regard to the concept of self-control or powers of resistance, it is stated that, self-
control is to be understood a disposition of the perpetrator through which his insight into 
the unlawful nature of a particular act can restrain him from, and thus set up a counter-
motive to, its execution.  Self-control is simply the force which insight into the unlawfulness 
of the proposed act can exercise in that it constitutes a counter-motive.  In normal non-
criminal persons the idea of committing an unlawful act arouses aversion. Only where very 
strong motives are present to promote the execution of such an act, is a crime actually 
committed.  But where insight into the unlawfulness of the act, even though present, 
arouses no aversion at all, so that such insight cannot operate as a counter-motive, there 
is no self-control.” 
 
In their most recent work, Cauffman and Steinberg (2000:743) adapt the term maturity of 
judgment to describe the interface of cognitive, social and emotional influences on juvenile 
functioning and decision making.  The authors elaborate on the meaning of maturity of 
judgment. The first is that judgment refers to the process of decision-making, and not to 
any particular decision outcome.  Maturity of judgment, then, refers to the way that the 
process of decision-making changes with development. The question of whether a juvenile 
offender, ought to have known better, cannot be answered by looking only at the nature of 
his or her behaviour. The second point about maturity of judgment is that judgment is 
neither exclusively cognitive nor exclusively psychological; it is the by-product of both sets 
of influences.  Accordingly, an individual can exhibit poor judgment because of some sort 
of intellectual deficiency, such as faulty logic or ignorance of some crucial piece of 
information; because of some emotional or social shortcoming, such as impulsivity or 
susceptibility to peer pressure; or both. Cauffman and Steinberg (2000:743) argue that a 
young teen who robs a liquor store with his friends exhibits poor judgment regardless of 
whether he does so because he miscalculates the likelihood of violence, or whether he 
does so because he was encouraged by his friends or feared their disapproval. The 
question is not whether robbing a liquor store is a bad decision.  The question is whether 
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this decision arose from factors that put adolescents, relative to adults, at an inherent 
disadvantage when faced with choices in potentially antisocial situations. 
 
According to Cauffman and Steinberg (2000:744) there may well exist psychosocial factors 
that affect the sorts of decision individuals make that follow a developmental progression 
between adolescence and adulthood. They propose a model of maturity of judgment that 
emphasizes three broad categories of psychosocial factors that are likely to affect the 
ways in which individuals make decisions, including decisions to commit antisocial or 
criminal acts. These three categories of psychosocial factors include (1) responsibility, 
which encompasses such characteristics as self-reliance, clarity of identity, and 
independence; (2) perspective, which refers to one’s likelihood of considering situations 
from different viewpoints and placing them in broader social and temporal contexts; and 
(3) temperance, which refers to tendencies to limit impulsivity and to evaluate situations 
before acting. These categories are not mutually exclusive, nor are they without some 
cognitive elements. The ability to appreciate the long term consequences of an action, for 
example, is an important element of perspective, but requires the cognitive ability to weight 
risks and benefits, and is related to the ability to forgo immediate gratification, which is an 
element of temperance.   
 
Cauffman and Steinberg (2000:757) believe that risk-taking is the by-product of an 
interaction between cognitive and psychosocial factors. It is adolescents’ deficiencies in 
the psychosocial domain, not the cognitive domain, that lead them to take more chances 
and to get into more trouble.   
 
The authors conclude that psychosocial characteristics continue to develop during late 
adolescence, and that these changes result in significant declines in antisocial decision-
making.   
 
4.3.4 Social Development 
 
Van Niekerk (2001:A3-2 – A3-9) gives the following guidelines regarding social 
development of a child: 
 
The social group, particularly the family, is essential to the holistic development of children. 
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Children from 3 to 12 years 
 
Children from 3 to 12 years of age have a stronger desire to please, and during this phase, 
learn to share and to give and take. Peer relationships take on an important value and 
friendships outside the immediate family take on great importance. However, the 
immediate family is experienced as the “secure base” from which to explore the world and 
to which one returns for support and resources. 
 
Children from 13 years to early adulthood 
 
Children over the age of 12 are acutely aware of peer relationships and usually attach 
great importance to belonging to and having an identity with a peer group. Peer group 
pressure is therefore a powerful force and the need to be seen as “grown up” is strong and 
often gives a sense of status to the teenager. This age group may also experience a return 
to egocentric preoccupation with the self, particularly with physical body image.  
Separation from close family and the need for independence may begin during this phase, 
and power struggles between caretakers on one hand and children in this stage of 
development on the other are a normal part of the struggle for independence and 
autonomy. 
 
In a consultation document by the Home Office of the United Kingdom Government (Home 
Office (b)1997:1) it is stated that people are influenced throughout their lives, especially as 
they grow up, by a variety of factors which may lead them towards, or away from, crime.  
The single most important influence on a child’s development is that of the family. Those 
children who show signs of criminal behaviour at an early age are those who are most 
likely to end up as serious or persistent offenders. Such children often come from 
communities and families which are unstable, chaotic and suffer from a number of 
problems. Their parents are likely to have a criminal record, to neglect their children, or to 
exercise low levels of supervision and harsh and erratic discipline, and themselves come 
from similar families. Children who are exposed to abuse and neglect within a climate of 
hostility at home are particularly at risk of becoming violent offenders. 
 
According to the consultation document (Home Office (b)1997:2) children’s behaviour and 
attitudes are shaped and influenced by their experiences at school. Children who offend 
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are more likely than others to fail at school, to play truant persistently, to behave 
disruptively or be permanently excluded from school. 
 
The consultation document (Home Office 1997:3) points out that juvenile offenders often 
commit offences with others. The use of leisure time, and peer pressure, can influence the 
likelihood of offending. Those who spend their leisure time in unstructured and 
unsupervised activity on the streets are more at risk of offending.   
 
According to Earl-Taylor (Maughon & Geduld 2004:1) children who kill are not born violent, 
but are created by their social circumstances. He indicates that most children who kill have 
themselves been subjected to violence. According to Earl-Taylor, murders committed by 
groups of children usually involves on principal instigator, whose behaviour is followed by 
the other. Children become socialised into violent behaviour in four stages.  First, they are 
the subjects of physical, sexual or emotional abuse or neglect. They then witness violent 
behaviour, which is frequently committed by their father against the mother in the child’s 
home.  In the third stage, the child becomes involved in violent coaching, modelling role-
playing behaviour on the violence they witness in their immediate surroundings. In the final 
stage, they start enacting violent behaviour.   
 
The Australian Institute of Criminology (1990:77–84) states that all human behaviour 
results from the interaction of genetic and environmental factors, and violent behaviour is 
no exception. Evidence strongly suggest that such behaviour is largely determined by the 
interaction of constitutional characteristics, such as temperament and intelligence, and 
factors within the family, which is the environment in which the child grows up. Observers 
of young children have noted that a high proportion of their social interchanges are hostile 
in character, but that normally the proportion of aggressive actions decreases with age.  
This change is a result of the socialisation process which every child undergoes:  a 
combination of observational learning – seeing how the people around cope with situations 
where aggression is one possible reaction – and conditioning – learning what behaviour is 
approved via the routine interactions of child and parents. 
 
According to the Australian Institute of Criminology (1990) child physical abuse is not 
usually intentionally gratuitous.  Rather, it occurs in the course of punishment, when 
parents are responding to some perceived misbehaviour on the child’s part. The 
circumstances in which physical punishment is used against children contributes to a 
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learning process. Children learn to associate love with physical punishment. The child is 
struck by those human beings to whom he or she is the closest.  As physical punishment 
is most typically employed as a means of redress for misbehaviour on the part of the child, 
the child may come to accept it as morally justifiable to use violence against a wrongdoer.  
Because of the acknowledged importance of family experiences in children’s development, 
it is often assumed that the rupture of the family may easily result in delinquency in general 
and aggression in particular. However, the evidence is inconclusive. Even a traumatic 
break-up of the family may be no more damaging than its cause: a miserable prevailing 
atmosphere in the home may affect the child more than parental supervision (Australian 
Institute of Criminology: 1990).   
 
Studies support the commonsense view that abuse and neglect make an important 
difference in a child’s behaviour.  However, bearings or psychological abuse may be only 
one feature of child-rearing practices in abusive families which may result in aggressive 
behaviour in children. It is commonly held that abused children will inevitably become 
abusive parents.  Evidence confirms that abusive parents themselves tend to have been 
abused or neglected, physically or emotionally, as children (Australian Institute of 
Criminology: 1990).   
 
According to Crofts (2002:60) the social environment of the child is of importance, for the 
child may not regard certain forms of criminal behaviour to be seriously wrong if they are 
part of his/her daily environment.  Family life plays a central role in the development of 
aggressive behaviour in children, and in the control of such impulses as well.  However, 
there are many other social influences which may affect aggression, including television, 
schooling and peers. There is strong evidence to suggest that the onset of delinquency 
precedes participation in delinquent groups and that much juvenile crime occurs in a group 
setting for reasons that do not necessarily have anything to do with the influences of peers 
on one another.   
 
The Australian Institute of Criminology (1990) also indicates that the more delinquent a 
boy, the less value he attaches to the opinion of his friends, and that delinquent group 
seem to be the refuge of boys with little respect for the opinions of friends. The company of 
delinquent or aggressive peers, in school or out, may influence individuals to misbehave.  
However, the magnitude of the effect is difficult to estimate and in any case, such 
behaviour seems usually to predate communal factors. School experience and friends, it 
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seems, are largely incidental to the more important factors or personal traits and family 
experience in determining criminality in general, and violent behaviour in particular.   
 
Cohen (2002:4–5) indicates that the classic texts in child psychology – especially those of 
the great Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget (1896 – 1980) – come from a time when 
education was more formal, when there was less competition, when children’s TV didn’t 
exist, when there was no Internet and when no commercial genius had dreamed of the 
idea of marketing to children and using focus groups of 6-year-old consumers.  Even 
anodyne heroes like Babar and Winnie the Pooh appeared later (at least as major 
television and radio personalities) than Piaget’s key books. The effect of exposure to the 
media on children’s intellectual development is only now starting to infiltrate psychology. 
 
Many children have to cope with divorce and with living in stepfamilies which can make 
them more emotionally agile, and fragile, then ever before. It is not unusual for a 5-year-
old child to be in a family that includes a new baby by her blood mother and a new man, 
an older sibling who was born to her blood parents and step siblings whose blood parents 
are her mother’s new partner and his ex-wife. 
 
Child psychology cannot afford to ignore these changes if a person is to understand the 
developmental pattern.  Further, in the West, people should be sensitive to issues like 
poverty.  It has been estimated that 5 million children die of malnutrition every year; 
millions more survive but suffer profound intellectual and emotional consequences. All the 
theories tend to be about how well-fed children develop and developmental psychologists 
in the West pay too little attention at present poverty and malnutrition making – or breaking 
– the mind of a child (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 2005:9-13). 
 
Cohen (2002:74) also states that today children commit crimes at a younger age and that 
preteen criminals are common now. 
 
Reference was made to the provisions of the Child Justice Bill, 2002 providing that if the 
Child Justice Court orders an evaluation of the child that the evaluation must include an 
assessment of the cognitive, emotional, psychological and social development of the child 
a statement indicating that these factors are sufficient to establish criminal capacity of the 
child. They responded as follows: 
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Table 8: These factors are adequate to establish the criminal capacity of the child. 
View Motivation Problems Suggestions/Advice 
Subjects 
2,3,6,7,9,13,14, 
15,16 and  17 
agreed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subjects 
1,4,5,8,10,11 and 
12 disagreed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 2: Adequate 
 
 
Subject 3: All factors should be 
considered 
 
 
Subject 6:  Factors are adequate 
 
 
Subject 7: Basic factors 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 9: Statement supported 
 
Subject 13 Looks into all aspects 
the affect children’s development 
and children of the same age do 
differ 
 
Subject 14: Holistic approach 
needed 
 
Subject 15: Also proposes a 
holistic approach 
 
Subject 16: Other factors which 
may facilitate the process may 
have to be used 
 
Subject 17: Provides for 
thorough assessment 
 
Subject 1: Not adequate  
 
 
 
Subject 4: Full history as well as 
consultations with significant 
others i.e. parents, teacher etc. 
 
 
Subject 5: Various influences 
make you what you are 
 
 
 
Subject 8: Not only 
developmental issues may have 
impact 
 
Subject 10: Previous trauma and 
family background also important 
 
Subject 11: These are important 
but other factors should also be 
considered  
 
Subject 12: Would add cultural 
background 
 
 Subject 2: Must be evaluated within cultural 
context 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 6: Person who perform assessment 
must possess required skills 
 
Subject 7: Need to develop expertise in 
country to carry out evaluations and giving 
evidence. Need to develop 
evaluation/assessment method more culturally 
appropriate in SA context  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 14: If professional is not clued up you 
will get very superficial and meaningless 
evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 1: Educational development and 
cultural influences evaluated 
 
 
Subject 4: All spheres of development need to 
be included also sexual and language 
development 
 
 
Subject 5: Must include home circumstances, 
assessment of values that have been taught, 
presence or absence of religious beliefs in the 
home and assessment of norms 
 
Subject 8: Moral, contextual issues may 
impact on assessment of children 
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Table 8 shows a clear distinction between the opinions of the subjects. Ten of the subjects 
agreed with the statement that an evaluation of the cognitive, emotional, psychological and 
social development of a child is adequate factors to establish the criminal capacity of a 
child. Seven disagreed with this statement. 
 
The subjects who agreed include five lawyers, three social workers and two criminologists. 
 
The subjects who disagreed stated that a full history and consultations with significant 
others like parents and teachers is important and that not only developmental issues have 
an impact on criminal capacity. It was further noted that previous trauma and family 
background are also important issues to take into account. The subjects who disagreed 
include two lawyers, one psychologist, two criminologists and two social workers. 
 
Some of the subjects suggested that cultural context should also be taken into account. 
Other suggestions included educational development, sexual, language and moral 
development. The importance of the skill of the person who performed the assessment 
was also pointed out. Furthermore the need to develop expertise in our country to conduct 
the evaluations and testifying in Court was also expressed. The need for the development 
of an evaluation/assessment method that is more culturally appropriate, especially in our 
country was expressed.     
 
None of the different disciplinaries held the same view regarding the statement that an 
evaluation of the cognitive, emotional, psychological and social development of a child is 
adequate factors to establish the criminal capacity of a child. The criminologists, social 
workers and lawyers also differed in their views from each other. 
 
The fact that seven of the subjects were of the opinion that the cognitive, emotional, 
psychological and social development of the child are not adequate to establish the 
criminal capacity of the child indicates that it might be necessary for the Legislature to 
amend the provisions in the Child Justice Bill, 2002 to specifically include other 
developmental and environmental factors as well. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
In the Child Justice Bill, 2002, introduced into Parliament during August 2002, the common 
law presumption regarding the criminal capacity of children has remained unchanged 
except for the increase of the minimum age for criminal capacity to 10 years. The Child 
Justice Bill, 2002 makes provision for the evaluation of the criminal capacity and 
prescribes specific aspects of the development of children that must be assessed during 
the evaluation.  These aspects – cognitive, emotional, psychological and social 
development of a child – are important factors that should be taken into account when 
deciding whether or not a child between the ages of 10 years and under 14 years had the 
necessary criminal capacity at the time of the commission of the offence.   
 
The next chapter will deal with the proving of criminal capacity on the merits of the case.  
Other important factors relating to the development of children that should also be taken 
into consideration when assessing the criminal capacity of children will be highlighted.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
MERITS OF THE CASE AND OTHER IMPORTANT FACTORS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In terms of section 56(2) of the Child Justice Bill, 2002, the prosecutor or the child’s legal 
representative may request the Child Justice Court to order an evaluation of the child by a 
suitably qualified person. An evaluation of the child’s criminal capacity is therefore not 
compulsory.  Criminal capacity can therefore, by implication, still be proved merely on the 
merits of the case. There is no legal obligation to prove the criminal capacity of the child 
before putting charges or at any specific stage during the proceedings. It can be regarded 
as one of the elements the State has to proof before closing its case.   
 
In this chapter the important factors, that should be considered or taken into account, 
when deciding whether or not criminal capacity has been proved beyond reasonable doubt 
on the merits of the case, will be highlighted. A practical illustration in this regard will be 
furnished.  Other important aspects regarding the development of children that should also 
be taken into account will be discussed. 
 
5.2 Merits of the State’s case 
 
As indicated in the introductory paragraph of this chapter, it is clear that it is still possible, 
though not desirable, that the criminal capacity of a child offender can be decided upon by 
merely assessing the evidence placed before the Court in proving the criminal charges.   
 
It is therefore implied that in this regard the facts of the case, the circumstances 
surrounding the offence, the nature of the offence and the child’s conduct before and after 
commission of the offence, will play an important role.  However, care should be taken not 
to rely only on the child’s conduct directly after commission of the offence. As stated in R v 
Tsutso (supra), the fact that the child offender ran away after stabbing a person with a 
knife, is not an indication that he knew what he had done was wrong. It may also be an 
indication that he was afraid of the person he stabbed.  In R v K (supra) the review Court 
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also indicated that the child might have ran away because he was too frightened to go 
back home because his mother (the deceased whom he stabbed) might be waiting for him. 
 
A statement that criminal capacity can be proved and decided upon by taking the facts of 
the case, surrounding circumstances before and after commission of the offence, nature of 
the offence and the conduct of the child before and after the commission of the offence 
into consideration, was included in the questionnaire and responded to as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 103
Table 9: Criminal capacity can be proved and decided upon on merits/facts of the case. 
View Motivation Problems Suggestions/Advice 
Subjects 
1,2,3,5,6,9,10,11,14,15 
and 16 agreed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subjects 4, 7,8,12,13 
and 17 disagreed 
Subject 1: Logical aspects to take 
into account 
 
Subject 2: Observation and 
evaluation of child before and after 
essential 
 
Subject 3: Agreed 
 
Subject 5: If objectively and 
professionally done by specifically 
trained persons 
 
Subject 6: Relevant facts will speak 
for itself 
 
Subject 9: Statement Supported 
 
Subject 10: That should also be 
taken into account 
 
Subject 11: This is the best way to 
determine criminal capacity. Some 
crimes are calculated and planned. 
Children run away sometimes and 
hide the stolen goods 
 
Subject 14: Should however not be 
seen in isolation to the development 
of the child 
 
Subject 15: The child’s social context 
is very important  
 
Subject 16: Agreed 
 
Subject 4:  Not Solely 
 
 
Subject 7: This is how Courts do it 
now.  
 
 
 
 
Subject 8: No needs far more 
comprehensive assessment 
 
 
 
 
Subject 12: Circumstances after 
commission of the offence and the 
conduct of the child after the 
commission of the offence can not 
be taken into account regarding the 
offence 
 
Subject 13: This is not enough to 
prove criminal capacity but it should 
assist in the pre-trial assessment of 
the child and for the pre-sentence 
report 
 
Subject 17: Those factor relates to 
the guilt of the accused and not to 
criminal capacity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 6: 
Sometimes evidence 
lacks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 3: Assessment factor should also 
be taken into account 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 4: A combination of all factors 
influencing behaviour should be considered  
 
Subject 7: Need for evaluation and 
evidence of that. Other factors will be taken 
into account by Court but evidence on 
individual child’s development needed 
 
 
Subject 8:  Child’s developmental history, 
opportunities of development etc. need to 
be included. Workshop issue and develop 
list of factors as well as process of 
collecting information that should be taken 
into account will serve as guide to Courts 
and professionals 
 
 104
Table 9 indicates that eleven of the subjects agreed with the statement that criminal 
capacity can be proved and decided upon by taking the facts of the case, surrounding 
circumstances before and after commission of the offence, nature of the offence and the 
conduct of the child before and after the commission of the offence into consideration. Six 
disagreed with the statement.  
 
The eleven subjects who agreed with the statement indicated that if this is done objectively 
and professionally by specifically trained persons it can be done. One subject stated that 
the facts will speak for itself.  Another subject is of the opinion that this is the best way to 
determine criminal capacity and further indicated that some crimes are calculated and 
planned.  In some instances the children run away from the crime scene and hide the 
stolen goods for example. These subjects include four lawyers, three criminologists and 
four social workers. 
 
The six subjects that disagreed motivated it by stating that it is how it is being done now 
and there is a need for an evaluation and evidence of it. One subject pointed out that a far 
more comprehensive assessment is needed. Another subject was of the opinion that 
circumstances after the commission of the offence and the conduct of the child after the 
commission of the offence should not be taken into consideration. It was further noted that 
these factors are not enough to prove criminal capacity but could assist in pre-trial 
assessment of the child and for the pre-sentence report. One subject remarked that the 
facts of the case and the child’s conduct before and after the commission of the offence 
related to the guilt of the child and not to his/her criminal capacity. Of these subjects one is 
a psychologist, three are lawyers, one is a criminologist and one a social worker.   
 
It was mentioned that although the Court take these factors into account, the evidence on 
the individual child’s development is still needed. A suggestion was made that a workshop 
should be held to develop and issue a list of the important factors as well as the process of 
collecting information that should be taken into account, to serve as a guide to the Court 
and other professionals.  
 
Although it is possible for the State to prove criminal capacity and for the Court to decide 
on the criminal capacity of the child offender on the facts/merits of the case, the fact that 
six of the subjects disagreed with this statement, indicates that it might not be a desirable 
situation since the developmental factors do play an important role in the decision.  
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5.3 Practical Illustration 
 
The consideration of the merits or facts of the case as well as the evaluation of the 
evidence of experts when deciding on the criminal capacity of a child offender is well 
illustrated in a recent case, The State v P (unreported case number 155/2003) in 
Pietermaritzburg, involving a twelve-year old girl accused of murder and theft.  The 
involvement of the accused only became known after the two black males (Hadebe and 
Tshabalala), arrested for the murder, pleaded guilty and revealed her involvement.  The 
murder was committed on 14 September 2002 and they pleaded guilty on 2 October 2002. 
The accused was questioned and subsequently arrested (Centre for Child Law 2006).   
 
In this matter it was alleged that on 14 September 2002 the accused unlawfully and 
intentionally killed her grandmother (an adult female). It was further alleged that the 
accused, on the said date, unlawfully and intentionally stole various items, including 
jewellery, several wristwatches, a cellular phone, a video machine, a satellite decoder and 
several items of clothing from the deceased (Centre for Child Law 2006:2).   
 
The accused pleaded not guilty on both counts and stated that she obtained the 
assistance of two black men on the night of 14 September 2002 to kill the deceased. She 
allowed them to take jewellery and other property from the house of the deceased in return 
for this. She stated that she had done this at the behest of one Dash, who had told her on 
the Wednesday preceding the day of the murder, that he wished her to do him a favour, 
that she should get people to kill the deceased, and further told her that if she did not do 
this, the deceased would kill her mother and her brother and she therefore had to choose 
between them. This gave rise to the defence that was raised that the influence by the said 
Dash was very strong, in that it affected the accused’s capacity to control her conduct, she 
being twelve-years old at the time of the offence (Centre for Child Law 2006:2).   
 
It was also submitted by the defence that the cognitive ability of the accused at the time of 
the incident, was such that the accused could not extract herself from the dilemma of 
choosing between the life of her grandmother on the one hand, and that of her mother and 
brother on the other, which she found herself in as a result of the intervention of the said 
Dash (Centre for Child Law 2006:3).   
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The accused’s version was that Dash wanted the deceased killed as a favour.  According 
to the accused, Dash gave her a total sum of R750 (a relatively big sum of money for a 
twelve-year old) and the only reasonable inference the Court could draw from this 
allegation is that Dash had an interest in having the deceased killed. The accused 
indicated that she did not know why Dash would have any interest in having the deceased 
killed and she agreed with the proposition that it would not do Dash any good. She also 
agreed that Dash did not suggest that he would harm the deceased, or the accused’s 
mother and brother, and agreed she was not doing Dash a favour but doing her mother 
and brother a favour (Centre for Child Law 2006:6).   
 
The accused stated that she knew at the time that theft was a crime and that killing was a 
crime and that people go to jail for killing. She said, however, that she was not sure that if 
you hired someone to get somebody killed, it was a crime. She said that in her mind the 
killer commits an offence, but not the person who hires them. She said she agreed with 
and understood that she had hired two people to kill.  Later in her evidence the accused, 
however, said that at a later stage when she thought about it, she realised she had 
committed a crime.  She however maintained she did not know it was a crime before she 
committed it, because she was really confused. She stated that she realised when she 
gave the jewellery to the killers and told them to take the items in the house, that they 
belonged to the deceased. She also realised that giving items that do not belong to you to 
someone else, was wrong. The Court regarded the accused’s evidence as to what she told 
her brother after the murder, as significant. She agreed that she had said to her brother 
not to tell what had happened, otherwise they would get into big trouble.  When asked 
what trouble, she replied trouble with the family and police (Centre for Child Law 2006:38).   
 
The Court indicated that the evidence of the accused herself also has to be considered 
with the evidence as to how the murder was carried out. Certain aspects in the Court’s 
view are relevant not only to the issue of whether the accused appreciated the 
wrongfulness of her act, but whether she had the ability to act in accordance with that 
appreciation. The Court referred to the following aspects (Centre for Child Law 2006:39):   
 
(i) The accused must have decided to use sleeping tablets to ensure that the deceased 
did not resist her attackers. This was a central requirement of the plan which could only 
have been hatched during the week preceding the murder, as the deceased only obtained 
the pills in that week.  When the accused gave the deceased her tea with the sleeping 
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tablets in it, the deceased complained that it tasted bitter and the accused told her there 
must be something wrong with her mouth. She took the tea back to the kitchen, added 
more sugar and handed the deceased the tea again.  While drinking the tea the deceased 
read the newspaper and then fell asleep. In the Court’s view this aspect indicates 
planning, and determination to proceed with the plan, regardless. 
 
(ii) The accused stated that if there was a chance that the deceased’s son was coming 
that weekend, she would have ignored the alleged signal by Dash. She stated that when 
deceased’s son was coming for the weekend, he would come on a Friday, but said she 
knew he was not coming when she knew they were going to Durban on the Sunday.  She 
said she knew this by Saturday. It is therefore apparent that the accused knew that 
deceased’s son would not be there on Saturday night and there would be no danger of him 
arriving with two men in the house.  In the absence of the influence of Dash, this indicates 
foresight and planning as to when it would be safe to carry out the plan (Centre for Child 
Law 2006:40). 
 
(iii) It was admitted by the defence that the accused phoned a male friend at 8:26pm, but 
the accused was unable to get him. The accused said she was unable to remember this, 
but it must have been her.  The said male friend stated she phoned him again later at 
9:25pm, asking him to go to the movies, or something. She also said that the car was 
there with the keys, so they could use the car. He declined as he had a girlfriend, but she 
said they could go as friends as there was no one at home.  She said her granny had gone 
out with friends. He then joked to her, saying that her granny probably went out with a 
boyfriend. The accused replied, “That bitch doesn’t have a boyfriend.” or “… won’t have a 
boyfriend.”, one of the two, the witness was not very clear.  He then asked her how she 
could say a thing like that, which she didn’t reply to. She then asked if he would still like to 
go out and he said no.  In cross-examination he conceded that he had not said in his 
statement to the police, that the accused had called the deceased a “bitch”. The accused 
in evidence admitted phoning him but denied referring to the deceased as a “bitch”. The 
accused admitted the second phone call was made for the purpose of creating an alibi, 
whilst the killers were still in the house. The accused stated that if the said friend had gone 
with her she would have taken her brother with them, gone to the 10:00 pm show at the 
movies, and when she got home pretended that she had found the deceased murdered 
(Centre for Child Law 2006:41).     
 
 108
The purpose of the earlier call even before the murder must have had the same objective 
of creating an alibi. The wish to create an alibi in advance again indicates an appreciation 
of the consequences of her conduct and a wish to avoid them.   
 
The Court pointed out that it is significant that both Hadebe and her male friend, between 
whom there is no possible connection, state that the accused used the same word to 
describe the deceased, respectively, before and after the murder.  It is also significant that 
Hadebe states this was said in conjunction with the accused showing him the photos of 
her parents, which the accused denied, but which her defence has conceded.   
 
Due consideration had been given to the failure by her male friend to mention this in his 
statement to the police.  The Court was nevertheless satisfied that the accused described 
the deceased in this manner. This is an important insight into the accused’s attitude 
towards the deceased immediately before and after the murder (Centre for Child Law 
2006:42). 
 
(iv) The accused stated that she closed and locked the front door and gate, so that no 
one would see after the killers had entered the house. Hadebe said that when they were 
leaving the house, the accused asked them to wait, as she wanted to check outside if no 
one was around who might see them leaving, and denied that they had asked the accused 
to check outside. The accused, however, maintained that it was one of the men who asked 
her to see outside if anyone was there, so she stood within the gates and saw nobody.  It 
is difficult to see why if the accused was concerned to nobody should be able to see into 
the house when the killers entered, she would not be equally concerned that nobody saw 
them when they were leaving and she would wish to check first. This again indicates an 
appreciation of the wrongfulness of her conduct and the wish to avoid the consequences 
of it (Centre for Child Law 2006:43).   
 
The Court indicated that although aware of the care that must be exercised in drawing 
inferences from the demeanour of a witness, but because of the issues involved in this 
case, it is particularly appropriate for it to do so. The Court’s overriding impression was 
that the accused displayed a self-control and composure throughout the proceedings, 
which was far beyond her age of fourteen years, in an environment which would have 
been daunting even for an adult.  Apart from one or two occasions when the accused shed 
a tear whilst giving evidence, the Court did not see the accused display any emotion, even 
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when Tshabalala and Hadebe were giving a graphic account of how they murdered the 
deceased.  To the contrary, the accused followed the evidence closely, regularly writing 
notes for her defence team, without at any stage seeking reassurance from her mother 
who was seated next to her. The Court of course did not lose sight of the fact that it is two 
years since the incident and the accused has matured in the interim. Nevertheless, the 
Court continually had to remind itself that the accused was only fourteen years of age.   
 
In considering the accused’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct, and 
act in accordance with such appreciation, it was necessary to consider the views of the 
experts. Professor Pillay was called by the State and Mr Willows was called by the 
defence. They are both clinical psychologists (Centre for Child Law 2006:44).   
 
Professor Pillay was of the view that the accused functioned well above the median point 
in her intellectual development, and that in this regard her level of functioning was higher 
than the average twelve and a half year old. In summary, emotionally and socially she 
functioned well above her chronological age of twelve and a half years at the time of the 
murder. The age of the accused was twelve years and five months at the time of the 
murder (Centre for Child Law 2006:44).   
 
By virtue of the defence raised by the accused, as to the influence and involvement of 
Dash, the major portion of his evidence was devoted to expressing his views on the ability 
of the accused to deal with this influence. For example, he expressed the view that the 
accused would have been able to deal with the influence of an older person in socially 
acceptable ways, and had the capacity to tell other adults, and think through the dilemma 
other than by violence. In short, in his opinion the accused had the cognitive capacity to 
solve the moral dilemma she claimed she was put in.   
 
He did concede, however, that his brief when he interviewed the accused, was to 
determine in terms of section 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act, whether the 
accused had any mental illness or defect, which should affect her criminal responsibility, 
and that although the accused had said she was scared of Dash, he did not investigate 
this aspect because it was outside his brief.  He conceded therefore that one had only one 
leg of the inquiry as to the issue of whether the accused could cope. Mr Willows expressed 
the view that the accused was appropriately emotionally and socially mature for her age, 
but he recognised that the accused was socialised into a lifestyle beyond her years. As 
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regards socialisation, the accused was more of a street-wise child.  Her cognitive maturity 
was probably average/above average (Centre for Child Law 2006:45). 
 
He agreed that intellectually the accused was at least of average intelligence and probably 
above average.  He was of the view that the accused at the time of the incident lacked the 
ability to appreciate the long term consequences of her act, such as this trial. If she had 
been asked the question at the time, if you commit a crime do you go to jail, he thought her 
answer would have been yes.  He expressed the view that because of the situation she 
had been placed in by Dash, her emotional turmoil at the time of the crime, overwhelmed 
her cognitive abilities. He stated the accused would have believed Dash because she 
viewed him as dangerous and influential. He stated that he did not investigate the truth of 
the allegations given to him, and the facts given to him may have leaned him towards a 
finding which he otherwise may not have made. The acceptance of Dash’s involvement 
was a crucial part of his report, but he said that some factors may be true, nonetheless. He 
stated that his opinion would change if it was shown that the accused had deliberately lied 
to him and had not simply made an incorrect statement due to amnesia (Centre for Child 
Law 2006:45–47). 
 
He stated that he never felt that the accused’s periods of anger or irritation towards the 
deceased, was such that she would engineer to have her murdered. He stated the step 
from a child being angry at a disciplinary adult, towards getting people to murder that 
person, is a huge step.  He was of the view that it was highly improbable that based upon 
her own anger towards the deceased, the accused could have, or would have come to the 
decision to kill the deceased purely on her own, because to do so would require a very 
noticeable behavioural conduct, an emotional disorder in a child to behave in that way.  
There was nothing in his view about her personality, outside of the few hours of the 
incident, that suggested she had the capability to behave in that way.  His theory therefore 
was that there was adult influence on the accused.  He further stated that to carry out the 
murder on her own, there would be many signs of the previous behaviour that would lead 
one to conclude that this sort of behaviour was a natural progression of her bad or 
misbehaviour. It was a type of behaviour that would place the accused far above her 
present state of maturity, being the age appropriate behaviour of a twelve and a half year 
old. He stated that if the accused had behaved out of her own volition and her own 
decision, he would put the accused at least fifty percent higher than that (Centre for Child 
Law 2006:45–47). 
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It is clear that the accused’s version as to the involvement of Dash was a major influence 
on the views expressed by both Professor Pillay and Mr Willows.  Although Professor 
Pillay’s views were not based upon an acceptance of the accused’s version, the thrust of 
his opinion deals with the ability of the accused to extricate herself from the dilemma, in 
which she had been placed by Dash.  Mr Willow’s views are expressed on the basis of the 
acceptance of the accused’s version and he concedes that if it was shown to him that the 
accused had deliberately lied to him, his opinion would change, although with certain 
reservations. 
 
The Court rejected the accused’s version as to the involvement of Dash. The accused has 
deliberately lied to the Court and to Mr Willows.  It is therefore self- evident that great care 
must be exercised in relying upon Mr Willow’s views. The views of Professor Pillay as to 
the ability of the accused to extricate herself from the dilemma in which she was placed by 
Dash, likewise do not assume such importance.   
 
The opinion of Mr Willows that the accused did not have the capacity to act of her own 
volition and murder the accused, has, however, to be considered against the evidence of 
the motivation the accused had for wishing the deceased dead, as well as the evidence as 
to the manner in which she must have planned and carried out the murder, as well as the 
fact that she has lied to Mr Willows and the Court (Centre for Child Law 2006:48).   
 
It is trite law that in receiving the evidence of psychologists and psychiatrists, particularly in 
criminal Courts, the expertise of the witness should not be elevated to such heights that 
sight is lost of the Court’s own capabilities and responsibilities in drawing inferences from 
the evidence. 
 
When consideration is given to the use of sleeping tablets to drug the accused, the taking 
into consideration of the absence of the possibility of a visit by deceased’s son, the attempt 
to create an alibi for herself before and after the murder, and the precautions taken to 
ensure that the killers were not seen, together with the evidence as to the motivation the 
accused had to have the deceased murdered and the elaborate lies the accused has told, 
the Court was satisfied, despite the opinion of Mr Willows, that the accused appreciated 
the wrongfulness of her act, and was able to act in accordance with such appreciation.  
Because of the antipathy the accused harboured towards the deceased, despite her 
protestations of love for the deceased, which had clearly built up over a period of time, the 
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accused, in the Court’s view, planned and carried out the murder of the deceased. This 
could not have been an impulsive act. What finally caused the accused to carry out the 
murder of the deceased on the day in question remain unknown, as the accused has 
masked her activities in a web of lies and deceit, all designed to absolve her from the 
consequences of the heinous crime she committed in having her own grandmother 
murdered (Centre for Child Law 2006:47–48). 
 
The Court was therefore satisfied that the State has succeeded in proving beyond 
reasonable doubt that the accused had the necessary criminal capacity and has therefore 
successfully rebutted the presumption that the accused was doli incapax at the time of the 
commission of the offences. 
 
The Court was also satisfied on the evidence that the State has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused had the necessary mens rea to commit the crimes of 
murder and theft.  The accused’s aim and object was to have the deceased murdered and 
reward the deceased’s killers with the deceased’s possessions. The accused was 
convicted on the charge of murder and on the charge of theft (Centre for Child Law 
2006:48–49).   
 
The accused was sentenced to thirty-six (36) months of correctional supervision in terms 
of section 276(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 on certain conditions, 
including that she was placed under house arrest, that she must attend the NICRO 
program the Journey, she must receive regular support therapy from Mrs Joan van 
Niekerk, she must render one hundred and twenty (120) hours of community service.  If 
the accused fails to comply with the conditions of the sentence, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions can decide to bring the breach under the Court’s attention for the imposition 
of an alternative sentence. The State was granted leave to appeal against the sentence. 
The appeal was heard in November 2005 and the Supreme Court of Appeal substituted 
the sentence by imposing a sentence of seven years imprisonment, suspended for five 
years (Centre for Child Law 2006:50). 
 
5.4 Other Important Aspects Regarding the Development of Children 
 
As indicated in chapter 4, in terms of section 56(4) of the Child Justice Bill, 2002, the 
cognitive, emotional, psychological and social development of the child must be assessed 
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during the evaluation process. Müller (2001:2) indicates that it is necessary to develop an 
approach to children in the legal system that will be fair to children while at the same time 
will protect the rights of the children as accused, and which will lead to a successful 
method of obtaining accurate information. Such an approach will have to view the process 
of testifying from all perspectives, ranging from the child’s cognitive ability to the 
perceptions of the personnel involved. Müller (2001:2) suggests that an ecological 
approach be adopted in terms of which there is a constant interaction between systems, 
and ant change in one system will have an effect on another system. In viewing the child 
as a source of information, the quality of the child’s evidence will depend on a number of 
interacting factors: the child himself/herself (his/her cognitive ability, language 
development and perceptions), the context in which the evidence is given (in open Court), 
the personnel involved in the process (whether the personnel is trained and competent to 
deal with children). All these factors are interrelated and, therefore, any change introduced 
into one system will cause an effect in another system. Since these various systems are 
interlinked, an ecological systems approach professes that it is not possible to do just one 
thing in isolation. 
 
It is submitted that the following developmental aspects are also of great importance when 
deciding whether or not a child between the ages of 10 years and under 14 years had the 
necessary criminal capacity at the time of commission of the offence: 
 
5.4.1 Sexual Development 
 
According to Serrao (2004:5) the face of child abuse is becoming younger with an increase 
in the number of children under the age of 14 appearing in Courts for rape and other 
sexual abuse charges. Statistics showed that 25 percent of sexual abuse was committed 
by child offenders. Young sexual abusers came mainly from problem families. It is believed 
that one of the main reasons children were being sexually active was because they lacked 
parental care and were exposed to pornography.   
 
Due to the fact that it is clear that young sex offenders are increasing, it is important for all 
the role-players in the legal system to acquaint themselves with the sexual development of 
children. According to Van Niekerk (2001:A3-2 – A3-9) sexual development of children is 
an area of child development around which there are many myths. One of the most 
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pervasive is the myth that children are asexual beings who will experience any form of 
sexual touching as bad and/or traumatic.   
 
Children from 5 to 12 years 
 
Children from the age of 5 to 12 years have usually learned the rules about touching 
themselves sexually, and if this behaviour persists during this phase of development, it is 
usually very secret (Van Niekerk 2001:A3-2 – A3-9). 
 
Children in puberty 
 
Girls may reach puberty from anywhere between 9 and 13 years of age and boys from 10 
to 14 years. Hormonal changes in male and female adolescents contribute to an increased 
interest in sexual activity. This increased interest may not coincide with a young person’s 
access to further information on sexuality and how to cope with sexual impulses, or 
indeed, every human being’s need for closeness and intimacy.  It is important to note that 
children under the ages of 12 to 14, whether they are victims or perpetrators of sexual 
abuse, rarely have a full adult understanding of the implications and possible 
consequences of the sexual behaviour they have been involved in, especially where there 
are strong taboos in discussion of sexual issues between adults and children (Van Niekerk 
2001:A3-2 – A3-9). 
 
Sapa (2003:1) reports that a 10-year-old boy was arrested after a five-month old baby was 
raped at Elliotdale outside Umtata in the Eastern Cape on 10 January 2003. It is the matter 
of S v N Zanaye (unreported) being dealt with by the Sexual Offences Court in Umtata.  
 
5.4.2 Physical Development 
 
According to Van Niekerk (2001:A3-2 – A3-9), the child’s physical appearance is important 
to observe, but it is essential not to conclude that the physically developed and mature 
child is developed and mature intellectually or emotionally. 
 
Adults with whom the child interacts, often treat the child who is precocious in physical 
development in an adult way. This has obvious dangers when one is interacting with a 
child within the criminal justice system. As puberty and growth are occurring earlier and 
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earlier in each successive generation – due (in theory) to improved nutritional and medical 
care – one must be very careful not to assume that the child is adult in every other way.  
Particularly with girls, physical maturity precedes maturity in other aspects of development. 
Sometimes the physically smaller children come across in Court as more vulnerable and 
appealing. This may be to the advantage of the case as visual impressions have great 
impact both on our conscious and subconscious minds. 
 
The physical vulnerability of a small child should not be exploited by the prosecution in a 
way that may compromise the psychological well being of the child.  Sometimes a decision 
not to use the intermediary system may be made in order to capitalise on the visual impact 
of the small child witness on the Court. The best interests of the child should be the first 
consideration of the prosecutor. 
 
Crofts (2002:61) warns that deducing criminal capacity from factors such as appearance or 
demeanour in Court is inadvisable.  The child must have understood the wrongfulness of 
the act at the time of committing the act. The child may, however, not have understood the 
wrongfulness of the act at the time, but have come to understand the seriousness of the 
act purely through the dealings with the police and with the Court. How a child behaves in 
Court may then have little to do with how he/she behaved at the time of committing the act. 
 
5.4.3 Language Development 
 
Van Niekerk (2001:A3-2 – A3-9) indicates that language development is very clearly linked 
to the language to which the child is exposed in the home, the school and the learning 
environment, and also through the media. 
 
Müller (2001:9) states that it is important to understand the development of language in 
children, so that questions can be framed in a manner understandable to the child. 
 
Children from 6 to 12 years 
 
From 6 to 12 years, vocabulary becomes more extensive and the ability to deal with 
complex sentence construction expands. However, children of this age may still use words 
out of context and without full understanding of meaning. 
 
 116
Children from 13 years to early adulthood 
 
Children over the age of 12 are usually able to manage complex vocabulary and language 
constructs, depending on their exposure to the use of language as well as to their level of 
education. However, even at this age there may be misunderstandings about words 
relating to information that is taboo for discussion in the home or that is restricted to adult-
only environments. 
 
It is essential, therefore, when dealing with children of any age group that the specific 
meaning a child attaches to words and expressions is understood by both the child and the 
adult in question. A child’s use of language may be very idiosyncratic, and may also be 
affected by trauma (Müller 2001:9). 
 
According to Du Preez, Naudé and Pretorius (2004:25) more than three million children 
are neglected and/or abused each year in the United States.  Neglect in particular, is a 
significant problem, not only in the United States, but also in the rest of the world, with 
South Africa being no exception.  In South Africa, 17 million children live in deep poverty.  
Although not all children living in poverty are neglected, poverty may be an indicator of 
neglect.  Neglect of children does not only pose a social problem for governments and 
institutions that need to create facilities to care for these children, but also has an impact 
on the intellectual functioning of these children. This is mainly because they do not only 
have a lack of provision of basic needs such as food, water, sanitation and a safe home, 
but also experience a lack of communication, intellectual stimulation and parental 
interaction.   
 
Du Preez, Naudé and Pretorius (2004:26) point out that language capacity plays an 
important role in intellectual development, attention and readiness to learn, socio-
emotional development, behavioural issues and academic achievement.   
 
Du Preez, Naudé and Pretorius (2004:29) believe that neglected children have a verbal 
disadvantage because of lack of interaction and communication between caregivers and 
children.  Neglected children’s language capacity is therefore inadequately developed, and 
this impacts on intellectual development, socio-emotional development and behavioural 
issues.   
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Language development and the understanding thereof by role-players in the criminal 
justice system is a very important aspect, which can lead to various misunderstandings 
during the assessment of children and during the criminal trial. 
 
Müller (2003:2) points out that children are perceived by the Courts to be miniature adults 
and their evidence is evaluated on this basis, often resulting in an injustice to the child.  
Müller (2003:2) emphasizes that cognizance needs to be taken of the fact that children 
differ dramatically from adults with respect to, among other, language development.  In 
order for the Courts to communicate more effectively with children, it is necessary that 
experts inform judicial offices of the common misunderstandings involved in 
communicating with children.  Müller (2003:5) points out that inconsistencies in a child’s 
evidence which may lead to misunderstanding can be used to compromise the child’s 
credibility in a devastating manner.  Children are extremely literal in their use of language 
and this should be recognised by the Court, the prosecutor and the attorney, even the 
person assessing the child and this should be clarified during the Court proceedings (Louw 
2005:30). 
 
Müller (2003:6) states that children use vague, free-associative style of communication 
and this is particular evident in their description of places.  Although children will reply in 
the affirmative when asked whether they know where a place is, they will be unable to 
provide directions or an address.   
 
Another important issue, as pointed out by Müller (2003:6) found in children’s 
communication is referred to as underextention. Children often attribute to a word only part 
of the meaning which the same word has for adults. This is a very common 
misunderstanding that arises especially in cases involving sexual abuse where the position 
of clothing becomes very important.  A child may deny that she was wearing any clothing 
only to admit later that she was wearing a costume.  To the child this is not a contradiction, 
because a costume is not considered to be clothing.   
 
The importance of knowing and understanding the stages of language development can 
not and should not be underestimated, especially in an assessment situation. If the 
professional conducting the assessment do not understand what the child means when 
saying something or why he/she describes something in a specific manner, the essence of 
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what the child says will be lost and the interpretation thereof might not be correct and this 
will inevitable be to the disadvantage of the child.  
 
5.4.4 Moral Development 
 
Van Niekerk (2001:A3-2 – A3-9) states that young children have little sense of the moral 
code of their family and culture. Preschool children may conform to the moral teaching of 
their family and/or significant others, not because they understand the issue of morality, 
but because they experience the consequences of their own behaviour. As the child 
matures and thought processes become more sophisticated, it can be said that the child’s 
“conscience” (or “superego”) develops. This means that the child’s control over its own 
behaviour becomes more internally rather than externally based: that is, the child begins to 
self-approve or self-disapprove, and is no longer entirely dependent on the cues and 
responses of significant others. Internal controls, however, do not develop without the 
presence and consistent use of external feedback – positive, negative or neutral – on the 
child’s behaviour.  A young child may thus have a “limited” sense of the wrongfulness of an 
act – but not necessarily the understanding of the morality of the act. Furthermore, young 
children may not necessarily have the behavioural controls and/or the prerequisite ability 
to act in accordance with society’s view on a particular behaviour. It is important to note 
that although environment and formal teaching influence and support a child’s social and 
moral development, formal education is not the only way in which this can be achieved.  
For example, in the areas of moral and social development, the rural child may be 
inducted at a fairly young age into taking responsibility for caring for the resources of the 
extended family (herding cattle and goats) and may have an advanced sense of morality 
and social responsibility in this area of functioning despite the lack of formal schooling. 
 
Kohlberg (1984:170–172) indicates that to understand moral stage, it is helpful to locate it 
in a sequence of development of personality.  We know that individuals pass through the 
moral stages one step at a time as they progress from the bottom (Stage 1) toward the top 
(Stage 6).  After the child learns to speak, there are three major developmental stages of 
reasoning:  the intuitive, the concrete operational, and the formal operational. At around 
age 7, children enter the stage of concrete logical thought; they can then make logical 
inferences, classify things and handle quantitative relations about concrete things. In 
adolescence, many but not all individuals enter the stage of formal operations, at which 
level they can reason abstractly.  Formal operational thinking can consider all possibilities, 
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consider the relations between elements in a system, form hypotheses, deduce 
implications from the hypotheses, and test them against reality. Many adolescents and 
adults only partially attain the stage of formal operations; they consider all the actual 
relations of one thing to another at the same time, but do not consider all possibilities and 
do not form abstract hypotheses. 
 
According to Kohlberg (1984:170–172), almost no adolescents and adults will still be 
entirely at the stage of concrete operations, many will be at the stage of partial formal 
operations, and most will be at the highest stage of formal operations.  Since moral 
reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral reasoning depends upon advanced logical 
reasoning. There is a parallelism between an individual’s logical stage and his or her moral 
stage.  A person whose logical stage is only concrete operational is limited to the 
preconventional moral stages, Stages 1 and 2.  A person whose logical stage is only “low” 
formal operational is limited to the conventional moral stages, Stages 3 and 4.  While 
logical development is a necessary condition for moral development, it is not sufficient. 
 
In summary, moral stage is related to cognitive advance and to moral behaviour, but our 
identification of moral stage must be based on moral reasoning alone. 
 
The six moral stages are grouped into three major levels: preconventional level (Stages 1 
and 2), conventional level (Stages 3 and 4), and post-conventional level (Stages 5 and 6). 
 
To understand the stages, it is best to start by understanding the three moral levels. The 
preconventional moral level is the level of most children under 9, some adolescents, and 
many adolescent and adult criminal offenders. The observance of rules and regulations is 
mainly based on the desire to avoid punishment. The conventional level is the level of 
most adolescents and adults in our society and in other societies. Rules and norms are 
generally accepted with an intent to avoid disapproval or dislike of others. The 
postconventional level is reached by a minority of adults and is usually reached only after 
the age of 20.  The term “conventional” means conforming to and upholding the rules and 
expectations and conventions of society or authority just because they are society’s rules, 
expectations, or conventions.  The individual at the preconventional level has not yet come 
to really understand and uphold conventional or societal rules and expectations.  Someone 
at the postconventional level understands and basically accepts society’s rules, but 
acceptance of society’s rules is based on formulating and accepting the general moral 
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principles that underlie these rules.  These principles in some cases come into conflict with 
society’s rules, in which case the postconventional individual judges by principle rather 
than by convention (Kohlberg 1984:172–173; Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong 
2000:39). 
 
In this regard Moffatt (2002:51) points out that children, who for example kill another 
person will only come to realize the significance of their actions in their mid- to late teens. 
Prior to late adolescence, the guilt and remorse that they may have experienced would 
almost exclusively relate to being in trouble and having people angry with them. By late 
adolescence, however, these children will be capable of understanding the permanence of 
their actions and the broad ramifications of the pain they have caused. Only then will they 
experience much deeper remorse, regret and guilt. 
 
5.4.5 Cultural Context 
 
The UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre (2005:12) points out that developmental 
psychologists are increasingly applying a theoretical framework in which child 
development is understood as a cultural process.  Childhood is understood as a product of 
specific economic, social and cultural processes.  
 
Moffatt (2002:20) points out that culture at large is a part of the teaching process through 
both words and action. Actions are usually clearer messages than words. Trough movies, 
television, advertisements and music culture teaches that violence is acceptable or even 
expected. Culture influences the way people think and act. 
 
Labuschagne and Van den Heever (1993:100) point out that chronological age limits for 
fixing criminal capacity did not exist in traditional indigenous law.  Examples includes the 
Bafokeng in Rustenburg where the present position is that a boy who became a cattle 
herder, at approximately 15 years of age, may be summoned to appear before the 
traditional Court,  the Northern Ndebele’s attach criminal capacity to school attendance, 
approximately 8 years of age and according to the Northern Sotho’s a small child is not 
considered as criminally responsible as it is believed that his brain is too weak and no 
specific chronological age exists for criminal capacity. The Courts determine criminal 
capacity on the ground of his mental ability.   
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In South Africa there is a diversity of cultures and traditions and some of the beliefs and 
traditions might have an influence on the criminal capacity of offenders and specifically on 
child offenders. In the African context, cultural practices pertaining to belief in witchcraft 
and muti and muti killings may very well have an impact on the ability of a child to 
distinguish between right and wrong and on the child’s ability to act in accordance with 
his/her insight between right and wrong. Even in communities where there is no emphasis 
on ownership of property and there is no rules regarding the use of each other’s property, 
a child might grow up not realizing that one is not supposed to take another person’s 
property and this can have an impact on his/her criminal capacity. 
 
This is a very important aspect that should be studied and incorporated in our criminal 
justice system, especially the juvenile justice system.  
 
Other factors relating to the development of children were also furnished and it was stated 
that these should specifically be included in the assessment of the alleged child offender. 
The responses are shown in table 10. 
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Table 10: Physical, language, sexual and moral development should be specifically                 
included in the assessment.   
 
 
View Motivation Problems Suggestions/Advice 
Subjects 
1,2,4,5,8,10,11,13,
14,15 and 17 
agreed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 3, 6, ,9,12 
and 16 disagreed 
 
Subject 1: Should be included and 
considered with other 
 
Subject 2: Any aspect impacting on 
child’s motivation, intent and liability 
 
Subject 4: All aspects must be included 
 
Subject 5: Some children are extremely 
advanced physically. Moral 
Development important 
 
Subject 8: Better to name separately 
 
Subject 10: Trauma assessment 
(sexual abuse – children tend to act out 
the same abuse) also important 
 
Subject 11: Cultural context, beliefs and 
traditional upbringing also important 
 
Subject 13: A holistic evaluation of the 
child is necessary to arrive at fair and 
reliable conclusion and to assist 
magistrates and prosecutors who are 
not experts in child development  
 
Subject 14: Definitely and more 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 15: Agreed 
 
 
Subject 17: Because of our country’s 
history children come from different 
backgrounds 
 
 
Subject 3: Yes to moral development. 
No to language development 
 
Subject 6: Included in factor mentioned 
by Child Justice Bill, 2002 
 
 
Subject 9: Categories provided for in 
Child Justice Bill, 2002 are sufficient  
 
Subject 12: These aspects are included 
in the elements provided for in the Child 
Justice Bill, 2002 
 
Subject 16: Included in factors as 
provided for in Child Justice Bill, 2002 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 5: Peer pressure and peer 
group situation needs to be 
included 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 11: Each case must be 
considered on own merits and all 
factors that can have influence 
must be considered 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 14: Current assessments 
are done one dimensional and do 
not really focus on the holistic 
functioning of the child. 
Assessments are done as a once 
off activity and that is why 
assessments in the majority of 
cases are inadequate  
 
 
Subject 15: Also important to 
ascertain with who the child has 
contact on a daily basis in his 
social context 
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Eleven of the subjects agreed that the psychical, language, sexual and moral development 
of a child offender should specifically be included in the assessment of the child offender. 
Five disagreed with the statement. 
 
Subject 7 (legally qualified) indicated he/she is not qualified to answer. 
 
The eleven subjects who agreed motivated it by stating that any aspect having an impact 
on a child’s motivation, intent and liability must be included and that it will be better if these 
factors are named separately. One subject indicated that trauma assessment is also 
important and another was of the opinion that a holistic evaluation of the child is 
necessary. The cultural context of the child and the traditions and beliefs he/she grew up 
with, were also mentioned. The subjects who agreed include four lawyers, four social 
workers, one psychologist and two criminologists. 
 
One subject who disagreed, indicated that moral development is important but not 
language development.  Four subjects indicated that these factors falls in broader 
categories mentioned above.  The subjects who disagreed include two lawyers, one 
criminologist and two social workers. 
 
A suggestion was made that peer pressure and peer group situations should also be 
included. 
 
The fact that eleven subjects agreed that physical, language, sexual and moral 
development should specifically be included in the assessment of the criminal capacity of 
the child offender, indicates that these are important factors that can not be overlooked by 
the criminal justice system and the professionals working in the field and should 
specifically be included in the Child Justice Bill, 2002. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
From the above it is clear that criminal capacity can be proved on the merits or facts of the 
case, the child offender’s conduct before and after the offence, the nature of the offence 
and the surrounding circumstances. Physical, language, sexual and moral development 
are evidently very important factors that should also be taken into account when deciding 
on the criminal capacity of children. Another important aspect, which needs definite 
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attention, is cultural context, especially in a cultural diverse country like ours. These factors 
should definitely be included in the Child Justice Bill, 2002. It is suggested that the Child 
Justice Bill, 2002 be revised to include these factors as part of the evaluation of the 
criminal capacity of child offenders, before its passing in Parliament. However, it is 
furthermore submitted that the various developmental factors concerning children, to be 
taken into account, should not be a closed number. Room and scope should be left open 
to cater for other factors that might be important in certain cases, to ensure that all the 
needs of child offenders can be met, especially in our diverse country.   
 
The UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre (2005:xiv) states that many different disciplines 
contribute to the understanding of how children acquire capacity. Developmental 
psychologists have long studied how, why and when children develop. Anthropologists 
have contributed to our understanding of how differences across cultures influence the 
understanding of childhood and consequent treatment of children.  Lawyers and medical 
practitioners have grappled with methods of defining competence in order to determine 
when a child can assume responsibility for decision-making.  Sociologists have begun to 
examine the concept of childhood and the extent to which it is socially rather than merely 
biologically constructed. 
 
Crofts (2002:63) suggests that the best approach to determining a child’s criminal capacity 
is to gather information on the child’s level of understanding generally (for example from 
evidence of her home and social background) in relation to the concrete act (for example 
from evidence as to what the child said, how the child committed the act, what the child did 
before and after the act). 
 
It is furthermore clear that the criminal capacity of children should be determined and 
assessed from a multi-disciplinary point of view and this needs to be addressed when 
developing a separate juvenile justice system. The Child Justice Bill, 2002 should also 
reflect this approach. To reserve this function to a specific profession will not only delay 
the assessment process, but it will also prejudice the children in the criminal justice 
system. It might result in a situation where some of the developmental factors are over 
emphasized at the expense of other equally important factors, due to the fact that the 
assessment is done from one point of view. In this regard criminologists, social workers, 
probation officers and psychologists can and must be trained and included in the 
assessment process.    
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In the next chapter other issues related to criminal capacity, namely the time and number 
of assessments, testimonial competency of the child offender, evolving capacities of 
children and age determination will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CAPACITY RELATED ISSUES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
There are other key issues closely linked to criminal capacity of children that also need 
attention namely: the time of the assessment and the number of assessments, the 
testimonial competency of the child offender, the evolving capacities of the child and age 
determination. 
 
In this chapter these issues will be highlighted and discussed with a view of finding 
possible solutions for the problems arising from them. 
 
6.2 The Time of the Assessment and the Number of Assessments 
 
Both the common law presumption, as it is formulated in our law at present, and the 
proposed provisions of section 5(2) of the Child Justice Bill, 2002 requires that the State, in 
order to rebut the presumption of doli incapax, must prove beyond reasonable doubt that a 
child offender, between the age of 10 years and below 14 years, had the necessary 
criminal capacity at the time of the commission of the alleged offence (my own 
emphasis). This is a very important factor and the weight that the Court will attach to the 
evidence of any professional expert, who assessed the criminal capacity of a child 
offender, will to a great extent depend on the time lapse between the commission of the 
offence and the assessment of the child’s criminal capacity. In the matter of the 12 year 
old girl that was convicted of murder, illustrated in chapter 4, this factor amongst others 
played an important role in the Court’s acceptance of Mr Willows’ evidence, when he 
testified on the criminal capacity of the accused on behalf of the defence. The State also 
argued that Mr Willows’ evidence , that the accused was doli incapax  at the time when the 
offence was allegedly committed, should be rejected on various grounds, including the fact 
that the murder was committed on 14 September 2002 and Mr Willows only assessed the 
accused during July/August 2003, about 10 – 11 months after the incident.  Prof Pillay, on 
behalf of the State assessed the accused just over a month after the murder was 
committed. 
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The assessment of the criminal capacity of a child offender, between the age of 10 years 
and under 14 years, should be done as soon as possible after the commission of the 
offence. It is common knowledge that in our legal system there are various delays in the 
finalization of criminal trials and if the assessment on the criminal capacity is only done 
during the trial, in most instances some months after the commission of the offence, the 
criminal capacity of the child offender at the time of the commission of the offence will not 
be accurately determined. This leads to a dilemma for the assessment as the Court has 
before it a child looking and behaving in a very different way as to when the crime was 
committed. One cannot recover exactly what the child’s criminal capacity was at the time 
of the commission of the offence. The fact that children are continuously developing, and 
this process of development cannot be put on hold, has some serious implications for 
assessment, especially if the assessment is only conducted during the trial and sometime 
after the commission of the offence. Furthermore, the processes children are exposed to 
after arrest are sometimes life perspective changing in themselves.  For example, even the 
assessment processes can contribute to the maturing of the child. In the matter of S v N 
Zanaye (supra) where a 10-year old boy allegedly raped a five-month old baby, the alleged 
incident occurred on 10 January 2003 and the matter was postponed on various occasions 
and eventually transferred to the Sexual Offences Court in Umtata.  In this Court the 
matter was further postponed until 29 June 2005 to obtain the Director of Public 
Prosecutions’ decision on whether or not to proceed with the prosecutions.  This is a clear 
example of the time delays that can and do occur in criminal cases against children and 
emphasizes the need to do an assessment as soon as possible after the commission of 
the offence.  In this matter, if it were to proceed and an assessment is requested, it will be 
done more that two and a half years after the alleged commission of the offence and that 
is unacceptable. 
 
Muntingh (2005:8) in this regard states that children’s cases are taking very long to be 
adjudicated, with the result that there are now more awaiting-trial than sentenced children 
in South African prisons. 
 
A statement that an evaluation of the child offender immediately after the commission of 
the offence should be made compulsory, was made and the comments indicated in table 
11. 
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Table 11: Evaluation immediately after the commission of the offence should be compulsory.   
 
View Motivation Problems Suggestions/ Advice 
Subjects 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 
10,12,13,14,15,16 
and 17 agreed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 11 
disagreed 
Subject 1: Seems to be in order 
 
 
Subject 2: Yes 
 
 
 
Subject 3: Yes 
 
 
 
 
Subject 4: Yes 
 
 
 
 
Subject 5: Yes ideally 
 
 
Subject 6: Yes the sooner the 
assessment, the more relevant the 
findings 
 
Subject 7: Important as soon as 
possible 
 
 
 
Subject 8; Definitely – arrest, 
detention alter child’s presentation 
and development  
 
 
 
Subject 9: Statement supported 
 
 
 
Subject 10: I agree 
 
Subject 12: I agree 
 
 
 
Subject 13: Definitely 
 
Subject 14: Agreed 
 
Subject 15: Agreed 
 
 
Subject 16: Agreed 
 
Subject 17: Assessment should be 
kept to the minimum to prevent 
trauma for the child 
 
Subject 11: It will not be practical. 
The child might incriminate 
himself/herself 
Subject 1: Constitutional 
rights must be considered 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 3: Access to child 
immediately after 
commission of offence 
might not be possible 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 5: Resources not 
available  
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 7: if compulsory 
and at State expense, 
must be costed  
 
 
Subject 8: Assessments a 
year after commission of 
offence, unreliable and 
have to depend on recall 
of past events 
 
 
 
 
Subject 2: If child pleads guilty, 
willing to accept responsibility 
and pay penalty for deed, no 
need to assess 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 4: Follow-up later should 
be conducted to determine other 
factors that might influence 
behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 7: Even if no prosecution 
there should be some 
intervention and evaluation will 
assists 
 
Subject 8: Assessment must be 
brief and must include collection 
of collateral information and not 
information on child alone 
 
 
Subject 9: Evaluation should 
include an assessment by the 
evaluator of the child’s criminal 
capacity 
 
 
Subject 12: Multidisciplinary 
team should do evaluation as 
soon as possible after 
commission of the offence  
 
 
 
 
Subject 15: Not only of the child 
but also a profile of the people 
who are in contact with the child 
on a daily basis  
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Table 11 shows that sixteen of the subjects agreed that an evaluation of the child offender 
immediately after the alleged commission of the offence should be made compulsory. 
 
One subject disagreed and motivated it by stating that it will not be practical and that there 
is a possibility that the child might incriminate himself/herself. This subject is a lawyer. 
 
The subjects who agreed stated that the sooner the assessment is done, the more 
relevant the findings will be. One subject submitted that the arrest and detention alter the 
child’s presentation and development. It was pointed out that even if the prosecution of the 
child does not proceed, the evaluation will assist in the planning of the intervention.  
 
The problems foreseen in this regard  includes that it might be difficult to gain access to 
the child at that stage, there is not enough resources available and the State will have to 
cost it.  Suggestions made relates to the fact that follow-up assessments should be done 
and that the assessment should be brief. 
 
The fact that almost all the various disciplinaries agreed on this issue is an indication of the 
importance of conducting an assessment as soon as to ensure that the results are reliable.  
 
 With regard to the assessment of child offenders in general, the Child Justice Bill, 2002 
provides in section 19 that a probation officer, upon receipt of the prescribed notice of the 
arrest of a child, must assess the child before the preliminary inquiry. Section 23(7) of the 
Child Justice Bill, 2002 provides that the probation officer must complete an assessment 
report and make recommendations as to the prospects of diversion, possible release of 
the child, the placement of the child and the transfer of the matter to a Children’s Court, 
stating the reasons for such a recommendation. In terms of section 56(2) of the Child 
Justice Bill, 2002, referred to above, the Child Justice Court may order an evaluation of the 
criminal capacity of the child offender, upon request of the child’s legal representative or 
the State. Section 62(1) of the Child Justice Bill, 2002 provides that before sentencing a 
child, the Child Justice Court must request a pre-sentence report prepared by a probation 
officer or any other suitable person, prior to the imposition of sentence. The Child Justice 
Court may deviate from this provision under certain circumstances, but not in cases where 
a sentence with a residential requirement is imposed, even if this sentence is suspended.  
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From the above it is clear that a child offender, between the ages of 10 years and under 14 
years , has the potential of being assessed on three different occasions, probably by three 
different persons for three different reasons, throughout his/her trial. This can be a very 
traumatic experience for the child offender, especially if it is his/her first contact with the 
criminal justice system.  
 
In the best interest of the child, it is suggested that the Child Justice Bill, 2002 be revised 
and amended, before its passing in Parliament, to provide for a comprehensive evaluation 
of the child offender, as soon as possible after the commission of the offence. This 
evaluation should include all the necessary information and recommendations relating to 
the placement of the child, the prospects of diversion, the release of the child, criminal 
capacity of the child (including the cognitive, emotional, psychological, social, sexual, 
physical, language and moral development as well the cultural context of the child) and all 
the necessary background information (social circumstances, level of education, motive for 
the offence etc.) of the child. This report can always be extended after conviction to serve 
as a pre-sentence report and, if the child is diverted and does not comply with the 
conditions for diversion, and the criminal trial proceeds, the necessary evaluation on 
his/her criminal capacity would be available. This will not only minimize the trauma for the 
child offender, but it will definitely put all the role players in the criminal justice system, who 
has to take decisions on how to deal to deal with a specific child offender, in a better 
position to act in the best interest of that child, and to make informed choices.  
 
The statement that all child offenders under the age of 18 years should be assessed and 
evaluated to ascertain their criminal capacity was posed to the professionals and they 
responded as indicated in table 12. 
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Table 12: All offenders under 18 years should be assessed and evaluated to ascertain 
criminal capacity                     
View Motivation Problems Suggestions/Advice 
Subjects 
2,3,4,5,7,9,10, 
13,14  and 15 
agreed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subjects 
1,6,8,11,13,16 
and 17 
disagreed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 2: Important to take all factors 
into account 
 
Subject 3: Criminal capacity should be 
assessed at all times 
 
Subject 4: More diversified picture 
needed. Proper individualised picture 
more appropriate and effective  
 
Subject 5: Best case scenario. Socio-
economic background, upbringing, 
personal circumstances affect criminal 
capacity 
 
Subject 7: Information from US 
suggesting that large number of children 
under 16 lack criminal capacities. Large 
number of children with developmental 
problems, learning problems, low IQ  
 
Subject 9: Statement is supported 
 
 
Subject 10: That would be the best way 
to ascertain their capacity 
 
Subject 13: Assessment of each 
individual is important 
 
Subject 14: It will be wonderful 
 
 
 
 
Subject 15: A holistic approach should 
be followed 
 
Subject 1: Minor between 14-18 years 
should be regarded as doli capax  
 
 
Subject 6: Children 14-18 years old 
possess criminal capacity.  Assessment 
done if in doubt 
 
Subject 8: Given the levels of child 
offending, presumption of incapacity for 
children under 14 should stay 
 
Subject 11: It would cause problems in 
practice. 13-14 year old children know 
the difference between right and wrong 
and can act in accordance with this 
insight. Assessment would cause delays 
 
Subject 13: Children of 15 years and 
older generally meet the requirements for 
criminal capacity 
 
Subject 16: Only where there is 
reasonable doubt to believe the contrary 
 
Subject 17: Only children under 14 years 
should be assessed to ascertain their 
criminal capacity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 4: Might not be cost 
effective 
 
 
Subject 5: Thousands of 
offenders between 14-18 
years. Might be impractical. 
Would require huge 
resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 14: In South Africa 
with lack of capacity in the 
field and lack of proper 
professionals or experts to do 
the work it is highly unlikely to 
work 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 8:  Psychiatrists 
useful assessment of mental 
illness unless specialising in 
children otherwise limited 
experience  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 5: Assessment can be 
requested for 14-18 year old if 
necessary 
 
 
Subject 7: Should improve probation 
assessments to pick up problems and 
place criminal capacity in question 
 
 
 
Subject 9: Assessment should 
preferably done by trained officials in 
the Department of Social 
Development, for submission to and 
consideration by a judicial officer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 1: If child between 14-18 
years dispute criminal capacity, 
he/she must prove incapacity 
 
Subject 6: All offenders under 15 
years should be assessed 
 
 
Subject 8: 14-18 years should be 
assisted by competent helping 
professionals with training in law and 
child development  
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Ten of the subjects agreed with the statement that all offenders under the age of 18 years 
should be assessed and evaluated to ascertain their criminal capacity and seven of the 
subjects disagreed with it. 
 
The subjects that agreed with the statement indicated that according to information from 
the United States of America suggests that a large number of children under 16 years of 
age lack criminal capacity. There are also large numbers of children who have 
developmental and learning problems and low IQ’s. They also indicated that all factors 
should be taken into account when deciding on the issue of criminal capacity and that 
criminal capacity should be assessed at all times. The socio-economic background and 
personal circumstances affect criminal capacity and must be considered. Three of the 
subjects are social workers, three are criminologists, one a psychologist and three are 
lawyers.  
 
Seven of the subjects disagreed with the statement and motivated it by stating that 
children between 14 – 18 years should be regarded as doli capax, that they do posses 
criminal capacity and that assessments can be done if there is doubt of the child’s criminal 
capacity in a specific case.  Five of the subjects are lawyers and two are social workers.  
 
The problems foreseen in this regard related to the costs involved in assessing all 
offenders under 18 years, the lack of resources and capacity to do the assessments. 
 
Suggestions in this regard included a suggestion that if a child between the ages of 14 – 
18 years disputes criminal capacity he/she must prove it.  Another subject suggested that 
all offenders under 15 years should be assessed. The improvement of probation 
assessments was also suggested. 
 
Ten of the subjects agreed with the statement that all offenders under the age of 18 years 
should be assessed and evaluated to ascertain criminal capacity and this indicates that 
there is a need for the assessment of all child/youth offenders in our country. This might be 
because there are so many factors that can impact on a child’s criminal capacity and a lot 
of those factors are applicable in our country. 
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6.3 Testimonial Competence of the Child Offender 
 
Due to the fact that criminal capacity can be decided upon by merely assessing the 
evidence placed before Court, it is inevitable that most child offenders will appear in Court.  
Issues relating to the assessment of the evidence of child offenders are therefore of equal 
importance.   
 
Schmidt and Zeffertt (1997:87) point out that there is no statutory provision governing a 
child’s capacity to give evidence and there is no recognized age limit for a witness, but a 
child who is so immature that he/she cannot communicate intelligibly with the Court or, 
even if he/she can, is unable to appreciate the duty to speak the truth, must obviously be 
disqualified as a witness (Schwikkard, Skeen & Van der Merwe 1997:281). 
 
Zeffertt, Paizes and Skeen (2003:670) state that in terms of section 162(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977, every witness must give his/her evidence under oath. In matters 
involving children, the first duty of the presiding officer is therefore to inquire whether a 
young child, tendered as a witness, understands the meaning and religious sanction of an 
oath. The usual procedure is for the presiding officer to question the child. In terms of 
section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, a person who is found not  to understand 
the importance and nature of the oath due to inter alia the fact that he/she is too young, 
may be admitted to give evidence in criminal proceedings without taking the oath or 
making the affirmation.  
 
Schwikkard (2004:10) indicates that generally when talking about the testimonial 
competence of juveniles the focus is inevitably on the juvenile witness, who is not the 
juvenile offender.  According to Schwikkard (2004:10) the question arises as to why the 
testimonial competence and cautionary rules are not an issue in relation to the child 
offender. The answer should be that these rules cannot and should not be applied to the 
child offender. However, the fact that they are applied to other child witnesses, be they 
called for the prosecution or the defence, reflects an approach to children’s evidence and 
certain beliefs about it that will inevitably remain unarticulated in the mind of the person 
trying the facts when evaluating the child offender’s evidence. 
 
Schwikkard (2004:11) states that he has not encountered a reported case where the 
testimonial competence of a juvenile offender is an issue. The author asked whether we 
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can automatically assume that a child who has criminal capacity is a competent witness.  
The answer is no. First, when dealing with children under the age of seven years, the 
absence of capacity cannot be equated with an absence of testimonial competence. The 
irrebuttable presumption that children under the age of seven years lack criminal capacity 
is a statement of policy, not the result of an individual factual inquiry. Consequently, a child 
under the age of seven years who lack criminal capacity may still understand what it 
means to tell the truth. So the assumption that child offenders have testimonial 
competence cannot be based on the finding that they have criminal capacity.  However, 
there is a very good reason for assuming that children who are deemed criminally 
responsible are also presumed to be testimonialy competent – it would be untenable to 
have a child deemed fit for trial but insufficiently competent to speak in his or her own 
defence.  It is also an expressed acknowledgement that a child’s testimony – irrespective 
of whether he or she can articulate an appreciation of what it means to tell the truth – has 
value.   
 
Schwikkard (2004:12) refers to the cautionary rule applicable to the child witness and 
indicates that this rule applies to the child witness who is not the offender. This rule 
provides that a presiding officer must be aware of the inherent dangers in assessing a 
child’s evidence.  As a consequence, a Court will seek corroboration in order to assist it in 
determining whether the witness is credible. However, corroboration is not essential for the 
requirements of the cautionary rule to be met. Reference is made to Woji v Santam 
Insurance Co Ltd 1981(1)SA1020(A) where the Court stated that the question which the 
trial Court must ask itself is whether the young witness’ evidence is trustworthy.  
Trustworthiness depends on factors such as the child’s power of observation, his power to 
recollection, and his power to narration on the specific matter to be testified.  In each 
instance the capacity of the particular child is to be investigated.   
 
Schwikkard, Skeen and Van der Merwe (1997:388) explain that a cautionary rule is a rule 
of practice and must be followed whenever the evidence of certain witnesses (for example 
children) is evaluated. It serves as a constant reminder to Court that the facile acceptance 
of the credibility of those witnesses (i.e. children) may prove dangerous. 
 
The South African Human Rights Commission (2000:29) defines cautionary rules as 
evidentiary rules of practice that require presiding officers to exercise caution prior to 
accepting the evidence of certain categories of witnesses and child witnesses fall into this 
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category.  The South African Human Rights Commission (2000:30) indicates that in order 
to be responsive to the reality of children, the Courts need to take into account the 
cognitive and emotional developmental reality of children when assessing a child’s 
evidence. The South African Law Commission (2002:176) recommends that the cautionary 
rule relating to children should be abolished statutorily in the Sexual Offences Bill.  In fact 
the recommendation to abolish, refers to the cautionary rules relating to children, single 
witnesses, and complainants in sexual offences (Van Niekerk 2003:4) 
 
Schwikkard (2004:12) states that he has been unable to find any authority on whether the 
cautionary rule applies to child offenders, but logic dictates that if presiding officers are 
instructed to treat children as inherently unreliable witnesses, it must colour their 
assessment of the child offender’s testimony.   
 
This aspect definitely needs attention.  Concerted efforts should be made by the 
Legislature and Government to eliminate even the slightest possibility of the cautionary 
rules, in respect of child witnesses and single witnesses, being applied in respect of child 
offenders.  If not, the application thereof in relation to child offenders will severely prejudice 
child offenders in that their fundamental right to a fair trial will definitely be infringed upon. 
It is suggested that the Child Justice Bill, 2002 should include a clear provision, specifically 
prohibiting the application of the cautionary rules by the Child Justice Court, in respect of 
child offenders, even if such an application is subconsciously. 
 
6.4 The Evolving Capacities of the Child 
 
The UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre (2005:vii)  points out that the understanding of 
childhood varies significantly around the world.  No universal consensus can be found as 
to what children need for their optimum development, what environments best provide for 
those needs, what form and level of protection is appropriate for children at a specific age. 
 
Article 5 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989:3) provides as follows: 
“State Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where 
applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local 
custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a 
manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and 
guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.” 
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The UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre (2005:ix) indicates that the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (1989) recognizes that children in different  environments and cultures 
who are faced with diverse life experiences will acquire competencies at different ages, 
and their acquisition of competencies will vary according to circumstances.  It therefore 
also follows that children will require varying degrees of protection.  The UNICEF Innocenti 
Research Centre (2005:x) concludes that the evidence that children do not acquire 
competencies merely as a consequence of age, but rather through experience, culture and 
levels of parental support and expectation, has implications for determining the most 
effective legal framework for respecting children’s rights to participate in and take 
responsibility for those  decisions they are capable of, while also providing appropriate 
protection.  The UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre (2005:x) indicates that there are a 
number of possible models to address this problem: 
 
(i) Provision in law of fixed, prescribed age-limits: to a large extend, this model exist in 
the majority of States Parties of he Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, where the 
law prescribes a broad range of rigid age limits for example the age of criminal 
responsibility. The advantages of this model includes the fact that all citizens, adults and 
children have a clear understanding of when certain rights and responsibilities can be 
exercised and that the model is relatively simple to understand and to implement. A 
disadvantage is that the uniformity on the exercise of rights does not reflect children’s 
actual and differing capacities (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 2005:x). 
 
(ii) Removal of all age-limits, substituting a framework of individual assessment to 
determine competence to exercise any particular right : the advantages of this model 
includes the fact that it enables judgments about children’s capacities to reflect prevailing 
assumptions and experience, rather than legislation that may be outdated and out of 
touch, it will eliminate the fixed inconsistencies that may exist within and between different 
parts of civil and criminal law. The disadvantages includes that it will be a costly and 
burdensome administration to assess individual children on a very wide range of legal 
matters, considerable skill would be needed to judge children’s individual capacity and the 
potential inconsistency in widely divergent assumptions and mechanisms for assessing 
competence. This model is furthermore at odds with the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 1989, which does propose the introduction of certain legal age-limits. 
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(iii) Introduction of a model that includes age-limits but entitles a child to demonstrate 
competence and acquire the right at an earlier age: this model combines the establishment 
of fixed age-limits, automatically entitling children to exercise certain rights, with 
recognition that children may be entitled to exercise certain rights earlier if they 
demonstrate the necessary capacity. The advantages of this model includes that it 
protects children while also acknowledging the need for flexibility in the application of age-
limits and it provides a consistent basis for assessment of all children. It also establishes 
patterns in children’s development associated with age, while recognizing that individual 
children can and do vary significantly in their levels of understanding and competence. The 
disadvantages includes that considerable resources are required to assess specific 
capacities of individual children and the fact that poor and marginalized children are less 
likely to have access to opportunities for challenging the legal age-limits. In this regard the 
UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre (2005:51) states that in the case of private and public 
law, it would be necessary to clarify that an application to exercise a right below the legally 
prescribed age-limit could only be instigated by the child.  Even then it would have to be 
strictly enforced to prevent the possibility that adults might submit such application against 
the best interests of children, by for example recommending that a child below the 
minimum age for criminal responsibility could be held criminally responsible.  
 
(iv) Providing age-limits only for those rights that are at risk of being abused or 
neglected by adults and introducing a presumption of competence in respect of other 
rights: the advantages of this model includes that it protects areas of potential vulnerability, 
while recognizing children’s evolving capacities to participate in day to day decision-
making, it provides flexibility and respects differences in children’s evolving capacities and 
the assessment of the capacity of individual children is limited to those adults with whom 
they have personal or professional relationships for instance parents, doctors, teachers, 
judges and social workers. A disadvantage is that the imposition of some fixed age-limits 
in order to provide protection may be seen to limit children’s opportunities to demonstrate 
capacity and take increased responsibilities for their lives  
   
The UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre (2005:xi) points out that realizing children’s rights 
in accordance with their evolving capacities can only be achieved through a holistic 
approach to implementing the Convention of the Rights of the Child, 1989.  It represents a 
fundamental challenge to conventional attributes towards children, questioning some of 
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the deeply held assumptions about children’s needs, children’s development, protection of 
children and children’s agency. 
 
6.5 Age Determination 
 
Another important issue closely linked to the criminal capacity is age determination, 
because it is important to know the exact age of a child when deciding to prosecute or not, 
and to know whether criminal capacity must be proved or not. It is not uncommon for 
South African children to be unaware of their ages and dates of birth (Child Justice 
Alliance 2001:6).  In some cases even the parents of such children are unable to give 
particulars in this regard. One of the reasons for this is that in many instances births are 
not registered and the parents are illiterate. Another problem may be the fact that there are 
a lot of street children in South Africa who are more at risk of being in conflict with the law, 
and are on the streets because they are orphans with no family or official documents.  
Labuschagne and Van den Heever (1993:98), submits that traditionally in black 
communities the registration of births is unknown and the age of individuals, in the sense 
of a specific number of years of age is indeterminable.   
 
6.5.1 Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 
 
In terms of section 337 of the Children Procedure Act, 1977, the presiding judicial officer 
may estimate the age of a person if in any criminal proceedings the age of that person is a 
relevant fact of which no or insufficient evidence is available. The finding of the presiding 
officer may not be simply based on observation. There should be a proper attempt at 
finding evidence.  The following can be used: 
(i) birth certificate 
 
(ii) evidence of the parents 
 
(iii) evidence of family or other persons knowing of the birth of the accused 
 
(iv) expert evidence 
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(v) estimation of age 
 
Section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 reads as follows: 
“Estimating age of person – 
If in any criminal proceedings the age of any person is a relevant fact of which no or 
insufficient evidence is available at the proceedings, the presiding judge or judicial officer 
may estimate the age of such person by his appearance of from any information which 
may be available, and the age so estimated shall be deemed to be the correct age of such 
person, unless – 
 
(a) it is subsequently proved that the said estimate was incorrect; and 
 
(b) the accused at such proceedings could not lawfully have been convicted of the 
offence with which he was charged if the correct age had been proved. 
 
An estimation of age may only be made once it is established that no or insufficient 
evidence is available.”   
 
Leggett (1999:27) refers to age determination and states that proving the age of a child in 
the first place is a problem in the South African context. Many births continue to occur 
unregistered, and street children rarely carry ID documents. At present, a cumbersome 
and expensive procedure is required to medically prove a child’s age, including skeletal x-
rays. 
 
In theory, the weight of this encumbrance should work to the advantage of the child, since 
borderline cases in which minor offences have been committed would rarely justify the 
cost and should thus be diverted to welfare. In practice, police officers often fudge the 
records and incarcerate the child anyway. The sword swings in both directions, however, 
and many youths above the minimum age are held with younger children, creating an 
additional hazard for the most vulnerable in state custody. 
 
Since the deciding factor in the early stages of processing an accused child is physical 
age, the impact of physical deprivation on development must be considered. Malnutrition 
has been demonstrated to retard development both physically and mentally. And this calls 
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into question a whole range of issues surrounding the ways South Africa’s history and 
present inequality have affects its young people. 
 
6.5.2 Case Law Relating to the Age Determination of Accused 
 
(i) In S v Swartz 1970(2)SA240(NC) the Court stated that seldom ought there be no 
evidence available in a magistrate’s Court as the help of the district surgeon or any other 
doctor can be invoked. 
 
(ii) In S v Sibisi 1976(2)SA162(N) James JP stated: “… it is not only desirable but 
essential that, in all cases in which the age of the accused become relevant… the 
magistrate should … record what his finding is in regard to the age of the accused; and … 
he should further record briefly his grounds for (his) finding…” 
 
(iii) In S v Swato 1977(3)SA992(O) the Court held that the section could only be applied 
when it had been established that no or insufficient evidence is available and that it could 
not be invoked merely to avoid inconveniencing the district surgeon. 
 
(iv) In S v Ngoma 1984(3)SA666(A) the Court indicated that the general rule is that the 
best admissible evidence must be used to determine a juvenile accused’s age. 
 
(v) In S v Khumalo 1991(2)SACR694(W) the Court stated that in all cases where the 
age of an accused was of material importance, either in respect of conviction or in regard 
to sentence, magistrates should properly record everything so that the method by which 
the accused’s age was determined appeared adequately from the record.   
 
(vi) In the matter of S v Mbelo 2003(1)SACR84 the ages of both the accused and the 
victim were  material issues which could impact on whether or not the minimum sentence 
for rape of a victim under 16 years in terms of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 105 of 
1997, must be considered. The Court decided that where the determination of age is of 
material importance and hearsay evidence is inadmissible, a baptismal certificate is not 
sufficient proof of age. The information furnished by the accused and his father could also 
not be regarded as evidence because it was unattested. The accused’s legal 
representative had made admissions conceding the truth of the alleged age on behalf of 
the accused. The Court accepted this evidence because as with any other admission, an 
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accused would be bound by the admissions properly furnished on his/her behalf by a legal 
representative. 
 
(vii) In S v Dial case number 021/2004 the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court 
made it clear that section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 is not to be resorted to 
out of convenience, but rather out of necessity. In this case the Court a quo estimated the 
age of the accused as being 19 years of age. When queried about this the presiding officer 
indicated that there is no district surgeon in Aliwal North who could have examined the 
accused and that the accused mother would have been of no assistance as she is a 
unsophisticated person. In these circumstances the presiding officer decided that there 
was no or insufficient evidence as to the accused’s age and he made the estimation of the 
accused’s age as older than 18 years. 
 
6.5.3 Proposed Provisions in the Child Justice Bill, 2002 
 
As indicated above, many children accused of crimes in South Africa do not know their 
exact ages.  The Child Justice Bill, 2002 proposes a solution to this problem by providing 
that where a child’s age is uncertain or is in dispute – 
 
(i) the probation officer should gather available information and make an estimation of 
the age of the child and should such information on a prescribed form. The legislation 
provides a list of documents or other forms of information relevant to the estimation of age; 
 
(ii) the magistrate presiding at a preliminary inquiry should make a determination of 
age based on all available evidence, and the age so determined should be considered to 
be the child’s age until contrary evidence is placed before a Court; 
 
(iii) the child may be taken to a medical practitioner for estimation of age by the 
probation officer. 
 
Sections 24, 31 and 82 deal with the various procedures to be followed by the probation 
officer, inquiry magistrate and presiding officer in a criminal Court when determining the 
age of an accused: 
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“Estimation of child’s age by probation officer 
 
24.(1) If the age of a child who must be assessed is uncertain, the probation officer must 
make an estimation of the child’s age and must complete the prescribed form. 
  
(2) In making the estimation, the probation officer must consider any available 
information in the following order of cogency, subject to subsection (3):  
  
(a) A previous determination of age by a magistrate under this Act or under the 
Criminal Procedure Act or an estimation of age in terms of the Child Care Act, 1983 (Act 
No 74 of 1983); 
 
(b) statements made by a parent, the legal guardian or any other person likely to 
have direct knowledge of the age of the child or a statement made by the child himself or 
herself; 
 
(c) a baptismal certificate, school registration form or school report, or other 
information of a similar nature; or 
 
(d) an estimation of age by a medical practitioner. 
 
(3) If the probation officer is unable to make an estimation by virtue of information 
contemplated in subsection (2)(a), (b) or (c), the probation officer must refer the child in the 
prescribed manner to a medical practitioner for an estimation of the child’s age. 
 
(4) The probation officer must submit the estimation on the prescribed form together 
with any relevant documentation to the inquiry magistrate before the child’s appearance at 
a preliminary inquiry.” 
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The Community Law Centre ((c)2003:2) points out, with reference to S v Mbelo (supra) 
that in terms of the above provisions, the use of statements by the child, the child’s parents 
or other persons likely to have direct knowledge of the age of the child, as well as 
baptismal certificates and school reports may be utilized by the probation officer when 
estimating a child offender’s age. 
 
“Age to be determined by inquiry magistrate 
 
31.(1) If the age of a child is uncertain, the inquiry magistrate must determine the age of 
the child after considering the form and any documentation submitted by the probation 
officer in terms of section 24(4). 
 
(2) (a) For the purposes of a determination – 
 
(i) an inquiry magistrate may require any relevant documentation, 
information or statement from any person; 
 
(ii) an inquiry magistrate may subpoena any person to produce the 
documentation, information or statements contemplated in subparagraph (i); and 
 
(iii) section 24(2) applies with the changes required by the context. 
   
 (b) Chapter 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act applies with the changes required by 
the context to the issue of a subpoena contemplated in paragraph (a)(ii). 
 
(3) The inquiry magistrate must enter the age determined in terms of subsection (1) 
into the record as the age of the child, which age must be regarded as the correct age of 
the child until the contrary is proved on a balance of probabilities. 
 
(4) If the inquiry magistrate determines that the person was over the age of 18 years at 
the time of the alleged commission of the offence, he or she must close the preliminary 
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inquiry and postpone the proceedings as contemplated in section 50(6) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. 
 
(5) If the inquiry magistrate makes a determination of age that is not supported by a 
valid birth certificate, identity document or passport, a copy of the record of the 
determination must be forwarded to the Department of Home Affairs for the issue of an 
identification document to the person concerned.” 
 
“Age Assessment of Person Claiming to be Child 
 
82.(1) If a person who is charged with an offence in a Court at any time before the 
imposition of sentence alleges that he or she was under the age of 18 years at the time of 
the alleged commission of the offence, the presiding officer must refer the person to a 
probation officer in the prescribed manner. 
 
(2) The presiding officer of a Court contemplated in subsection (1) may at any before 
the imposition of sentence of his or her own accord refer a person charged with an offence 
in that Court to a probation officer if it appears to the presiding officer that the person is 
under the age of 18 years. 
 
(3) The probation officer must make an estimation of the age of the person in 
accordance with section 24 and submit the prescribed form and any relevant 
documentation contemplated in that section to the presiding officer concerned. 
 
(4) The presiding officer must determine the age of the person, and for that purpose 
section 31 applies with the changes required by the context. 
 
(5) If the age of the person is determined to be under the age of 18 years and the trial 
has - 
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 (a) not yet commended, the presiding officer must transfer the matter to an inquiry 
magistrate having jurisdiction; or 
 
 (b) already commenced, the proceedings must continue before the presiding 
officer, but the remainder of the proceedings must be conducted in terms of this Act and 
the Court must be regarded as a child justice Court.” 
 
It is suggested that as part of the recommended comprehensive investigation to be done 
as soon as possible after the arrest of the child, and in cases where the age of the child 
offender is uncertain, the age determination of the child should also be thoroughly 
investigated at that stage. This will play an important role in the decisions taken about the 
child’s position and future at a very early stage of the proceedings. In this regard 
knowledge and understanding of the physical development of children is very important to 
the probation officer, social worker or criminologist who has to make recommendations 
regarding the estimated age of the child, to the presiding officer.   
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
There are various important issues closely linked to criminal capacity and these include 
the time and number of assessments, the testimonial competency of the child offender, 
evolving capacities of the child and age determination. These issues must be considered 
and should be addressed in the new juvenile justice system proposed and provided for in 
the Child Justice Bill, 2002.   
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CHAPTER 7  
 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the findings of the project will be furnished, the relevant conclusions will be 
highlighted and the recommendations will be made. The findings will include the current 
position in South African law with regard to the issue or criminal capacity, as well the 
proposed provisions in the Child Justice Bill, 2002. 
 
7.2 Findings 
 
There are guidelines regarding the establishment of a minimum age for criminal capacity in 
the International Instruments although no specific age is suggested. 
 
Australia, the United Kingdom and Hong Kong investigated the position relating to the 
issue of criminal capacity of children during recent years. Australia decided to keep the doli 
incapax presumption and only amended the minimum age for criminal responsibility to 10 
years in all its jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom of Great Britain there are differences.  
England and Wales abolished the doli incapax presumption 1998 and Scotland, although 
recommendations for changes have been made by the Scottish Law Commission in 2002, 
has not amended their position. In Hong Kong the decision was taken to increase the 
minimum age for criminal responsibility to 10 years and to retain the doli incapax 
presumption for children between the ages of 10 and below 14 years. 
 
The current position in our law regarding the criminal capacity of children is formulated in 
the common law presumptions. In terms of the common law there is an irrebuttable 
presumption that children under 7 years of age are doli incapax and they can therefore not 
be prosecuted for any crime. There is a rebuttable presumption that children between the 
ages of 7 and 14 years are doli incapax. Children between the ages of 7 and 14 years can 
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therefore be prosecuted if the State can prove beyond reasonable doubt that they had the 
necessary criminal capacity at the time of the commission of the offence.  
 
The test for criminal capacity has two legs. The first leg requires that the child must have 
had the ability to distinguish between right and wrong and the second leg requires that the 
child must have had the ability to conduct himself/herself in accordance with this insight 
into right and wrong, at the time of the commission of the offence. 
 
Since the ratification of the International Instruments, the South African government has 
taken various initiatives to fulfill the duties and obligations placed upon it as a State Party. 
One of these initiatives includes the drafting of the Child Justice Bill, 2002 that was 
introduced into Parliament in August 2002. Once promulgated, it will establish a separate 
juvenile justice system for the adjudication of juvenile offenders. The Child Justice Bill, 
2002 codifies the common law presumption on criminal capacity and raises the minimum 
age for criminal capacity to 10 years. The need to raise the age for criminal capacity is 
clear from the fact that the majority of the professionals, who participated in the study, 
were of the opinion that the minimum age of 7 years for criminal capacity is too low.       
 
Criminal capacity of children can be proved and decided on through the merits/facts of the 
case. 
 
Physical, language, sexual and moral development are very important factors that should 
also be taken into account when deciding on the criminal capacity of children. Another 
important aspect, which needs definite attention, is cultural context, especially in a cultural 
diverse country like ours.  
 
Many different disciplines contribute to the understanding of how children acquire capacity. 
Developmental psychologists have long studied how, why and when children develop. 
Anthropologists have contributed to our understanding of how differences across cultures 
influence the understanding of childhood and consequent treatment of children. Lawyers 
and medical practitioners have grappled with methods of defining competence in order to 
determine when a child can assume responsibility for decision-making. Sociologists have 
begun to examine the concept of childhood and the extent to which it is socially rather than 
merely biologically constructed. 
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From the provisions of the Child Justice Bill, 2002 it is clear that a child offender, between 
the ages of 10 years and under 14 years, has the potential of being assessed on three 
different occasions, probably by three different persons for three different reasons, 
throughout his/her trial. This can be a very traumatic experience for the child offender, 
especially if it is his/her first contact with the criminal justice system.  
 
There are various issues closely linked to criminal capacity and these include the time and 
number of assessments, the testimonial competency of the child offender, evolving 
capacities of the child and age determination. 
 
7.3 Conclusions 
 
Although various authors criticises the manner in which the issue of criminal capacity is 
being dealt with by the Courts it is clear form the case law that the Courts do exercise 
caution in most cases where children  between the ages of 7 and 14 years are involved. It 
is furthermore important to link criminal capacity to a specific chronological age to prevent 
very young children from appearing unnecessary in Courts and to give a guideline to all 
the roll players in the criminal justice system. The general feeling is that not enough is 
being done in our criminal justice system to ensure that children between the ages of 7 – 
14 years have criminal capacity before they are prosecuted. 
 
From the above it is clear that the majority of the various professionals agreed on the fact 
that the minimum age of 7 years for criminal capacity is too low and that it should be 
raised, as provided for in the Child Justice Bill, 2002. 
 
The need for certainty as to when a child can be held criminally liable for an offence and to 
prevent the unnecessary exposure of too young children to the trauma of appearing in 
Court, is evident from the fact that ten out of the seventeen professionals, who participated 
in the study, were of the opinion that criminal capacity should be linked to a specific age. In 
this regard, however, there was a difference of opinion, even within the various 
professions. 
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All the various professionals who responded to this question held the same point of view 
indicating that not enough is being done in our legal system to ensure that child offenders 
between the ages of 7 – 14 years have criminal capacity before being prosecuted. 
 
The fact that three criminologists preferred not to answer some of the questions because 
they have not been involved with children in conflict with the law, in the criminal justice 
system is an indication that criminologists in general should be encouraged to become 
involved in this process as they can offer a valuable contribution to assist the Court in 
reaching a decision on criminal capacity. 
  
The majority of the participating professionals agreed with the statement that the 
provisions of the Child Justice Bill, 2002 will adequately protect child offenders and this is 
an indication that our country need a separate criminal justice system for juvenile 
offenders, and that the Child Justice Bill, 2002, in principle, will protect juvenile offenders. 
 
Fifteen of the subjects agreed with the statement that the evaluation should be done 
before the appearance in the Child Justice Court. It is clear that there is a need for an 
assessment of the child offender as soon as possible to enable all the relevant role players 
to make the right and informed decisions about the child offender at the beginning of the 
process. This will be in the best interest of the child. 
 
Each of the various professionals agreed that an evaluation immediately after the 
commission of the offence should be compulsory. The fact that the various professionals 
agree on this issue is an indication of the importance of doing an assessment as soon as 
to ensure that the results are reliable.  
 
The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child remained concerned that the 
minimum age for criminal capacity of 10 years, as proposed in the Child Justice Bill, 2002 
is still  too low and recommended that the provisions be revised with a view to increase it 
even further.  
 
Both Australia and Hong Kong have retained the rebuttable presumption of doli incapax 
and the fact that only one of the professionals, who participated in the study, was of the 
opinion that the United Kingdom (where the rebuttable presumption was abolished) offers 
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the best protection for child offenders with reference to the establishment of criminal 
capacity, is a clear indication that there is a definite need to retain the rebuttable 
presumption of doli incapax. 
 
The Child Justice Bill, 2002 was introduced into Parliament in August 2002 and the public 
hearings and deliberations started in February 2003. The provisions in the Child Justice 
Bill, 2002 will definitely provide better protection to children in conflict with the law. 
 
The Child Justice Court can order the evaluation of the criminal capacity of a child 
offender. The evaluation must include the assessment of the cognitive, emotional, 
psychological and social development of the child and the report must be furnished to the 
Court within 30 days after the order was made.  
 
The traditional theories regarding the development of children, including those developed 
by Piaget were based on research originating from Europe and the North American 
contexts and reflect presumptions about childhood in those societies. These presumptions 
are not the reality for millions of children throughout the world and do not take account of 
the impact of factors such as family, age of siblings, culture, status or social and economic 
contexts, on the process of the child’s development. 
 
Physical, language, sexual, moral development and cultural context should definitely be 
included in the assessment of the criminal capacity of children. 
 
It is clear that the criminal capacity of children should be determined and assessed from a 
multi-disciplinary point of view and this needs to be addressed when developing a 
separate juvenile justice system. 
 
The sooner the assessment of the criminal capacity of a child offender is conducted after 
the commission of the offence, the more reliable will the assessment be. 
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As indicated in paragraph 6.3 (supra) the issue of the application of the cautionary rules in 
relation to child offenders definitely needs attention.  Concerted efforts should be made by 
the Legislature and Government to eliminate even the slightest possibility of the cautionary 
rules, in respect of child witnesses and single witnesses, being applied in respect of child 
offenders.  If not, the application thereof in relation to child offenders will severely prejudice 
child offenders in that their fundamental right to a fair trial will definitely be infringed upon.  
 
7.4 Model of Practical Guidelines 
 
7.4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this model is not to furnish an assessment tool for criminal capacity but 
rather to give the Court and other role players a better understanding of the different 
factors that should be considered when assessing the criminal capacity of children. It also 
furnishes a brief overview of what each factor entails, what to expect from children in each 
age group, what important aspects to keep in mind when assessing a child’s evidence, 
appearance, responses (verbal and non-verbal) and actions in Court and to give some 
practical guidelines in this regard.  Finally, some questions and statements are also 
suggested to the Court to assist in determining the level at which the child before the 
Court, is functioning at. 
 
The chronological ages, during which children can be expected to develop and behave 
and be representative of a particular stage, are not fixed.  These guidelines and notes are 
a general indication of what to expect from children at a specific age, and all the factors 
should be taken into account and assessed as a whole. 
 
7.4.2 Criminological Model for Assessing Doli Incapax 
 
The following criminological model for the assessment of doli incapax can be derived from 
the findings and the conclusions: 
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Table 13: Criminological model for assessing doli incapax 
Physical aspects Psychological 
aspects 
Sociological aspects Judicial aspects 
Determining age 
between 10 and 14 
 
Physiological 
development 
 
Psychological 
development 
 
Emotional 
development 
 
Moral development 
 
Intellectual 
development 
 
Volutional 
development 
Social development 
 
Sexual development 
 
Language 
development 
 
Cultural context of 
upbringing 
 
Ability to differentiate 
between right and 
wrong 
 
Ability to behave and 
act in accordance with 
insight between right 
and wrong 
 
Testimonial 
competency of the 
child offender 
 
Merits of the case and 
the child’s conduct 
before, during and 
after the commission 
of the offence 
 
Evolving capacities of 
the child 
 
Time of the 
assessment after the 
alleged offence 
 
The maturing effect of 
the arrest, 
appearance in Court, 
the interviews by the 
police and the 
assessment 
 
 
 
The model can be briefly explained as follows: 
 
The physical aspects of determining doli incapax include that the physical development 
(appearance) of the child should be considered and the age of the child determined 
beyond reasonable doubt to be between 10 and less than 14 years of age. The physical 
appearance and the determined age should be in reasonable harmony. The fact that some 
children can look older that they are should be taken into account. 
 
Next, the psychological aspects that need to be taken into account to determine doli 
incapax, include the emotional, moral, intellectual, volutional, cognitive and overall 
psychological development of the child.  These should be in harmony with the 
psychological aspects of the developmental stage of the 10 to 14 years old child. 
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To follow up on the psychological issues, the sociological aspects (where the child’s 
functioning is measured in his socio-cultural setting) that need consideration to determine 
doli incapax, include the sexual development, language development and the cultural 
setting of the child.  All these aspects should also be considered. 
 
The judicial aspects include the capacity of the child to distinguish between right and 
wrong, to act in accordance with that insight, the facts of the criminal case and the child’s 
conduct before, during and after the commission of the offence, the competency of the 
child to testify, the evolving (of the physical, psychological, sociological and judicial) 
capacities of the child, and the maturing effect the arrest, the appearance in Court, the 
interviews by the police and the assessment might have had on the child. Finally, the time 
that transpired between the alleged offence and the assessment should also be 
considered by the Court. 
 
Criminologically it makes sense to insist that all the above-mentioned aspects should be 
harmonised in assessing doli incapax.  
 
The aspects identified in the above model can further be illustrated and explained as 
follows: 
 
7.4.3 Cognitive Development 
 
The ability to distinguish between right and wrong forms part of a person’s cognitive 
mental function.  It relates to a person’s reason or intellect, in other words a person’s 
ability to perceive, to reason and to remember (Snyman 2002:162). 
 
According to Piaget (1967:88–99; Wadsworth 1996:26; Campbell 1976:1–4), children 
between the ages of 7 years to 11 years are in the concrete operational period.  They gain 
the abilities of conversation (number, area, volume, orientation) and reversibility.  Their 
thinking is becoming organized, rational and less egocentric.  They can solve problems in 
a logical fashion, but are typically not able to think abstractly or hypothetically.   Children in 
this age group will interpret questions literally.  They experience difficulty explaining their 
own thinking or answering questions like “why are you unhappy?” 
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Hypothetical questions will in all likelihood result in the proverbial “I don’t know” reply.  This 
means that children in this age group will not be able to answer questions about how other 
people think or feel or experience an event.   
 
Piaget (1967:88–99; Wadsworth 1996:11; Campbell 1976:1–14) states that the formal 
operational period begins at about the age of 11 – 12 years.  Children in this period gain 
the ability to think in an abstract manner, they have the ability to combine and classify 
items in a more sophisticated way and they have the capacity for higher-order reasoning.  
Children can formulate hypotheses.   
 
To access the cognitive development of the child, the Court can consider putting a 
problem to the child for solution and then follows the arguments of the child and prompt 
the child for more information.  Arguing from the hypothesis that most children from most 
cultures in South Africa at this age should have a good idea of personal possessions, the 
Court could consider engaging the child to argue about a problem regarding possessions.   
 
As indicated above, a person’s cognitive mental function relates to, amongst others, a 
person’s ability to remember.  Important factors to keep in mind when accessing a child’s 
memory of events: 
 
a) The more relaxed the child is in the situation of recall, the more likely it is that the 
child will remember the relevant information or facts.  This can be achieved by putting the 
child at ease in Court and by explaining everything that happens in Court in an age 
appropriate manner.  Court personnel (the presiding officers, prosecutors, attorneys) 
should be trained specifically to deal with children; 
 
b) Use language that the child understands.  An example in this regard would be that 
instead of telling the child that “Mr X testified the following…”, rather state that “Mr X said 
that…”; 
 
c) Be wary of certain distortions by suggestions.  In this regard questions with too 
much unnecessary detail in particular can bring the child under the impression that the 
person posing the question expects him/her to say something specific, or to use a term 
that the child might not be familiar with. 
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General questions to ascertain whether or not the child knows and understands the 
difference between right and wrong will include the following: 
 
a) Do you know that what you did was wrong? 
 
b) When will something be wrong? 
 
c) What happens when you do something wrong? 
 
d) Who taught you the difference between right and wrong? 
 
e) What did this person say about, for example, taking another person’s belongings? 
 
Although this information will never be enough to make a decision on the criminal capacity 
of a child, it will serve as an indication of the child’s understanding of what he/she has 
done, why he/she did it, of what is going on (in Court), and why he/she is in Court or 
charged with an offence.   
 
7.4.4 Emotional Development 
 
Emotions are experienced at all ages but the ability to describe and manage feelings may 
differ across age groups.  The child’s demeanour (appearance) and/or ability to describe 
feelings may not be congruent with what the child may have experienced.  The child may 
tell the Court of a very sad or frightening experience while he/she is smiling because 
he/she may not be able to control or recognise his/her emotions. 
 
As discussed in paragraph 4.3.2 (supra), children between the ages of 5 to 12 years learn 
to label the emotions they are experiencing, and events are responded to with more 
appropriate emotional responsiveness.  The child in this age group starts to identify their 
emotions more accurately and displays the correct emotions during their evidence, for 
example cry when talking about a sad experience.  
 
Suppression may often be a successful defence against uncomfortable emotions.  
Children between the ages of 5 to 12 years are also aware that they should have some 
level of control over their feelings, they are capable of appropriate and strong feelings of 
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guilt, and they may actually fear the loss of control of emotion. In this instance the child 
may deny a very embarrassing incident or pretend that it happened to a friend and not to 
him/her.   
 
Children who grow up in homes that are troubled by parental mental-health problems, 
substance abuse or family violence, face significant threats to their own emotional 
development (National Council on the Developing Child 2005:2). These children lack 
appropriate emotional responses and maturity. Expert testimony is therefore of utmost 
importance to bring these facts and circumstances under the Court’s attention. 
 
The Court should take notice of how the child acts when he/she describes the details of 
the offence or the circumstances under which it occurred. The child must be asked about 
his/her actions during the commitment of the offence, before the offence was committed, 
and afterwards.  This will give the Court an indication on whether or not the child can 
express himself/herself accurately and give the correct sequence of the event as well.  The 
evidence of the child can be measured against the facts of the case and the evidence led 
by the State. 
 
It is also important that the Court recognises the fact that girls often have a greater ability 
to describe feelings accurately than boys, who are discouraged from an early age from 
expressing feelings. Some children get too scared to allow themselves to identify their 
feelings or even to feel their own emotions (Van Niekerk 2001:A3-2 – A3-9). 
 
One should assess the child’s emotional responses throughout the process and constantly 
compare the child’s visible emotions to what he/she says, and the way it is said. The Court 
should take cognisance of the child’s emotions and the way he/she displays it when giving 
evidence. Does the child look frightened when testifying about a frightening experience or 
cry/look sad when testifying about a sad incident? This will once again give the Court an 
indication of the child’s emotional development and his/her ability to express his/her 
emotions appropriately. 
 
The child offender may experience anxiety in the Court environment.  This should be 
acknowledged and not be interpreted as an indication of unwillingness to cooperate or 
stubbornness. The child may not be able to concentrate, laugh a lot, pretend that he/she 
does not understand what is going on or refuse to answer a question. The training of 
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presiding officers to deal with children, to understand the different developmental stages of 
children and to relate to children of various ages is of utmost importance in this regard.    
 
In circumstances where the child is requested to elaborate on a specific incident or topic 
which he/she perceives as bad or naughty, a natural reaction would be for the child to 
deny the allegations, to minimise them as much as possible, or not to want to talk. The 
child may be too embarrassed or shy to talk about the incident or may be afraid of being 
reprimanded. 
 
7.4.5 Psychological Development 
 
The second leg of the test for criminal capacity relates to the conative mental function.  
The most important aspect in this regard is whether the child has the ability to conduct 
himself/herself in accordance with this insight into right or wrong, at the time of the 
commissioning of the offence (Snyman 2002:177-178). 
 
The conative function of a person relates to a person’s ability to make a decision, set a 
goal, to pursue the goal and to resist impulses or desires to act contrary to what his/her 
insights into right and wrong reveal to him (Snyman 2002:162). The possibility of coercion 
from an adult or older child to commit the crime is important when considering the child’s 
free will or choices. This fact will usually emerge from the evidence during the trial, but if it 
doesn’t the Court should specifically address this issue through questions to the child.   
 
7.4.6 Social Development 
 
The single most important influence on a child’s development is that of the family.  
Children between the ages of 3 and 12 years have a strong desire to please and are 
learning to share, and to give and take. Crimes may be committed to fit in with social 
relations. Peer relationships take on an important value and friendships outside the 
immediate family take on great importance. 
 
Children over the age of 12 years are acutely aware of peer relationships and usually 
attach great importance to belonging to and having an identity with a peer group.  A child 
in this age group may experience a return to egocentric preoccupation with the self.  The 
egocentric stage of development relates to the fact that the child is unable to separate their 
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own perspective from that of others.  Separation from close family and the need for 
independence may begin during this phase (Van Niekerk 2001:A3-9). 
 
Important factors that should be specifically addressed in this regard include: 
 
a)   Communities or families which are unstable or chaotic;   
 
b) Parents who have criminal records, have problems with alcohol abuse, drug abuse 
or neglect their children; 
 
c) Harsh discipline or low levels of supervision; 
 
d) Children who are exposed to abuse or family violence; 
 
e) The way the family functions and the values of the family; 
 
f) The relationship between the child and his/her parents, the relationship between the 
parents, and the relationship between the child and his/her siblings; 
 
g) The experiences of the child in school, the child’s performance in school, his/her 
attendance at school, the friends of the child, influences of subcultures or gangs, peer 
pressure and the child’s ability to resist peer pressure. 
 
The above factors should be presented to the Court either through the evidence of an 
expert witness or through the evidence led by the State or the defence attorney.   
 
7.4.7 Sexual Development 
 
Young sex offenders are increasing and knowledge of the general manner in which sexual 
development occurs is important. 
 
Children are not asexual beings who experience any form of sexual touching as bad 
and/or traumatic. The child may not be traumatised by sexual abuse in its self but by the 
reaction of the adult who finds out about it. This reaction, if not controlled in the presence 
of the child can cause the child to believe that he/she did something bad or wrong. An 
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uncontrolled outburst can cause more trauma to the child than would have been the case if 
the revelation of the abuse was reacted to in a calm and controlled manner. 
 
Children from the age of 5 to 12 years have usually learned the rules about touching 
themselves sexually, and this behaviour during this phase of development is usually very 
secretive.  Children in puberty – girls from anywhere between 9 and 13 years of age, and 
boys from 10 to 14 years of age – usually have an increased interest in sexual activity.   
 
The exposure of the child to sexual encounters, be it personally or through watching third 
parties, is important.  Exposure to pornography should also be considered. The Court 
should make enquiries in this regard if these facts are not presented during the course of 
the trial. Expert evidence should however cover these aspects.   
 
Other important factors that should be considered include: 
 
a) The living arrangements in the family; 
 
b) Where do everyone sleep, does the child share a room with adult couples; 
 
c) Has the child been exposed to sexual encounters by watching adults; and 
 
d) What was explained to the child in this regard. 
 
Children under the age of 12 to 14 years, rarely have a full adult understanding of the 
implications and possible consequences of the sexual behaviour they have been involved 
with. 
 
Another important aspect here is the fact that children who commit sexual violence usually 
lack close bonds, depersonalise emotion, have often been exposed to pornography and 
have been victimised themselves, not just in relation to sexual abuse but also in relation to 
physical and emotional abuse and deprivation. Questions in this regard are very important 
in cases where children are accused of sexual offences as this will give the Court some 
insight into the child’s motivation or justification for the act.  
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7.4.8 Physical Development 
 
Physical appearance is important but it is essential to remember that a physically 
developed and mature child is not always intellectually or emotionally developed and 
mature.  Physically smaller children may come across in Court as more vulnerable and 
appealing and a physically bigger child may be treated more like an adult although he/she 
is of tender age (Van Niekerk 2001:A3-2 – A3-9). 
 
The Court should constantly remind itself of the chronological age of the child and should 
deal with the child in a manner appropriate to the child’s age and not to the child’s 
demeanour or physical appearance.   
 
7.4.9 Language Development 
 
Language development of a child is linked to the language to which the child is exposed in 
the home, the school and the media. 
 
From the ages of 6 to 12 years children’s vocabulary becomes more extensive and the 
ability to deal with sentence construction expands.  Children in this age group may still use 
words out of context and without full understanding of the meaning.   
 
Children over the age of 12 years are usually able to manage complex vocabulary and 
language constructions, depending of their exposure to the use of language as well as to 
their level of education.  There may still be misunderstandings about words relating to 
information that is taboo for discussion in the home or that is restricted to adult-only 
environments. 
 
Children are extremely literal in their use of language and this should be recognised by the 
Court. The child may deny that a person (perpetrator) is a friend of him/her and his/her 
family. When it later transpires that the person often visited their home, the child may 
explain it by saying that the person is not a friend of him/her but knows his mother/father. 
 
Children use vague, free-associative style of communication and this is particular evident 
in their description of places.  A child may indicate that he/she knows where a place is but 
will be unable to provide directions or an address.   
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Children often attribute to a word only part of the meaning that the same word has for 
adults.  For example, when asked whether he/she was wearing clothes, the answer may 
be negative.  When it later emerges that the child wore a costume, it may seem like a 
contradiction but it is not.  Upon further enquiry the child may indicate that a costume is not 
regarded as clothing. It is important that each answer the child gives are understood in the 
contexts that the child uses it in and not in the context that the adults in the case would 
use it. If the Court is uncertain as to the exact meaning the child attributes to a word, it 
must seek clarity from the child. 
 
Language development is also linked to a child’s perception of time, the absence or 
presence of other people and the different relationships they have with other children 
and/or adults. 
 
The Court should always ensure that it attaches the same meaning as the child to the 
words the child uses.  If the child refers to someone as a friend, what does it mean?  If the 
child contradicts himself/herself, is it really a contradiction or does the word has another 
more literal meaning to the child?  It is suggested that the Court should request 
explanations for comments or answers by the child, which the Court does not understand 
or is unsure of.   
 
Dates, locations, times or sequence of events are often perceived by younger children as 
being peripheral.  The issue of centration also plays a role.  Centration is when a child 
focuses on certain aspects of a situation to the exclusion of others.  A child may be able to 
describe a car, the colour, the make, but be unable to say whether anybody was sitting in 
the car.  It is more appropriate to use general life experiences carefully as an indication of 
meaningful events for younger children.  Examples include meal times, weekdays as 
compared to weekends and birthdays. Rather ask whether an incident occurred during the 
week or on a weekend.  Do not expect specific dates/days. A child may state that he/she 
knows where a specific place is but when asked for directions or an address he/she may 
not be able to furnish it (Müller 2003:6).  
 
Children can answer questions relating to what, where and who better than those relating 
to how, when and why. 
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The following phrases or word constructions should be avoided when communicating with 
child offenders (Louw 2005:31): 
 
a) Long, constructed questions- rather use short sentences. Ask one question at a 
time. Use the active form of speech rather that the passive form of speech, for example 
rather say “ when John and Ken were fighting” instead of  “while the fighting between John 
and Ken was going on”;  
 
b) Three to four syllable words like “identify” – rather use one to two syllable words like 
“tell” or “show”; 
 
c) Complex time-forms like “I would like to know” – rather use simple time-forms like “I 
want to know”; 
 
d) Unfamiliar words like “juveniles” – rather use a familiar word like “children”; 
 
e) Questions in the negative like “Is it not true?” – rather use positive constructions like 
“Is it true?”. 
 
7.4.10 Moral Development 
 
A young child may have a limited sense of the wrongfulness of an act, but not necessarily 
the understanding of the morality of the act. 
 
Kohlberg (1984:170–172) formulated a model to explain moral development.  The first is 
the preconventional moral level and this is the level of most children under 9 years of age.  
The observance of rules and regulations is mainly based on the desire to avoid 
punishment. 
 
The conventional level, according to Kohlberg (1984:170–172), is the level of most 
adolescents and adults in our society.  Rules and norms are generally accepted with an 
interest to avoid disapproval or dislike of others. 
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7.4.11 Cultural Context 
 
Childhood is understood as a product of specific economic, social and cultural processes.   
 
Chronological age limits for fixing criminal capacity did not exist in traditional law.  
Traditions and beliefs within a specific culture may influence the criminal capacity of child 
offenders.  The belief in witchcraft, muti and muti killings may have an impact on the ability 
of a child to distinguish between right and wrong and on the child’s ability to act in 
accordance with his/her insight between right and wrong (Labuschagne & Van den Heever 
1993:100). 
 
Factors that should be considered is 
 
a) How the community in which the child stays perceive the child’s actions and the 
offence; 
 
b) What are the family of the child’s opinion or values in this instance; 
 
c) What are their beliefs or perceptions; 
 
d) What is the child’s perception of his/her action, and how does he/she justify it. 
 
7.4.12 Merits and/or Facts of the Case 
 
Although the onus rests on the prosecution to prove the criminal capacity of a child 
offender, there is no legal obligation to prove this prior to putting the charge or at any 
specific stage of the proceedings.  It is one of the elements necessary to be proved and 
needs only be proved prior to closure of the State’s case.  It is therefore possible to rely on 
the evidence presented on the merits for purposes of arguing that this element has, in fact, 
be proved (Meintjies 2001:B3-3). 
 
One of the important aspects that became clear during the course of this research is the 
fact, however, that the sooner the assessment of the criminal capacity of a child offender is 
conducted after the commission of the offence, the more reliable will the assessment be. 
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In many instances the facts of the case itself will prove criminal capacity.  Important 
aspects in this regard include: 
 
a) The age of the child at the time when the offence was committed; 
 
b) The nature of the offence.  In this regard it appears that if the offence is heinous, 
the criminal capacity of the child may be more apparent; 
 
c) The child’s actions before, during and after the commission of the offence; 
 
d) Whether the child acted alone or under coercion of older offenders; 
 
e) Motivation of the child when committing the offence (Meintjies 2001:B3-3). 
 
Although the facts and/or merits may be an indication of the child’s criminal capacity, it 
should not be assessed in isolation and all the circumstances of each case must be 
considered together. 
 
7.4.13 Illustration 
 
The Court could consider applying a simple test like the following (including all the relevant 
aspects in a question and answer and discussion format to accommodate the capacities of 
the child): 
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Table 14: Practical suggestions of questions∗ 
Question / Statement Testing / Measuring / 
Ascertaining 
Phase of 
development 
Note 
Are the clothes you are wearing 
yours? 
Concept of ownership Cognitive 
Language 
Ensure that the child attaches the same 
meaning to the concept. For example the 
child might not regard a costume as 
clothes. 
And the watch you have on? (or 
any other ornament the child is 
wearing)  Does it also belong to 
you? 
Make sure the concept of 
ownership is understood 
correctly. 
Cognitive 
Language 
Questions should refer to concrete 
objects/ornaments. Children between 7-11 
years of age can not think abstractly. 
If someone would take away 
your watch (ornament) and not 
ever give it back, would that be 
OK or not? 
 
Expecting an answer that 
demonstrates the child 
knows what is right or 
wrong. 
Psychological 
Language 
Caution should be taken not to ask too 
many hypothetical questions. Children 
between the ages of 7-11 years are 
typically not able to think hypothetically. 
Why do you say that it is OK / 
not OK? 
Expecting an answer that 
will demonstrate logical 
reasoning and insight 
based on the previous 
answers. 
Cognitive 
Psychological 
Language 
Keep in mind that children are extremely 
literal in their use of language and ensure 
that the same meaning is attached to the 
words. 
If it has happened, what do you 
think should happen to the 
person who took the 
watch/ornament? 
Expecting an answer 
referring to punishment – 
indicative of what happens 
to someone who does 
something wrong. 
Cognitive 
Language 
Psychological 
Social 
Caution should be taken not to ask too 
many hypothetical questions. Children 
between the ages of 7-11 years are 
typically not able to think hypothetically. 
If you yourself have the 
opportunity to take a 
watch/ornament that belongs to 
someone else and you know 
that no-one will know about it, 
would you still take it? 
Expecting an answer that 
will reveal the child can 
conduct himself/herself in 
accordance with his/her 
insight into what is right or 
wrong. 
Psychological 
Language 
Try to use short sentences and words 
familiar to the child to ensure that he/she 
understands what the question is. 
If some does take something 
that belongs to you and does 
not return it, how would you feel 
about it? 
Human emotions can be 
reduced to six: happy, 
surprise, fear, anger, 
disgust and sad.  The child 
may not be able to 
articulate his/her 
emotion(s) as such.  The 
Court will have to infer the 
reduction. 
Emotional 
Language 
The child’s emotional responses and the 
child’s expressions should be monitored 
throughout the process. 
Now let us take the situation 
where your best friend takes 
your watch/ornament and does 
not give it back.  It is called 
stealing. Right?  How would you 
feel about that? 
Expecting answers that will 
reveal consistency in 
arguments for what is right 
or wrong. 
Cognitive 
Language 
Social 
Try to use short sentences and words 
familiar to the child to ensure that he/she 
understands what the question is. 
In matters where a sexual offence has been committed by the child it is important to also ascertain the sexual development of the 
child, a transitional sentence would be appropriate at this point.  Something like the following could be used:  I also want to ask you 
about more sensitive matters.  Is that OK? I want to know what you think about sexual matters.  Can I ask you some questions about 
it?  Thank you. 
Can you explain to me: do you 
know what intercourse/sex is ? 
Expecting either a vague 
or a (very) technical and 
explicit answer. 
Cognitive 
Psychological 
Emotional 
Social 
Sexual 
Sexual behaviour between the ages 5-12 
years is usually very secretive in this 
phase of development.  Children under 
the age of 12-14 years rarely have a full 
adult understanding of the implications or 
consequences of sexual behaviour. 
When do you think is it OK for 
people to get involved with sex?  
Why do you say so? 
Expecting a simple yes or 
no answer. The 
explanation, if any, can be 
very vague or explicit. 
Sexual knowledge 
Social 
 
Children in puberty usually have an 
increased interest in sexual activity. 
Have you ever seen people 
‘doing sex’? 
Ascertaining watching of 
sexual activity 
Sexual knowledge Exposure to sexual encounters, directly or 
indirectly, is important.  
Should children be doing it? 
Why do you say so? 
Expecting a simple yes or 
no answer. The 
explanation might be a 
simple “I don’t know”. 
Sexual knowledge 
Cognitive 
Psychological 
Emotional 
The child may be uncomfortable in 
answering this question due to the 
secretiveness of sexual behaviour 
between the ages of 5-12 years.   
 
  
                                                
∗ This model was created by the researcher 
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7.5 Recommendations 
 
The practise in the Courts to call the parents or guardians of the child offender to testify on 
behalf of the State to prove the criminal capacity of the child is unacceptable and should 
be prohibited by including such a prohibition into the Child Justice Bill, 2002. It is also 
recommended that if a child pleads guilty to the charges put to him/her, an inquiry into 
his/her criminal capacity should be compulsory.  The Court must be satisfied that every 
element of the offence has been admitted.  If the child pleads guilty and no specific 
reference is made to the criminal capacity of the child in the statement in terms of section 
112(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977, one can argue that not all the elements 
of the offence have been acknowledged (Skelton 2006:1–5).  
 
The Government should prioritise the finalization and promulgation of the Child Justice Bill, 
2002 since the process has been dragging on since its introduction into Parliament in 
August 2002.  
 
 
It is recommended that the Child Justice Bill, 2002 be revised to specifically include factors 
such as physical, language, sexual, moral and culture as part of the evaluation of the 
criminal capacity of child offenders, before its passing in Parliament. However, it is 
furthermore submitted that the various developmental factors concerning children, to be 
taken into account, should not be a closed number.  Room and scope should be left open 
to cater for other factors that might be important in certain cases, to ensure that all the 
needs of all child offenders are be met, especially in our diverse country.   
 
Another important aspect that emerged from this research is the fact that the assessment 
of the criminal capacity of children should not and could not be approached, in isolation, 
from only a legal, psychological, social or criminological point of view.  A multi-disciplinary 
approached has to be followed to ensure that the best interest of the child is adequately 
protected and to ensure that justice is served in every matter involving a child. In view of 
this any attempt to develop an assessment tool from a criminological point of view only will 
be a futile exercise. The Child Justice Bill, 2002 should therefore reflect the fact that the 
criminal capacity of children should be approached from a multi-disciplinary point of view. 
To reserve this function to a specific profession will not only delay the assessment 
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process, but it will also prejudice the children in the criminal justice system as it might 
result in a situation where some of the developmental factors are over emphasized at the 
expense of other equally important factors due to the fact that the assessment is done 
from one point of view. In this regard criminologists, social workers, probation officers and 
psychologists can and must be trained and included in the assessment process. 
Preferably – in the best interest of the child – they should function as a multi-disciplinary 
team in the service of the Court. 
 
It is recommended that the Child Justice Bill, 2002 be revised and amended, to provide for 
a comprehensive evaluation of the child offender, as soon as possible after the 
commission of the offence. This evaluation should include all the necessary information 
and recommendations relating to the placement of the child, the prospects of diversion, the 
release of the child, criminal capacity of the child (including the cognitive, emotional, 
psychological, social, sexual, physical, language and moral development as well the 
cultural context of the child) and all the necessary background information (social 
circumstances, level of education, motive for the offence etc.) of the child. This report can 
always be extended after conviction to serve as a pre-sentence report and, if the child is 
diverted and does not comply with the conditions for diversion, and the criminal trial 
proceeds, the necessary evaluation on his/her criminal capacity would be available. This 
will not only minimize the trauma for the child offender, but it will definitely put all the role 
players in the criminal justice system, who has to take decisions on how to deal with a 
specific child offender, in a better position to act in the best interest of that child, and to 
make informed choices.  
 
It is suggested that a workshop should be held with all the different professionals involved 
with children in conflict with the law, to develop and issue a list of the important factors as 
well as the process of collecting information that should be taken into account, to serve as 
a guide to the Court and other professionals.  
 
It is furthermore suggested that the Child Justice Bill, 2002 should include a clear provision 
specifically prohibiting the application of the cautionary rules, by the Child Justice Court, in 
respect of child offenders, even if such an application is subconsciously. 
 
The proposed criminological model for the assessing of doli incapax should be refined 
through further research, which should include the different approaches by other 
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professionals in the field.  Its applicability in real cases should be thoroughly investigated.  
The development of an applicable assessment tool or scale to determine the presence or 
absence of the indicated issues could be developed as a standardized measuring 
instrument for the use of the Courts. 
 
7.6 Final remark 
 
The Courts are the upper guardian of the children in our country and a child’s best interest 
is of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. This is applicable 
whether the child is the victim or the perpetrator. The determination of the criminal capacity 
of children and the decision regarding it, is one of the life altering decisions our Courts 
have to make on a daily basis. It is therefore of the utmost importance that all the 
professionals involved with children in conflict with the law, in the criminal justice process, 
work together as a team, to place the Court in the best position it can be, to make this 
important decision in the best interest of the child.  
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ADDENDUM 
                                                                                                          P O Box 11720 
 ERASMUSKLOOF 
                                                                                                          0048 
 
                                                                                                          11 July 2005 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
 
 
Dear Prof / Dr / Adv / Mr / Mrs 
 
 
D LITT et PHIL RESEARCH: THE CRIMINAL CAPACITY OF CHILDREN 
 
I am a student at UNISA and are currently conducting empirical research as part of my D 
Litt et Phil Criminology degree.  I am employed by the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and serve as a Senior Legal Administration Officer in the 
Directorate: Law Enforcement. 
 
My dissertation deals with criminal capacity of children. I want to ascertain what the views 
of different professionals (lawyers, psychologists, social workers, criminologists and police 
officials) are about the criminal capacity of children. 
 
A questionnaire with 11 questions is listed hereunder.  It will be appreciated if you could 
share your views on the issue of criminal capacity with me to enable me to incorporate the 
different professions’ views into my theses.   
 
Please save the questionnaire, complete it and, sent same back to cbadenhorst@ 
justice.gov.za.   
 
Your kind assistance in this regard will be highly appreciated. 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
 
 
______________________ ______________________ 
Charmain Badenhorst Prof H Conradie 
Student Supervisor: UNISA 
083 278 2299 (012) 429 6680/6003 
(012) 315 1529 (w) 082 795 2463
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QUESTIONNAIRE: 
 
CRIMINAL CAPACITY OF THE CHILD OFFENDER 
 
 
1. In terms of South African common law presumptions, children under the age of 7 
years are doli incapax and can therefore not be prosecuted.  Children between the 
ages of 7 years and 14 years are rebuttably presumed to be doli incapax and if any 
such child is to be prosecuted, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable 
doubt that the child had the required criminal capacity at the time of committing the 
offence. 
 
(a) The minimum age indicated above under which prosecution cannot be conducted is 
too low.  Please give your comment. 
Comment: 
 
 
 
(b) Criminal capacity should be linked to a specific chronological age.  Please give your 
comment. 
Comment: 
 
 
 
(c) All child offenders under 18 years should be assessed and evaluated to ascertain 
their criminal capacity.  Please give your comment. 
Comment: 
 
 
 
(d) Enough is being done in our legal system to ensure that all child offenders between 
the ages of 7 years and 14 years have the necessary criminal capacity before they 
are prosecuted.  Please give your comment. 
Comment: 
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2. In all Australian jurisdictions the statutory minimum of criminal capacity is 10 years.  
Between the ages of 10 and 14 years, a rebuttable presumption operates to deem a 
child between these ages incapable of committing a criminal act.  Only if the 
prosecution can rebut this presumption, by showing that the accused child was 
able, at the relevant time, adequately to distinguish between right and wrong, can a 
contested trial result in a conviction.  In the United Kingdom this rebuttable 
presumption was abolished in 1998 and this has the effect that children between 
the ages of 10 and 13 years are treated in the same way as juveniles aged between 
14 and 17 years.  In Hong Kong in 2003, the minimum age of criminal capacity has 
been raised to 10 years of age, and the rebuttable presumption of doli incapax 
continue to apply to children on 10 years and below 14 years of age. 
 
(a) In your opinion which one of these countries offers the best protection to child 
offenders with reference to the establishment of criminal capacity, and why do you 
say so? 
Comment: 
 
 
3. The Child Justice Bill, 49 of 2002, was introduced into Parliament in August 2002.  
Deliberations on the Bill by the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional 
Development followed in March 2003.  In terms of the proposed provisions of the 
Child Justice Bill, 2002, the minimum age of criminal capacity is raised to 10 years 
and the rebuttable presumption of doli incapax applies to children between the ages 
of 10 and below 14 years.  If the criminal trial of a child offender between the ages 
of 10 years and below 14 years proceeds, the prosecutor or the child’s legal 
representative may request the Child Justice Court to order an evaluation of the 
child to establish criminal capacity. 
 
(a) These provisions will adequately protect child offenders.  Give your comments on 
this statement please. 
Comment: 
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(b) The evaluation of the child should be done before he/she appears in the Child 
Justice Court.  Give your comment, please. 
Comment: 
 
 
 
4. If the Child Justice Court ordered an evaluation of the child, the Child Justice Bill, 
2002 provides that the evaluation must include an assessment of the cognitive, 
emotional, psychological and social development of the child. 
 
(a) These factors are adequate to establish the criminal capacity of the child. Please 
give your comment. 
Comment: 
 
 
(b) Factors like psychical, language, sexual (where applicable in sexual offences) and 
moral development should be specifically included in the assessment of the 
(alleged) child offender.  Give your comment, please. 
Comment: 
 
 
 
5. Criminal capacity can be proved and decided upon by taking the facts of the case, 
surrounding circumstances before and after commission of the offence, nature of 
the offence and the conduct of the child before and after the commission of the 
offence into consideration. 
 
 
(a) Please give your comment on this statement. 
Comment: 
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(b) An evaluation of the child offender immediately after the commission of the offence 
should be compulsory.  Your comments, please. 
Comment: 
 
 
 
Thank you for your participation 
 
 
